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A BST RAC T
The aim of the thesis is three fold: a-To develop a new
questionnaire that measures anxiety in terms of four components
(feeling, cognitive, behavior and somatic). b-To investigate the
relationship between feeling and cognition with regard to anxiety. c-
To identify, with the application of Three Systems Theory, the most
salient component of anxiety in each of the DSM-III anxiety disorder
sub-classifcations and to evaluate the validity of DSM-III anxiety
disorder sub-classifications.
a-In order to assess the level of anxiety, I have developed a new
Four Systems An>:iety Questionnaire (FSAQ). FSAQ incorporates a feeling
component along with the behavioral, somatic and cognitive components.
A psychometric evaluation (reliability and validity levels) of the
questionnaire was found to be satisfactory.
b-Another aim is to reconsider one of the tenets of cognitive
therapy that cognitive appraisals are the necessary preconditions for
the emergence of feeling. Such a view assumes that feeling is merely an
epiphenomenon of cognitive processes. This research establishes,
however, that feeling and cognition appear to be relatively independent
systems and that their modes of interaction are influenced by the
personality structure of the individual. This conclusion was obtained
by using the FSAQ on university stUdents and various categories of
anxiety patients. In particular, the research compared the scores on
the feeling and cognitive components of both males and females,
obsessive-compulsives and rest of the DSM-III anxiety patients.
c- A further aim of the reseach was to examine the DSM-III anxiety
disorders classification from the Three Systems Theory?s point of view.
The Three Systems Theory proposes that anxiety has three relatively
independent components: cognitive, behavioral and somatic. In the
various anxiety sub-classifications of OSM-III one or other of these
three components dominates. The other purpose of my research was to
consider each of the OSM-III anxiety disorders separately and to
determine which of the three components plays the major role in the
manifestation of the particular syndrome.
In general, the results indicate that each anxiety disorder is
indeed characterised by a different profile. An anticipated outcome of
this research is that a clinician will be able to identify the main
component of anxiety in a particular syndrome and hence select most
appropriate treatment.
The results of this study support OSM-III classification of
anxiety disorders into two main categories of phobic and non-phobic
(i.e. phobic and anxiety states).
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I N T ROD U C TID N
Anxiety is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Barlow (1985) estimated that
30 to 40_% of the general population had an anxiety problem sometime in
their lives. Five to 10 % of the general population (Sheehan~ 1978) in
America suffer from various anxiety problems. Sheehan (1978) wrote
that approximately 10 to 15 percent of all patients seen in general
medical practice in America were anxious~ hypochondriacal, hysterical~
obsessive or fearful. In Britain in 1978 over 25 million benzodiazepine
(the most commonly used anti-anxiety drug) presciptions were dispensed
(Inst. for the study of drug dependence, 1982).
Because of the prevalence of anxiety a number of clinical
psychologists and psychiatrists have turned their attention t6 various
anxiety related problems with the purpose of finding the most effective
treatment for anxiety. One such attempt came from Lang in 1971.
Extrapolating from this work Rachman and Hodgson (1974) proposed the
Three Systems Theory, according to which anxiety comprises three
loosely coupled components: verbal (cognitive), motoric (behavioral)
and physiological (somatic). Furthermore, the three components are
capable of relatively independent functioning. This approach regards
affect (feeling) as a part of the cognitive component.
The focus of the present study is threefold:
A- An investigation of the relationship between ~ognitions and
affect (feelings)~ with reference to anxiety.
8- Within the framework of the Three Systems Theory, an
investigation of the most salient component of anxiety in each anxiety
, .
disorder sub-category of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual Third
Edition (DSM-III). Also, an evaluation of the validity of anxiety
disorders classification in DSM-III.
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c- The development of a new anxiety questionnaire.
The first aim is to investigate the relationship between cognition
and affect (feeling) in am:iety. The nature of this rela~ionship is not
clear as indicated from the ongoing controversy in current literature
(Hollandsworth, 1986). In this study it will be argued that for
clinical purposes, at least, affect should not be considered as an
epiphenomenon within the domain of cognitions. Affect and cognition
should be re~arded as interacting but relatively independent
components.
The positing of a fourth component (affect) suggests a need for Cl
revison of the Three Systems Theory and the assumptions of cognitive
therapy. It also implies the need for the development of a new
questionnaire which measures anxiety in terms of four components.
The inquiry into the relationship between affect and cognitions,
may in the first instance be conceived as relating to psychology in
general. However, it has strong implications for clinical psychology
in terms of the selection of the most appropriate treatment package for
patients with anxiety problems.
The second aim of this study is to identify the most salient
component of anxiety in each of the anxiety disorder sub-categories in
DSM-III using Three Systems Theory, and to examine the validity of
these anxiety disorder sub-categories. The investigation of the
manifestation of anxiety disorders from the Three Systems Theory
point of view, has direct relevance to clinical psychology, as it is
,
used in the assessment, classification and treatment of anxiety
disorders.
I will proceed by examining the main ~pproaches to anxiety in
psychology and the Three Systems Theory perspective. Then, I will
discuss whether affect should be treated as separate from cognition.
Finally, I will present background information about features of"
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DSM-III, together with a discussion of DSM-III anxiety disorders
classification from the framework of the Three Systems Theory.
1. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ANXIETY
This section forms the most comprehensive part of the introduction
chapter. It includes different approaches to the concept of anxiety
from four main schools of·psychology i.e. psychoanalytical,
physiological, behavioral and cognitive. The purpose of such
presentation is to outline the theoretical approaches of each school to
anXiety, and to illustrate the most salient component of anxiety in
each approach. Finally, a critical evaluation of the Three Systems
Theory will be presented.
1.1. PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH
All analytical theories regard an>:iety as central. For this
reason, before explaining anxiety in Freudian terms, the presentation
of the analytical theory in general will help the understanding of
anxiety within this theory.
Some authors (Prochaska, 1984; Fisher, 1970) state that Freudian
theory can be viewed from six different perspectives i.e. dynamic,
economic, topographic, structural, genetic and adaptive. Nevertheless,
approaching the theory using only the first five perspectives was
thought to be more convenient since the sixth perspsective i.e.
adaptive, which explains inborn preparedness of the individual to
interact with ongoing activities in the environment (Prochaska 1984),
was not originally put forward by Freud but was later developed by
Hartmann (1958).
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1.1.1. The Dynamic View
The analytical theory explains mental phenomena as continuously
interacting, struggling forces. The primary elements that bring about
this interaction are named as instincts, drives, which are continuously
t
in motion. These are directly experienced as an urging-energy, pressing
for immediate action. As Fenichel (1945) said "They (insticts) have a
provocative character" (p.ll). Those instincts impel the organism to
direct action. The regulating rule of those drives is called the
pleasure principle. Any kind of excitation is felt as unpleasure by the
organism, and the aim of the instinct is to reduce the level of
excitation, and such process of decreasing the excitation level is
experienced as pleasure. Although the instincts are the sole motivating
agency in the organism, they have a conservative character (Freud,
1932) The aim of the instinct is to sustain the level of home6statis
and to bring the organism back to this equilibrium level whenever the
level of excitation increases.
The aim of instincts is to lower the level of excitation by
discharge of tension that has been created by internal and external
exciting stimuli. The insticts are not always successful in carrying
out this action. The coun~er forces oppose and conflict, and this
struggle constitutes the basis of mental phenomena that last until the
death of the organism. The governing rule of the forces that are
striving for discharge is what Freud calls the ~lg~§~[g~[iQ£i~l§.,
while the counter forces that oppose such an immediate discharge are
regulated by what he calls the [§.~lii~ CiQ£i~lg.As Fenichel (1945)
stated "Impulses toward action are representative of primary
biological tendencies, the opposite impuls~s (counter forces) are
brought into the organism by influences from outside" (p.12). At birth
an infant is endo~ed with instincts only, but within a short period of
time the newborn realizes that it is not possible to gratify
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immediately all of his own drives, later he realizes that attempts for
immediate satisfaction o·fhis impulses may even bring punishment from
the environment. From the dynamic point of view, the whole theory of
personality is based on the struggle betwee~ impulses that are striving
for immediate gratification and counter forces that are trying to avoid
such gratification or at least trying to postpone them until the
gratification of such impulses will be in harmony with the demands of
the external situation.
Freud divided instincts into two categories, the sex instinct
(eros) and the death instinct (thanatos). Mental energy that is derived
from eros is called libido. It is the energy which represents the
sexual instinct in the psyche. The prime object of the libido is sexual
unification but in the course of mental development the original object
is deflected into self-love, friendship and love of humanity. The
mental representative of thanatos is not named by Freud but Arndt
(1974) suggested the name "mortido" to refer to the representative
force of thanatos. The behavioral manifestations of Mortido are acts of
hostility, aggression and destructiveness.
When these two forces, libido and mortido, become attached to
objects it gives rise to what is called cathexis. Cathexis refers to
the accumulation or concentration of either of these two mental forces
in a particular place or channel. In the psychosexual development of a
child, libido first gets cathected to the mouth, second anal and third
phallic areas of the body. Thus, sexual pleasure can be obtained by
stimUlation of these places of the body. For a healthy psychological
development of a child, libido must past through these three cathexis
sites of the body, reaching the genital stage in the end (these
developmental stages will be explained in the genetic view). But this
process can be halted so that a disproportionate amount of libido
becomes firmly. cathected to one of the above mentioned three C1.reasof
the body. This stopping of a portion of libido at a particular level
of development is termed fi~~t!QQ(Arndt 1974).
As causes of fixation Fenichel (1945) referred to two factors:
A- The constitutional structure of an organism
B- Experiences during the stages of psychosexual development.
By constitutional structure of organism, he meant the amount of
psychic energy available at birth, and the relative sensitiveness of
the three parts of the body. All these are related to physiology and
biology rather than psychology. Therefore the second factor will be
stressed.
Psychoanalysis deals mainly with experiences that lead to the
emergence of fixations. Again two events can be named, excessive
satisfaction or excessive frustration. In the case of excessive
satisfaction the stage at which this over-gratification occurrs_ is
renounced only with reluctance (Fenichel 1945). The organism will
always have a tendency to go back to this stage whenever it is
confronted even with a small difficulty. In the case of excessive
frustration the organism refuses to proceed because of the low level of
satisfaction at that level of development. In both situations the level
of strength of the instincts that are trying to attain immediate
gratification will be high, so the organism must employ its counter
instinctual forces to keep those impulses in harmony with the demands
of reality.
As Fenichel put it "When tendencies to discharge and tendencies to
inhibit are equally strong, there is e>:ternally no evidence of activity
but energy is consumed in an internal hidden struggle. Clinically this
is manifested by the fact that the individual subject to such conflicts
shows fatigue and exhaustion with no perceptive work" (1945, p.14).
Because the amount of energy that an individual employs for his psychic
life is limited in quantity, the greater the amount spent in internal
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conflicts the less is left for external events. This brings the topic
to mental economics.
1.1.2. The Economic View:
The economic view states that the quantity of energy available for
the organism to function is limited. The greater the amount of energy
is spent for internal struggle between instinctual forces and
counter-instinctual forces~ the less is left for other activities. An
individual tries to save as much energy as possible so that he can
utilize this unused energy to develop himself. The economy principle
also means the repetition of suitable behavioral patterns which thereby
become automatic~ and need little effort to execute them. The organism
tends to perform the functions necessary for the maintenance of
equilibrium with the minimum expenditure of energy; this is called the
princip~e of economy (inertia-principle) (Alexander~ 1963). The
principle of inertia (economy) impels the organism to cling to earlier
automatic behavior which was satisfactory in the past but which is no
longer appropriate for existing conditions. This returning back to the
earlier pattern of behaving is more pr~bable if the individual has very
little energy to deal with the·current problems. The initial amount of
energy is partly determined by the individual's constitution~ and
partly by the individual's mental economics. What is meant by mental
economics is the struggle between instinctual forces and counter
instinctual forces~ which aims to postpone the gratification of drives
or tries to inhibit (repress) them totally.
If, then~ the amount of energy cathected to the instinctual drives
is high, counter instinctual forces will have to exert a greater amount
of force to stop the instinctual drives. This means that a
disproportionately greater amount of an individual's energy is being
spent for inter~al conflicts~ leaving little to be spent for daily
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life. Hence, there is a negative correlation between the amount of
repression that an individual employs and the quantity of the energy
that is left for other activities of the individual. As evidence for
such a claim Fenichel (1945) presents the fact that neuroses
frequently break out at puberty. Before puberty the person affected
is able to withstand a certain amount of undischarged instinctual
energy, however, at puberty biological and psychological changes
demanded more energy. Counter forces are not sufficient because part of
the energy which is employed by counter instinctual forces to repress
the inctinctual demands pressing for gratification is taken away to be
spent for psychological and biological development.
It is often mentioned in this section that personality was seen as
an interaction between instinctual forces and counter instinctual
forces, but the most interesting point Freud brought into discussion is
that an individual is almost totally unaware of this struggle which
takes place in a very deep layer of his personality.
1.1.3. The Topographic View
Freud divided mental processes into three areas: conscious,
pre-conscious and unconscious. 'He also added that this three-fold
diViSion is neither absolute nor permanent. What is preconscious
becomes conscious without any assistance or Io'Jhatis unconscious may
become conscious through analytical work (1940).
Consciousness was the area of mental process that Freud dealt
least with. He referred to consciousness as the most surface layer of
personality, and as being made up of'broken lines~ Because what is
conscious is conscious only for a moment, it may not be conscious the
next moment (1940). He believed that consciousnes was a transitory
mental state.
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The pre-conscious occupies the place beneath consciousness~ and
is that part of mental life that has the capacity for becoming
conscious without the definite release of repression (Arndt, 1974). The
Pre-conscious consists of \o'lhatwere earlier conscious ideas and
memories "'lhichcan, \ljith relative ease~ become conscious again.
The unconscious is one of the most important contributions of
psychoanalysis to psychology. This part of the mental processes was
given the primary role as the determinant of behavior in Freudian
theory.
Unconsci ous pl'""ocesseshave total Iy different char acted stics from
conscious processes. Some important characteristics are:
A- No varying degrees of certainty in unconscious. Each event is
held to be as certain as the other. In consciousness (everyday life
thinking process) the degrees of certainty are vital and are a very
often employed dimension along which we arrange our ideas.
B- (,IJishesin the unconsc icus ewe free from mutual contradiction.
Two contrary wishes may be active at the same time and rather than
cancelling each other out~ they combine to form an intermediate wish as
a compromise.
c- Perhaps the most import~nt peculiarity of the unconscious is
that processes taking place in this system are timeless. Early
(childhood) unconscious experiences are not past events in the
unconscious but they exist in their original freshness in the present.
What is unconscious is always immediate even though it may have entered
the system a long time ago. So the orderly sequence of events is not
the characteristic of unconscious processes~ since in conscious life
orderly means that one event precedes another (Arndt~ 1974).
D- Unconscious processes are governed by the pleasure principle so
reality has no meaning for them.
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The analytical view of personality is a dynamic one that proposes
continuou~struggle between instinctual and counter instinctual forces,
and most of this struggle is unconscious. But nothing has been said
about how such a struggle occurs and through what kind of means.
1.1.4. The Structural View
Structurally, personality is divided up into three parts in
psychoanalysis. At birth a newborn's psychological structure is
-dominated by t~e id which is the seat of all instinctual drives and
wishes. Instinctual forces (libido and mortido) arise from the id. The
pleasure principle is the only rule that governs the id. An infant
directed by the id is a completely unsocial organism. He has very
little contact with reality. Freud referred to the id as a chaos, -that
part of the personality which is filled with energy reaching it from
the instincts, which aims only to bring about the satisfaction of
instinctual need subject to the observance of the pleasure principle
(1932). ~lhat has been said for unconscious processes also applies to
the id far it occuppies the great part of the unconscious. The id knows
no judgement of value, no good or evil, and no morality. Instinctual
.-
farces striving far discharge (cathexis) are the sale element of the id
(Freud, 1932). In the very beginning of an infant's psychological
development the id rules completely, and the mental life consists of
promptings and excitations. The infant finds those excitations
disturbing and tries to reduce this displeasure by motor activity. Just
after birth_ the infant is exposed to various kinds of frustrations. The
infant realizes that his id's wishes cannot be satisfied immediately.
He has to wait same time before the wishes of the id are gratified.
This contact with reality, the failure of the real world to
provide immediate gratification causes a structural change in the
baby's mind: the d~velopment of the ega.
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The development of the ego is also caused by the fact that the id,
governed by the pleasure principle is not able to bring desired
satisfaction to the organism. The pleasure principle does not apply to
the ego, which has its own governing rule, the reality principle. The
ego's primary task is self preservation therefore each step that it
takes must be in harmony with the demands of reality.
The point worth noting is that, the principle that regulates the
ego -the reality principle- does not contradict the pleasure
principle. The reality principle attempts to satisfy the instincts, by
taking into consideration the external situation. The reality principle
differs from the pleasure principle in one point and that is, the
impulses of the id that are striving for satisfaction must wait for the
appropriate moment rather than achieving immediate gratification
(Arndt, 1974).
When the e>:ternal and internal tasks of the ego ar-ecombined, it
can be said that the ego per-forms the task of mediating between the
external wDr-ld and the id. It accomplishes this task using such means
as attention, perception, the control of motor activity, and defence
mechanisms. As the infant matures, the ego star-ts to employ another
function that aids the ego in its task; namely, thought. In this w~y
the ego becomes mor-e ~ble to exert control over the pleasure principle
(the primary process) and substitute for it the reality principle (the
secondary process).
All these functions of the ego are named as the secondary process
as they opposse the primarY.process which controls the activities of
the id. The secondary process functioning include~those processes
which we are aware of and that are applied in ~veryday life. The ego
develops secondary process to function better as a mediator between the
demands of the id and requirements of the external reality. Again, the
ego's aim is to satisfy the id's impulses in a way that ~he
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gratification of the id's impulses is in harmony with the demands of
the environment. As Freud put it "All the functions of the ego are
performed in the service of the id" (1932, p.l09).
The ego consults its defense mechanisms (especially repression)
when it feels the threat of being dominated by the demands of the id.
This is also the moment at which an individual feels anxiety. Freud
referred to neurotic anxiety as a signal to the ego that unwanted
instinctual impulses are approaching the consciousness. These
instinctual forces must be suppressed, stopped or rendered powerless
(Freud, 1932). Repression is that mechanism by which those undesired
instinctual impulses are pushed back into the unconscious again. But to
keep all these instinctual impulses down by the process of repression
is a very energy consuming business; as it was stated before, the more
energy is spent for internal struggles, the less is left for the other
activities of the individual.
But the ego's task is not limited to the id and problems of the
external world. Between the ages 4- 7 new structural energy is being
formed in the personality, the super-ego which is the internalized
(introjected) voice of the same-sex parent, which continually asks the
ego to stick to its principles. In fact, through the super-ego all
societal rules are passed to the child. The super-ego can roughly be'
equated with conscience. It is that part of mental life that deals with
moral standards, rights or wrongs (Klein, 1984). This agency is also
mainly unconscious. The appearance of the super-ego brings an
additional burden to the operations of the ego. So the ego has to serve
three masters, the id (the seat of unconscious instincts, sexual ~nd
destructive), the super-ego (home of morality), and external reality.
So in order that it can enjoy a healthy life, the ego has the very
difficult task of achieving a compromise between the demands of these
three masters. As Freud said "The ego, driven by the id, confined by
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the super-ego, repulsed by the reality, struggles to master its
economic task of bringing about harmony among the forces and
influences working in and upon it; and we can understand how it is that
so often we cannot suppress a cry: !ii! !!QQl !!§~" (1932, p.l11).
In the developmental process of a child there are certain stages
at which the immature ego is very liable to be afflicted.
1.1.5. The Genetic (Developmental) View
One of the most shocking statements of Freud was the claim that
sexual life did not begin at puberty but was manifested as early as
birth. He also made a distinction between sexual and genital,
postulating that the former is a wider concept and includes many
activities that have nothing to do with genitals. Sexual life, he said
"includes the function of obtaining pleasure from zones of the body -
oral, anal and phallic - a function which is subsequently brought into
the service of reproduction" and he added that "the two functions often
fail to coincide" (1940, p.lO). He referred to an infant as a
"pol~morphous pervert", since the excitation of certain parts, which
are determined by the age of the child, gives him sexual pleasure.
Thus, for Freud the stages of psychological development are sexual
stages and are determined primarily by the unfolding of sexuality in
the-oral, anal, and phallic phases. Freud added one more stage; the
genital. This stage is nothing more than the reflection of the three
important stages in the formation of personality during the period of
puberty. Freud also inserted the period of latency between the three
pre-genital stages and the genital stage, during which all psychosexual
activity of the child subsides temporarily until the beginning of the
genital stage. The period of latency corresponds to primary school
years.
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The first three stages which cover the first five or six years of
an infant's life are important because during these years the origins
of the personality are established. The interaction between the child
and his environment (i.e. significant others) in each of these stages
is crucial in determining the variety of traits and types of characters
that an individual attains in adulthood. Each stage of psychosexual
development is determined by the concentration of sexual energy
(libido) in certain parts of the body. At each stage either
over-gratifiacation or frustration of the libido causes fixation at one
of these developmental stages. When such a fixation of the libido's
energy occurs it causes disturbances in the adult's psychological and
se~ual life which may lead to psychological symptoms and perversions.
Nobody has a faultless psycho-sexual development, some kinds of
fixations are always present.
The determining factor, whether an adult will have a healthy
personality and sexual life is based on quantitative relations (Freud,
1940). Freud comprehended the difference between neurotic and healthy
in terms of quantity rather than quality_ This was the conclusion that
compelled Freud ~o s~ate th~~ ~v~rv individual was neurotic to a
certain extent.
1.1.6. Implications for Anxiety
I have, up to now, presented a general sketch of Freudian theory·
From now on I will outline the conceptualization of anxiety from these
five different perspectives.
Freud referred to anxiety as an "affective state, it is the
reproduction of an old ~vent which brought a threat of danger. Anxiety
serves the purpose of self-preservation and is a signal of a new
danger" (1932, p.118). The analytic approach differentiates three types
of anxiety.
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Realistic anxiety (fear): It is a reaction to a danger that
exists in external world. Such an anxiety is connEcted to the flight
reflex. Freud regarded it as a manifestation of the self-preservative
instinct (1932).
Neurotic anxiety (includ~s free floating~ panic~ phobic etc.):
This is a signal of the ego indicating that the unconscious demands of
the id are ~pproaching consciousness and threatening the protective
wall of the ego.
Moral anxiety (super-ego anxiety~ guilt): Individuals having a
harsh super-ego are inclined to experience intense-guilt feelings when
they do something or think about something that opposes the moral norms
of their society.
For the purpose of this research, neurotic anxiety will be
elaborated, for it is the source of problematic an>:iety mostly
encountered in clinical practice.
According to the dynamic perspective, anxiety takes place between
instinctual and counter instinctual forces. This means economically
that a great amount of energy is expended on this struggle. The
implications of neurotic anxiety are seen in all its aspects from the
structural view. Freud (1932) thought that the ego was the sole seat of
the anxiety, that the ego alone can produce anxiety. Anxiety is felt by
an individual whenever the ego realizes that it can no longer keep the
instinctual forces of the id under control. The 'ego however, has
certain devices -defense mechanisms- through which it can control the
id. RepreSSion is the most often employed defence and it is intimately
related to anxiety. The process of repr~ssion pushes the threatening id
impulses back into the unconscious, thus preventing their becoming
conscious. When the libido (~sychic energy) is deflected from the
normal channel of flow during the period of psychosexual development,
it prevents the infant's psychic energy from appropriately discharging
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during the oral, anal or the phallic phases. This results in the unused
energy being pushed into the unconscious in the early years of the
infant. Because the repressed instincts are continuously striving for
discharge and because the unconscious is timeless, the repressed
material continually strives for discharge. The ego (counter
instinctual force) attempts to stop this gratification. The more often
the individual uses repression, the greater the amount of material
pushed back into the unconscious and the greater the force of the
material in the unconscious striving for gratification. Eventually, the
individual experiences anxiety whenever the ego is threatened to be
overwhelmed by the forces of the id. Therefore, a great amount of his
psychic energy will be necessary to control this internal struggle.
Freud stressed the primacy of affect, in this whole process,
claiming that the first time the ego felt anxious over certain events,
it employed the mechanism of repression to overcone this distasteful
feeling (importance of affect will be elaborated in the chapter
entitled Feelings and Cognitions).
There are instances, however, in which even though the ego employs
repression, it may not be able to control the instinctual energy or
the id. Under such circumstances the ego resorts to a symptom formation
process. For example, in an hypothetic~l case where repressed
homosexual wishes strive for gratification, the ego feels helpless. Its
measures are rendered ineffective by the strength of these repressed
wishes. Whenever a situation triggers such a latent homosexual wish,
the person experiences a paniC attack, i.e. the ego paniCS because it
cannot hold the drives of the id under control. The poor ego, left in a
very difficult situation, has two alternatives. Either it can let
homosexual wishes go i.e. become an overt homosexual, ot resort to
symptom formation which is a compromise between impulses of the id,
demands of external world, and commands of the super-ego.
- 16 -
The first path is very unlikely to be taken by this person since
those wishes are already in the unconscious which means that the ego,
taking commands from the super-ego and the external world, is strictly
forbidding their gratification.
The second alternative is symptom formation. Hence the ego
deceives itself into believing that the anxiety is caused by, for
instance, being in crowded streets. As a result, that person could
develop agoraphobia. In doing so, the ego substitudes a different
problem (agoraphobia) more acceptable than homosexual wishes.
Furthermore, this phobia prevents the person from entering into
situations where those homosexual impulses are likely to be stimulated
and thereby causing panic anxiety attacks. This process is termed
"displacement". The most important feature of displacement is the
removal of the source of anxiety from within one's own personality
(seated in the unconscious) and the attribution of it to something else
(object, situation etc.) that lies outside the person. It is always
possible to escape from something external whereas there is no escape
from a threat coming from within (Freud, 1932).
Obsessive-compulsive disorders are referred to by Freud (Arndt,
1974) as another example highlighting the relationship between symptom
formation and anxiety. If an obsessive p~rson is prohibited from
engaging in compulsive acts (rituals), he suffers from acute anxiety
attacks. Such cases seem to illustrate the validity of the Freudian
explanation of symptom formation as devices to deal with unmastered
drives. Freud asserted (1940) that symptoms of-neuroses are either a
substitute satisfaction of some sexual urge or a measure to prevent
such a gratification. As a rule however, they are a compromise between
the two. Whenever there is a problem of anxiety, it means ~hat
unconscious id drives, repressed mainly during the period of
psychosexual development, are striving for satisfaction.
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Before concluding the explanation of anxiety from an analytical
point of view, it is crucial for the aim of this reasarch, to stress
the importance of feelings (affects) in the formation of anxiety.
Recall that anxiety is the fear that repressed material is about to
dominate the ego. Repression is caused whenever the ego is desperate to
deal with the impulses of the id. Further, such a state is experienced
by the ego as disturbing, panicking and terrifying, in other words, a
state of unpleasure. Thus, feelings have a primary role in the
development of repression, which in turn determines the outcome of the
pyschosexual stages, the personality make up and the occurrance of
neurotic symptoms. So, the centrality of feelings in analytic theory is
obvious, accordingly they are the first target of analytic treatment.
Freud (1932) thought that the instincts, innate impulses which are
mainly uncounscious and derive their energy from the id, manifest
themselves as feelings.
1.1.7. Summary
The aim of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is to make those
problematic wishes and feelings conscious, to bring harmony between of
the id, the ego and the super-ego (neurotic problems also mean that
these are not working in harmony, rather;" conflicts are dominating
their relationships t6 each other). Perhaps here lies the most
important contradiction between analytic therapy and cognitive therapy.
The Freudian approach, in contrast to cognitive therapy, stresses that
feelings rather than cognitions are the primary cause of neurotic
anxiety. This conclusion can be traced back to the origin of neurotic
anxiety. Recall that in Freudian th~ory, the occurrance of neurotic
anxiety is tied to the excessive amount of repressed material. The ego
chooses the way of repression when it realizes that the FEELING of
unpleasure, that has been caused by unconscious id impulses, is about
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to dominate the personality. Recall also that in the dynamic
exlpanation of Freudian theory, the pleasure principle was introduced
to be the basic rule of psychic life (Freud, 1932). All these
conditions bring the discussion to the conclusion that, for Freudian
theory feelings play the determining function in the formation of
personality and psychological problems.
Cognitive therapists argue that a change in cognitions will bring
about a change in emotions and feelings; and neurotic problems lurk in
the cognitive structures of individuals. But if the basic rule is the
pleasure principle and repression is caused by feeling of unbearable
unpleasure and excessive repressed material is leading to the neurotic
anxiety, then the faulty cognitive structures of an anxiety patient
must have been determined by early affective crises. To be explicit: a
person has distorted cognitive structures, because he has accumulated
such a great deal of unconscious material that he begins to perceive
even innocuous situations as dangerous, even very trivial stimuli are
able to trigger the repressed material (again, this condition is
experienced as unpleasurable feeling) which is waiting for an
opportunity to gratify its impulses (unconscious id drives).
Sandberg, Taplin and Taylor (1983) point out the difference
between cognitive and analytic approaches by stating that
"Psychodynamic thi.nkers view emotions as the major psychological issue
and thinking as a secondary process. Cognitivists, not suprisingly,
tend to believe that emotions follow thought" (p.280).
So all these results bring the discussion lo the same point again,
in analytic therapy, feelings rather than cognitions are considered as
the most important component causin_g the problem and therefore they
should be changed first. It is also important to keep in mind that the
cognitive structures of a child do not develop out of nothing but are
formed by excitations and relaxations (these are experienced by the
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organism as feelings) that he has experienced since birth (Fenichel,
1945).
1.2. PHYSIOLOGICAL APPROACH
In the physiologital tradition, emotions are conceptualized as
physical and quantitative phenomena. This approach also stressess the
importance of environmental stimuli, but primary importance is
attributed to the activity of particular areas of the central nervous
system and changes in the levels of certain hormones in the formation
of anxiety. Fisher (1970) stated that the aim of physiological
psychologi$ts was to clarify the correlations between external
stimulation, certain physiological processes and affective experience.
1.2.1. Review of Theories
The 1950s witnessed an increasing interest in an area of the brain
called the reticular formation, which was thought to be an important
determinant of emotional experience. Direct electrical stimulation of
specific reticular areas immediately awakens the experimental animal
such as cats and rats, because of this peculiarity it is called the
reticular activating system (RAS) (Levitt, 1968).
The first theory to show the importance of the RAS came from
Lindsley (1951). He proposed that the RAS is closely related to the
level of cortical functioning, and that the greater the level of
cortical activity, the greater the emotional arousal (Fisher, 1970).
Malmo (1957) who adapted a similar approach to Lindsley's activation
theory argued that, the cerebral cortex and the reticular system are
involved in a reciprocal feed-back loops to maintain an optimal
stimulation level. Sensations arriving at the cortex are continuously
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sent back to the F:AG. liJhenthe frequency of impulses becomes too great,
the RAS plays a regulating function, sending inhibitory impulses back
to the cortex, thereby damping its activity. When stimulation from the
external world is low, the sensations arriving at the RAS via the
cortex is not optimal, the RAG therefore sends activity ptovoking
impulses to the cortex. It appears that the RAS and the cortex have a
reciprocal activity towards each other (Levitt, 1968). Basing his
argument on these assumptions Malmo (1957) claimed that the experience
of anxiety is a result of a weakening of the inhibitory ~spect of the
RAS. Such weakening results in too many facilitative impulses being
discharged to the cortex leading to a level of arousal which exceeds
the optimal. If the cortex cannot handle this excessive level of
arousal, the experience of anxiety occurs. Fisher (1970) drew attention
to the similarity between Malmo's theory and Freudian theory of
anxiety. According to the latter, anxiety is experienced when the ego
is overwhelmed by the stimulation coming from the id.
In 1960's the attention in psychophysiology moved to endocrinology
and hormones. It was adrenal and pituitary glands that attracted most
interest because both appeared to be involved in emotional arousal.
Research on endocrinology of anxiety can be divided into two
seperate kinds:
21- Those that aim to differentiate emotions according to the
activation of certain hormones.
b- Those that attempt to show that regardless of the nature of
emotion, physiological and hormonal activation will be the same. That
is, the type of emotion is determined by the type of interpretation of
a given situation (cognitive structures) (Theory of General Arousal)
(Levitt, 1968).
Those psychologists who advocate the first approach (Ax, 1953;
Breggin, 1964) attempted to assess specific hormonal changes related to
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anxiety and anger. Their research was mainly concerned with the impact
of adrenalin/nor-adrenalin ratio in the case of fear and anger. It is
known that although both hormones bring about sympathetic responses
they have a somewhat different function (Martin, 1971).
Adrenalin has more obvious central effects. It mediates the
increase in systolic blood pressure by an increase in heart rate,
further it causes an increase in blood sugar level. Whereas effects of
nor-adrenalin are manife$ted at the periphery, e.g. increased blood
pressure throuQh constriction of peripheral blood vessel~ rather than
increasing heart rate (Martin, 1971). After a succession of
experiements theorists such as Ax (1953), Elmadjian, Hope and Lamson
(1957) concluded that anxiety responses were more adrenalin dominated
while anger was largely determined by nor-adrenalin.
The General Arousal theorists such as Schachter and Singer (1962)
argued that physiological arousal is emotionaly non-specific and it
consists simply of a general arousal or activation but the type of
subjective feeling is determined at the cognitive level (Fisher, 1970;
Levitt, 1968). The General Activation theorists suggests that two
factors are involved in an emotional state (Dufy, 1962).
A- A degree of activation, low and high.
B- Direction.
A- Activation occurs at the physiological level, is non-specific
and may vary from individual to individual.
B- The second aspect operates at the psychological and behavioral
level. Two persons may have an equal level of physiological arousal in
a situation but the direction of arousal for each may be different,
i.e. one may interpret this arousal-as an anxiety while the other may
remain ignorant of such an activation. Several other theorists
(Schacter and Wheeler, 1962; Korchin, 1964) also agreed with this
explanation. Levi (1963) experimentally manipulated the experience of
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emotions by showing a tragic war film to one group, and a comical film
to another. They tested the level of adrenaline after the films.
Although the two groups of subjects reported different feelings, they
had approximately the same level of adrenaline and nor-adrenaline
increase. Similarly Di Giusto, Cairncross and King (1971) suggested
that variation in epinephrine level was probabaly affecting general
arousability.
The other area related to the relationship between hormones and
/
emotions is pituitary-adrenocortical activity. Martin (1971) stressed
the intimate involvement of pituitary adrenacortical system in
\
emotional reactions. He indicated that when the posterior hypothalamus
is activated in response to producing general sympathetic repsonse, it
releases hormones which stimulate the nearby pituitary gland to secret
adrenocorticotraphic hormone (ACTH) into the blood stream. The ACTH
causes the adrenal cortex gland to secret adrenocortical hormones (ACH)
which aids the organism in responding to stress.
1.2.2. Recent Develoments
Towards the end of 1970s two new theories of anxiety appeared in
the literature one by Gray (1979) the other by Redmond (1979). It is
not yet clear whether these two theories are incompatible or
complementary (Lader, 1983).
Gray (1979) suggested that anti-anxiety drugs block the behavioral
effects of secondary punishing or non-rewarding stimuli (CS). He
postulated a behavioral inhibition system which is impaired by the
anxiety drugs thereby alleviating anxiety states. He also tried to
localize this system neuro-anotomically, giving the primary role to the
septa-hippocampus. On the other hand Redmond (1979) concentrated on the
locus ceruleus and nor-epinephrine pathways.
- 23 -
Lader (1983) proposed an eclectic approach stating the importance
of ~oth Gray's and Redmond's theories. For him~ the explanation of
anxiety requires both systems to be taken into account. "Septa
hippocampal~ a specific system that involves the appraisal of specific
stimuli and the locus ceruleus a diffuse system that is involved in
the mediation of non-specific arousal and hypervigilance. The former is
relevant to phobic states the latter to generelized anxiety in tonic
states~ and panic attacks in phasic states" (Lader, 1983, p.9). Given
the lack of conclusive research it is presently ~remature, to determine
which theory is the most valid (Gray's, Redmond's or Lader's), and it
is better to leave such conclusion to the results of future reseach.
1.2.3. Summary
The physiological tradition views emotion (anxiety) as more
related to the activation of certain bodily processes rather than
attributing the importance to psychological factors.
In the physiological approach, any emotional state is tied to the
arousal of certain parts of the central nervous system or activation of
certain neurochemical agents and the subsequent development of somatic
symptoms. The treatment package,offered for the alleviation of
problematic anxiety contains direct intervention to those areas and
somatic symptoms by medication (anti-depressants or anti-anxiety drugs)
with varying degrees of success. Clinicians who adhere to this approach
attempt to discover areas of the CNS or certain neurochemical agents
which are related to the problem of anxiety. After identifying the
factors responsible for anxiety, they try to design and administer the
appropriate drugs which reduce the fntensity of such activation i.e.
alleviate anxiety.
Lack of successful treatment outcome, using pharmacological
interventions based on the physiological approach for the management of
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anxiety~ has partly led to the increased acceptance of the
contributions of environmental factors in the aetiology and treatment
of anxiety. This brings the discussion to the behavioral approa~h to
the conceptualization of anxiety.
1.3. BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
1.3.1. Development of Behavioral Theories
Before Behavicirism came to prominence, Functionalism and
Structuralism were the leading schools. The former devoted itself to
the analysis of the operations of consciousness while the latter mainly
dealt with the elements of consciousness. Both of these schools relied
heavily on introspection in their investigations.
Behaviorism was a revolt against both the subject matter
(consciousness) and the method (introspection) of these schools.
Instead of consciousness, Watson proposed overt behavior, for
introspection he substituted the objective method of experimentation.
In his book "Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It" (1913), he
referred to psychology as a purely objective, experimental branch of
natural sciences.
Although divergent theories appeared later within the behaviorist
school, certain principles were accepted by all psychologists adopting
this school of thought (Fisher, 1970).
A- Behavior whether human or animal, normal or abnormal, is
acquired through the process of conditioning.
B- The processes involved in conditioning display certain
consistencies that can be formulated in terms of laws.
Behaviorists conceived all psychological problems as
manifestations of inappropriate learning. Since learning meant
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stimulus-response connections, the aim of the behaviorist approach to
psychological problems was to break the stimulus-response chains that
lead to the emergence of the problematic behavior and then to
substitute these chains with more adaptive ones. In this process of
behavior modification the focus is on the overt behavior, not on the
underlying cause or on the cognitive structures of patients.
The success of behavior modi·fication in the laboratory led t.othe
attempts to apply Behaviorists' methods for clinical use, particularly
after it was shown that neurosis could be induced experimentally
(Kazdin, 1978). This seemed to confirm that the laws of learning could
be employed for the explanation and treatment of human psychological
disorders.
The fi~st Behaviorists to investigate anxiety were Pavlov and
Watson. Watson thought of neurotic disorders as conditioned emotional
responses.
The results of his experiments (Watson and Rayner, 1920) indicated
him that fears could be conditioned, that the conditioned reaction
could be generalized beyond the original conditioned stimulus and that
by applying the principles of learning the conditioned reaction could
be unlearned. Watson did not attempt to develop a comprehensive theory
to explain anxiety, but his studies of co~ditioned emotional responses
in human infants resulted in two conclusions (Kazdin, 1978).
A- Behavioral concepts and objective methods can be applied
to investigate emotional states and private experiences.
B- Exper t ment al observations of how emotional responses are
experienced, provide clues as to how everday fears might be created and
how they can be treated.
Mowrer (1939) equated anxiety with conditioned,fear (LeVitt,
1965). He defined anx ietv as a learne_d response occuring to Signals
(CS) that have been followed in the past by situations of injury or
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pain (UCS). Thus anxiety (fear) was thought of as a conditioned form of
pain reaction. However~ persistence of fear reactions to obviously
harmless stimuli (CS) in the absence of further pairing with the fear
evoking stimulus (UCS), posed difficulty for Mowrer's explanation of
anxiety. Mowrer's critics asserted that if anxiety is a conditioned
fear reactiqn, then repeated exposure of the CS only, should eventually
extinguish such fear reactions (Eysenck, 1979).
1.3.2. Mowrer's Two-Stage Theory
In 1947 in order to account for the resistance of anxiety
reactions to extinction~ Mowrer revised his theory, and proposed a two
process explanation of fear. He still claimed that anxiety was a
conditioned fear reaction but now asserted that conditioning was made
up of t!Q ~iff!c!nt eCQ£!§§!!. This model proposes that a fear is
acquired on the basis of the pairing of neutral and noxious stimuli
early in training, drive reduction playing no part in the first
instance, and that presenting the previously (now feared) stimulus
motivates the organism towards an action (avoidance). Acts leading to
the removal of feared stimulus are strengthened by a drive reduction
mechanism of reinforcement (Hilgard, 1967). In this way Mowrer combined
Pavlovian conditioning with Thorndike's th~ory. The result is the
following:
A- Contiguity Learning (Pavlovian): leading to the establishment
of fear.
B- Laws of Effect Learning (Thorndike): through which instrumental
responses leading to escape from the feared stimulus are reinforced.
Contiguity learning which Mowrer referred to as a "sign" learning,
involves the conditioning of involuntary responses of organs- and glands
including various emotional rections. A CS associated with an UCS
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becomes a "sign" that an aversive event will follow and itself
becomes aversive, thereby eliciting a fear response.
Laws of Effect Learning is called "solution" learning, and
involves voluntary responses of skeletal muscles. The problem solving
responses acquired in drive (anxiety) reduction are assimilated into
the repertoire of the organism.
In short, Mowrer stated that "avoidance learning" was a two stage
process in which fear becomes conditioned to some stimulus through sign
learning and such a stimulus then acts as a drive. This formulation
.-
supports ht s previous theol~y in lo'Jhichfear was viewed as a secondary
drive, acquired as a result of conditioning. Furthermore, instrumental
behavior that reduces the drive is learned through the process of
solution learning. That is, fear is learned by escaping from the
conditions that arouses it (Kazdin, 1978). This formulation is called
the two-stage theory of avoidance behavior because the first stage is
necessary fOI~the emergence of the second one. The first phase which
consists of acquisition of the fear, is thought to be a prerequsite for
the appearance of the setond phase in which the avoidance behavior is
executed (Rachman, 1976).
Mowrer thought that with the introduction of the two stage theory
of avoidance, he could explain the unpredicted resistance of avoidance
behavior to extinction. He, therefore, postulated that in the second
stage of the process i.e. in solution learning, the relief from anxiety
produced by the avoidance of CS led to conditioned avoidance reactions
(Eysenck, 1979).
Some psychologists were not satisfied with Mowrer's revised
explanation of anxiety. In the late 1960's and early 1970'5 the
Two-Stage Theory came under heavy criticisms (Rescarlo and ~olomon,
1967; Balles, 1970; Gray, 1971; Seligman and Johnston, 1973; Rachman,
1976; Eysenck, 1979). Gray and Seligman, for example, questioned
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whether all neutral stimuli were all equally prone to be turned into
fear signals. Gray argued. for instance, for the innateness of certain
fears in animals; Seligman (1971) argued that stimuli were not all
equally susceptable to fear transformation. A certain set of stimuli,
for human beings, may become a CS more quickly and may be more
resistant to extiction th~n other set of stimuli. Seligman called such
phenomena "preparedness".
Rachman (1977> argued that Mowrer presupposed a synchronous causal
relationship between fear, arousal and subsequent avoidance behavior.
Mowrer claimed that avoidance behavior could emerge only after the
conditioning of a fear response to a previously neutral stimulus. The
appearance of conditioned fear response acts as a drive leading the
organism to e>:ecute avoidance behavior (s). So fear and avoidance
behaviors are intimately related to each other. But Hodgson and Rachman
(1974) who studied patients during in vivo flooding treatment found
that although the patients" avoidance behavior improved conSiderably,
there was little change in their subjective fear. In other words,
predicted correspondance between fear and avoidance was not observed.
These authors, drawing on Lang's (1971) findings, concluded that fear
is made up of three loosely connected components: cognitive,
behaVioral, and somatic. This approach wi11 be discussed at length
later.
Eysenck (1979) criticized both Mowrer"s and classical
Behaviorists' (e.g. Watson) explanations of anxiety. The gist of his
criticisms is:
A- The lack of replicability. Later investigatiors (English,
1929; Bregman, 1934) were unable to replicate Watson's results
(conditioning of Albert). Eysenck pointed out that Watson did not take
individual differences into account.
- 29 -
B- The assumption of equipotentiality. Equipotentiality accepted
by Watson (i.e. any CS is as easily conditioned as any other) does not
apply to phobi as. Phobic stimul i seem to be nonarbi t.rarv and to be
related to the survival of human species through the course of
evolution (Landy and Gaupp, 1971; Lawlis, 1971).
C- Single trial conditioning is sometimes reported in connection
with the genesis of phobias, yet this is very difficult to produce even
in laboratory conditions. There appears to be something in the nature
of the certain specific CS that makes them particularly easy to
associate with UCS.
D- In order to obtain certain conditioning phenomena, the
experimental design must be drawn with high precision. But such
accuracy is unattainable in real life conditions.
E- Unreinforced conditioned reactions extinguish with several
repetitions of CS presentation. Anxiety rections (which were accepted
as conditioned fear reactions by 1'1mJrer,1939 and 1947) should be no
exception to this rule.
F- Finally Eysenck argued that presentations of unreinforced CS,
instead of leading to the extinction under all conditions as assumed by
classical behaviorists, actually produces more and more anxiety (CR) in
some circumstances.
1.3.3. Eysenck's Incubation Theory
In order to overcome these weaknesses of traditional behavioristic
explanation of anxiety, Eysenck introduced two toncepts: "preparedness"
(Seligman, 1971> and "Lncubation " (Eysenck, 1979).
The concept of preparedness ac~ounts for the first four
criticisms, listed above, and incubation the remaining two (E and F).
The notion of p~eparedness was first explicitly introduced by Seligman
(1971). In 1971 Seligman stated that "Phobias are highly prepared to be
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learned by humans, •••they are selective and resistant to extinction,
learned with degraded input, and probably noncognitive" (p.312). The
concept of preparedness explains English's (1929) and Bregman's
(1934) failures to replicate Watson's study. Both these researchers
used common household goods, such as curtains, as a CS and thus,
according to Eysenck would nat have the preparedness value of furry
animals (Eysenck, 1979)
The notion of preparedness runs counter to the notion of
equipotentiality but, accomodates the fact that humans have innate
predispositions to be easily conditioned by certain CSs. Hence, the
upshot of introducing all this is that a CS, which has a high level of
preparedness value, has the capacity for arousing fear by a single
trial conditioning procedure in a non-lab situation.
The phenomenon of incubation was put forward as an answer to the
last two criticisms (E and F). Eysenck showed that two albeit suprising
consequences would follow upon the CS alone being presented. It may
either lead to the extinction of the eR, or it may actually enhance the
CR.
He called the second possibility "incubation" (1979). Other
experimental findings (e.g. Diven, 1937; Bindra and Cameron, 1953;
Brush, 1964) had indicated to Eysenck th~'existence of incubation.
Eysenck asserted that ~hen a CS is unaccompanied by a UCS, there exists
tendencies both for incubation (enhancement) and for extinction
(weakening) of the CR that oppose each other. The tendency which is
stronger dominates the outcome. Usually, the extinction tendency is the
stranger, but under certain circumstances the incubation process may
prevail. Eysenck explained how the ehenomenon of incubation takes place
and what the parameters are.
Eysenck's clarification of incubation rested on Grant's
classification of Pavlovian conditioning. Grant (1964) called
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classical conditioning procedure (food-bell conditioning), Pavlovian A
conditioning. He named the other classical conditioning procedure, in
"Ihich an animal is subjected to repeated injections of morphine,
Pavlovian B conditioning. The UCRs to morphine were severe nausea,
profound secretion of saliva. vomiting and then profound sleep. With
daily continuous daily injections dogs began to exhibit severe nausea
and profound secretion of saliva at the first touch of the
experimenter. Eysenck listed important characteristics of such
conditioning as follows (1979):
A- Stimulation by the UCS is not contingent on subjects'
instrumental acts, and hence there is less dependence upon the
organism's motivational state. The CS acts as a partial substitute for
the UCS.
B- UCS elicits complete UCR. The UCR is not dependent upon the
organism's instrumental acts, but is directly caused by the UCS. In the
case of type- A conditioning the organism emits the UCR of appro~ch and
digesting the food.
The assumptions that the CS acts as a partial ~Jbstitute for the
UCS and that the UCS elicits a complete UCR forms the basis of
Eysenck's reformulation of the theory of anxiety.
In this manner, after pairing a Cs with Cl UCS, the presentation of
-CS alone comes to elicit at least fragments of the UCR. These CRs may
be similar to the original UCR. Sometimes they can be quite different.
In this way the CS, although unaccompanied by an UCS or an UCR, is in
fact followed by a CR which, while not very strong, is real and
different from the original UCR. Eysenck called this "nocive reponse"
(NR). With the elicitation of NR a kind of reinforcement is also
provided for a CS.Thus a positive feedback cycle is set in motion in
which The CR (or NR) provides reinforcement for the CS. As Eysenck put
it Hit is not the eR itself that acts as a reinforcer, but rather
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response produced stimuli~ not the autonomic, hormonal and muscular
reactions themsel ves but the exper ience of anx i atv based on them"
(1979, p.165). The stimuli (CS) associated with the experience of fear
(a noxious event) acquires the capacity, through classical
conditioning~ to arouse more fear which in turn produces more positive
feedback.
The Parameters of Incubation Theory are:
A- For a CR to act as a reinforcement, it must have drive
propert.ies.
B- The st.rength of UCS. Incubation is more likely to occur if the
UCS is strong.
C- Incubation follows upon short presentations of the CS. The
longer the presentation of the CS alone, the weaker the CR will be and
the CR will decline over time (Eysenck, 1979). A number of empirical
studies (Nunes and Marks, 1975; Borkovec, 1972) provided empirical
support for Eysenck's claim.
One implication of Eysenck"s reformulated anxiety theory was that
a re-examination of the classical administration of desensitization
treatments was necessary. This is because, if a CR acts as a
reinforcement and is strong enough to overcome the natural process of
extinction, then an>:iety reactions can be enhanced. Hence, the way to
eliminate such a CR is to prolong the CS exposure. Eysenck's
reformulation of t.he anxiety theory makes it necessary to scrutinize,
critically, the classical procedures of desensitization treatment. In
the classical desensitization, whenever a patient experiences high
level of anxiety the procedure is immediately terminated. According to
Eysenck's accounts however, the continued exposure to the CS should
lead to the extinction of the anxiety reaction. This is because a
short exposure of a CS enhances the CR, while prolonged presentation of
the CS leads to its extinction.
- 33 -
Eysenck calls his approach "the third theorY,of anxiety" (Eysenck,
1979). Bindra (1979) criticised the dual assumption of CS-CR links and
response reinforcements, as being inadequate t6 explain flexibility of
innovative action. He argued that while Eysenck's model may well
account for the stereotype and persistance of neurotic symptoms, it
fails to explain adequately the adaptive flexibility of the rituals of
obsessives (Bindra, 1979). Bolles (1979) criticised Eysenck for
focusing on the non-extinction of fear while ignoring the fact that not
only do CS's keep recurring but they also keep changing. kimmel, Wolpe,
Mineka, McAllister and McAllister (1979)_pointed to the scarcity of
data supporting the incubation theory. Eysenck was able to cite only
Napalkov's experiment (1963) as the only clear demonstration of
inCUbation. Paxton (1983) argued that the strenghtening of the CR with
the repeated presentation of CS alone is not adequate for explaining
the development of neuroses. Other processes (observational }earning)
which can also lead to the formation of neurotic problems are ignored
in Eysenck's theory.
Although its position is not well defined in the behavioristic
approach, Eysenck's approach to the phenomenon of anxiety is the most
comprehensive one, especially in terms of its possibilities to explain
some clinical data which are difficult to understand staying within the
framework of traditional conditioning theories.
1.3.4. Summary
In spite of the considerable disagreement that exists between
Behaviorist theorists, they generally accept that anx~ety is a learned
reaction and that stimulus-response connections should be the target of
investigation. Therefore, behavior therapists, when treating am:iety,
focus on maladaptive behavior only. They first, aim to identify and
then to eliminate enviromental cues that reinforce the problematic
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behavior. Second, they try to extinguish maladaptive responses by
applying the principles of conditioning. In explaining problematic
behavior, strict behaviorists tend to attribute little importance to
t.heevaluation and interpretat.ion of environmental events by the
individual.
However, cognitive explanations of psychological events are
gaining strength even within the behavioristic school itself. Today's
theories are trying to be more comprehensive in nature, including
different approaches ( e.g. Cognitive Behavior Modification).
1.4. COGNITIVE APPROACH
The Cognitive approach to psychological problems gained a
widespread acceptance in the field of clinical psychology in the early
1970s. However, importance of cognition in the development mental
problems was established at an earlier period (Adler, 1926; Kelly,
1955; and Rogers, 1961). Factors that resulted in the growth of
cognitive therapy in clinical psychology can be stated as fallows
(Murray and Jacobson, 1978).
A- Information Processing: Deriving from the logic of computers
and information processing, concepts such as feed-back loops and serial
information processing, are applied to explain perception, memory,
language, learning, cognitive development and problem solving.
B- Works of Piaget: Piaget's methods provided a new way of
studying the intera.ct.ionbehleen the organism and the.environment in
terms of intellectual, moral and social development. Piaget suggested
that mental structures (cognitions) could ~e viewed as organizing
experience and regulating behavior. The developing child is regarded as
an active, information seeking and processing organism rather than a
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passive receptacle for environmental inputs, the latter view being
synonymous with 'strict' behaviorism.
C- Social Learning Approach: Within this approach different
processes are assumed to regulate different behaviors (Bandura, 1969,
1974)•
a- Some behaviors are under the influence of e>:ternal stimuli.
These are influenced by classical conditioning processes.
b- Some response patterns are influenced by reinforcement. These
are influenced by operant conditioning processes.
c- Some behaviors are regulated by cognitive mediational processes
(Wilson 1978). Modelling is the primary example of this domain of
learning. The basic premise underlying this argument suggests that
learning, to occur, does not need to be followed by direct
reinforcement; humans acquire new behavior through observation alone
(cognitive learning).
1.4.1. Development of Cognitive Theories
Bandura (1969) asserted that psychological functioning involves a
reciprocal interaction between a person's behavior and the environment.
This reciprocal deterministic view immediately brings with it a new way
of conceptualizing human behavior, attributing to it a capacity for
self-directed behavior ch'ange which contradicts the behavioristic view
of situational and enviromental control.
Meanwhile, behaviorists also started to reduce their emphasis on
environmental factors in explaining behavior and tried to modify their
strict stimulus-response approath. First, behaviorists recognized the
importance of covert events (cognitions and thought) in manipulating
behavior as well as the overt events (stimulus) (Homme, 1963).
Behaviorists suggested that covert events could be controlled by the
factors which could also be applied to overt phenomena. Homme (1963)
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introduced the concept of coverants (covert-operants) to describe
covert behavior within the learning theory paradigm.
As a result of all these developments cognitive therapy flourished
opposing the behavioristic emphasis on environmental events
(antecedent~ consequent~ stimulus response connections)~ and the
importance they had given to the automaticity of human behavior.
Cognitive therapists stressed the clients view on those events
happening in the environment. Cognitive therapists, while
apppreciating the importance of enviromental events, attribute primary
importance to the client's evaluation of those events. In other words,
rather than stimulus-response chains alone, the perception of these
stimulus-response chains by the clients is accepted as the fundamental
factor in manipulating behavior. Thus, cognitive therapists do not
interpret classical conditioning as automatic reflexive responses.
Rather, they see conditioned responses as "self-activated on the basis
of learned expectations, and reinforcements accepted not as automatic
strengtheners of behavior but as a source of information and incentive
that regulate behavior" (Wilson, 1978, p.17) Therefore what a client
says to himself~ how he evaluates his circumstances and how he labels
events are the targets of intervention for cognitive therapy.
Cognitive therapy deals with thinking. The starting point for
cognitive therapy is the'~ecognition of the importance of what has
been Qoing on inside the patient's mind (cognitive structures) and the
effect of this on the development of mental problems.
Whatever the kind of cognitive therapy, each centres its emphasis
on the faulty thinking processe~ (cognitive structures, belief systems)
which are accessible to the consciousness of clients. The aim is~ first
to make the client ~ware of his faulty thinking style and to replace it
by substituting more adaptive and realistic ones. In these processes
Variations among different cognitive approaches come to the surface.
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One type may choose to stress automatic thoughts and coping strategies
(Meichenbaum~ 1977) while another kind of cognitive approach addresses
itself to a more global change through modification of faulty belief
structures (Ellis, 1962).
In the following pages the cognitive approach to the problem of
anxiety by three leading figures (Ellis, Beck and Meichenbaum) will be
presented.
1.4.2. Ellis's Rational Emotive Therapy
Ellis who developed Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) endorses the
words of Epictetus "man is disturbed not by the facts but the views he
takes of them" (Meichenbaum, 1977). Ellis explained his theory
postulating an ABC approach to the psychological events. Ellis argued
that an activating event (A), let's say, failing to perform well in an
examination, is not followed directly by an emotional and/or behavioral
consequence (C), such as a depressive reaction. The consequence,
however, is mediated by event (B), which is a person's belief about the
event (A). So th~ target of therapy is to change those beliefs that
are causing the problem behavior or emotion. Since those irrational,
erroneous ideas about the events happening around and about patients
themselves create the psychological problems, the therapist's task is
to enable patients to identify the irrational ideas and to replace them
-with more adaptive ones.
Ellis identified, what he called, 'must-urbatory' thinking as the
primary element leading to the establishment of irrational belief
structures. To him, psychological problems are usually caused by
absolutistic evaluation of unqualified shoulds, oughts, musts and
commands. Psycholog~cal problems rise because people do not only wish,
want or prefer to perform important tasks adequately. They insist that
they 'must', that they 'have to do so' (1982). In their belief system
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patients have, what Karen Horney (1965) called, a "tyranny bf shoulds".
Whenever people employ "must-urbatory" thinking they inevitably end up
with emotional problems.
All types of irrational 'musts' and derivative thinking styles
combine together to produce psychological problems, such as anxiety,
depression etc. Ellis and Grieger (1977) referred to anxiety as an
internal warning signal that one is in imminent danger of not getting
or of losing something thought to be needed.
From RET's point of view, an>:iety involves three fantasies
(Grieger and Boyd, 1980). The first fantasy is made up of a belief in a
"have to", a belief that something must occur, such as "I have to be
liked". The second fantasy is over "NOT" happening of this "have to",
such as "nobody will approve me, nobody will like me". The last one is
about the "awfulness" of the situation if the "have to" does not
happen, such as, "it wi11 be terri ble when nobody wi11 Ii ke me".
Greiger and Boyd (1980> suggested three an>:iety types re 1ated to these
fantasies:
A- Approval Anxiety: This type of anxiety has to do with the
importance placed upon being accepted by others and the necessity for
perfoming well in order to gain acceptance (1980, p.38). To gain
approval is positive and desirable to all individuals. But in the case
of an anxiety patient, to obtain approval from others is beyond being
merely desirable, it is essential for such a person and failing to get
it is a calamity. In RET terms, individuals who have such anxiety
believe that they must perfom well and obtain approval of others. A
vicious cycle occurs because they are over anxious about winning that
crucial approval from others otherwise they cannot function well. This
further increases their anxiety leading to poorer performance and more
amdety.
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B- Ego Anxiety: This type of anxiety is very similar to that
mentioned above. Indeed, sometimes both of them are regarded as one
(Ellis, 1982). Ego anxiety arises when people feel that their self or
personal worth is threatened (Breiger and Boyd, 1980). Such people
believe that they must perfom well and be approved by others so that
they, as humans, can have some worth. If they cannot get that desired
approval it is awful and terrible. In their belif system their worth
and essence is equated with gaining approval.
C- Discomfort Anxiety: This type includes a fear of pain,
frustration or discomfort. It is an outcome of a 'must-urbatory' style
of thinking. In contrast to ego anxiety which relates to a poor opinion
of self, discomfort anx iet.y relates to a poor opinion of other people
and the conditions in which one lives. The belief system, prototype of
discomfort anxious individuals, has Cl world view that requires people
and conditions to be the way he wants them to be and conversel y, not to
exist in any manner that will cause him severe discomfort. Individuals
who have discomfort anxiety can stand little frustration, since the
notion of tolerance to a normal level of frustration hardly exists in
their belief system.
Greiger and Boyd (1980) pointed out that while both ego anxiety
and approval anxiety are more dramatic and severe, discomfort anxiety
is usually less dramatic, though more common.
1.4.3. Beck's Cognitive Therapy
Beck's 'Cognitive therapy' is similar to that of Ellis's RET,
e>:cept for certain practical points and the kind of terminology used.
In common with all variations of cognitive therapies, the goal of
Beck's cognitive therapy is to develop rational and adaptive thought
patterns.
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Cognitive therapy's primary target is again the thinking styles of
clients. Beck (1976) viewed neurosis as caused by 'channelized
thinking'~ 'attention fixation' and 'distortions in reality'. He
stressed that the difference between neurotic disorders is not form
but content. In each kind,of neurosis reality is changed in order to
fit the concepts that dominate the patient's thinking. In mental
disorders the problem is not the labelling of the stimuli but the
meanings and importance that a patient gives to those stimuli. In other
words~ the client's interpretation of stimuli is pathologically
unrealistic. As a result the client begins to mis-construe the events
happening around him using 'arbitrary inference', 'selective
abstraction' and 'overgeneralization'. As Beck pointed out, such
distortions occur especially when the ideation is related to a
patient's specific problem. These distorted ideas have another
characteristic; that is being 'automatic' in nature. They appear as if
reflexes without any apparent precedent (anticedent) sign or reasoning.
They are much more-difficult to change by logic, reason and opposing
evidence than other thoughts. One of the most important tasks of the
therapist is to identify those automatic thoughts and help the client
to become aware of his automatic thoughts. Since these types of
thoughts have the characteristics of being reflex like and automatic,
clients usualy are not aware of them.
Cognitive therapists concentrate on clients' distortions of
reality. In therapy the client is, first, trained to recognize his
automatic thoughts. Once this is accomplished, the therapist encourages
the patient to identify and articulate his faulty automatic thoughts
which are causing the problems. Beck called his psychotherapy process
as 'learning to learn'. He said that this kind of therapy" ••. is
conducive to the patient·s developing new ways to learn from his
experiences and to solve problems ••••, this approach attempts to
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remove obstacles that have prevented the patient from profiting from
experience and from developing adequate ways of dealing with int.rnal
and external problems" (1976, pp.230-231).
According to the cognitive explanation of neurosis, thinking
disorders lie at the core of all problems. In each psychological
problem there are different types of distortions in the belief
structures of patients. In anxiety, the faulty belief structures are
about the concepts of exaggerated danger and patient's unrealistically
low estimate of his capacity for coping with it (Beck, 1976). Such
persons anticipate catastrophic occurances to themselves or to loved
ones. For example, "I am in a terrible condition, if I touch that place
I will get an incurable disease" etc. Such distorted ideation, with a
threatening content attached to it, produces anxiety. The feedback
cues of this anxiety cause the development of more am:iety prodUCing
ideation, leading to the vicious cycle. Beck called this phenomenon
"spiralling of fear and anxiety".
Attention of an am:iety patient is absorbed by concepts of danger.
That is, little attention is left to be spent for other activities
(similar to Freud's economy principle). Because most attention is
directed to certain concepts of danger, even a trivial event is
perceived as extremely harmful, and induces anxiety in the person.
To replace these faulty anxiety producing ideas with adaptive and
healthy ones, first the patient is trained to become aware of and to
identify these automatic thoughts (faulty rules). Then the therapist
and the patient, working together, substitute more realistic and
rational alternative thougths.
1.4.4. Meichenbaum's Cognit.ive Behavior Modification
The Idnd of cogni tive therapy developed by Meichenbaum was an
explicit mixture of cognitive and behavioristic methods. He attempted
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to make explicit the cognitive elements which were employed implicitly
in behavior therapy techniques. He stated that "if operant training
procedures could be improved by explicitly including in the treatment
regimen a client's thought and images~ then perhaps overt behavior
therapy techniques could similarly be improved"(Meichenbaum~ 1977~
p.107). Meichenbaum did not take the path of developing comprehensive
therapy methods as Ellis and Beck did~ rather, he tried to introduce
specific techniques to make cognitive elements more explicit.
In general Meichenbaum's contribution can be named as 'achieving
self-control through coping statements'.·The application of this method
to the treatment of anxiety was two fold.
A- Stress Inoculation training
B- Modification of classical behavior therapy techniques
(especially systematic desensitization) with the introduction of coping
self statements (Cullen~1981)
A- Stress Inoculation Training
The aim of this technique is to equip clients with skills to
cope with stressful situations. The underlying assumption is that 'the
way in which an individual evaluates or labels the situation determines
his subsequent emotional reaction'. The claim is that~ if someone can
be trained to employ coping strategies by looking at a stressful
situation from a different perspective~ then the negative affect will
be lessened.
In brief, stress inoculation training involves discussing the
nature of emotional stress reactions, rehearsing coping skills and
testing those skills under ~ctual stressful conditions (Meichenbaum~
1977).
-B- Modification of Classical Behavior Therapy Methods
Meichenbaum modified the systematic desensitization procedure by
introducing two new elements; a- discussion of problem generating ideas
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in the beginning of each session, and b- employment of coping imagery
instead of mastery imagery.
By introducing the discussion of problem-generating thoughts
clients are made aware of their distorted ideation and erroneous
thinking styles.
In mastery imagery the process of 'counterposing' stressful
situations in the imagination with a relaxed state is repeated until
the client is able to master such a visualization without anxiety. In
coping imagery, even though the client feels anxious, he is encouraged
to keep on visualizing, employing coping~elf statements to alleviate
his anxiety in the stressful situation. If the anxiety still persists
the procedure is first terminated and then repeated, until the client
is able to reduce his anxiety for that item in the hierarchy, with the
help of coping self-statements.
As an advantage of coping-imagery Meichenbaum (1977) indicated
that in this way clients learn to confront and reduce their anxiety. So
when they feel anxious again in a real life situation, they have a tool
(coping self-statements) that will assist them to deal with their
anx i et v,
1-,,4.5.Summary
Despite their different techniques Beck, Ellis and Meichenbaum
agree that psychological problems (e.g. anxiety) are caused by
irrational belief systems (or cognitive distortions or mis-construing
reality). Cognitive therapists attribute both the causes of
psychological problems and the remedy for them to the patient·s
thinking structures. The aim of cognitive therapy is to overcome
patient·s blind-spots, blurred perceptions" distorted cognitions and
self-deception. In a broader sense, it aims to reduce psychological
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distress by correcting misconceptions and wrong self-signals. Cognitive
therapists' stress on cognition does not mean that they underestimate
the importance of emotions in the formation of psychological problems~
but they prefer to change emotions by manipulating cognitions
(Beck,1976}. They assume that a change in the cognitive structures will
directly lead to a change in problematic feelings (affect).
Many psychologists of different orientations agree that cognitive
structures play an important role in psychological problems.
Nevertheless, difference in the conception of the relationship between
cognition and affect exist. If the psychoanalytical claim that"
cognition is distorted by unbearable AFFECT •••" (Lewis, 1983, p.168)
has any validity, then the relevance of direct intervention into the
cognitive structures needs to be re-examined. This point will be
elaborated in later chapters.
As noted earlier, one of the factors that contributed to the
development of cognitive therapy was the recognition of the limitations
--of behavior therapy which chose only the observable behavior as its
subject matter. Introduction of covert events (thoughts) into the
behavioristic sphere is gaining popularity in clinical psychology,
specifically in relation to an>:iety problems. At present, effectiveness
of multi-modal approaches~to psychological problems is widely accepted
in cliDical psychology (Barlow and Wolfe, 1981).
Before discussing the Three Systems Theory which offers a
multi-modal approach to anxiety problems by combining cognitive,
behavioral and physiological approaches, a brief summary of the
conceptualization and treatment of anxiety disorders f~om four main
schools of psychology will be presented.
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1 I:!"• ..s. D I FFE~!ENCES IN THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ANXIETY
BETlIJEEN FOUR ~1AI N SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY
The main differences between psychoanalytic, physiological,
behavioral and cognitive conceptualizations of anxiety are as follows.
From the psychoanalytical point of view the central role in anxiety
is attributed to unconscious intra-psychic conflicts. These conflicts
are assumed to take place during the psychosexual development stages,
mainly around the phallic stage and between the child (patient) and
significant others (usually the parent of the same sex). In classical
psychoanalytical theory, these conflicts are regarded as basically an
affective one (repressed hate, love, fear etc.). Thus
psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists view the anxiety disorders
as manifestations of underlying conflicts. Therefore they, first, try
to uncover the hidden problem, while helping the patient re-live the
denied, repressed feelings. Then, by working together with the patient,
the therapist aims to develope a healthier ego in the patient that can
handle future problems more constructively.
The physiological approach, on the other hand, concentrates mainly
on the somatic symptoms of an>:iety problems. The aim of such
intervention is to identify the bodily correlates of am:iety. The
medical approach to the assessment and treatment of the anxiety
disorders endorses a physiological approach. The physiological
perspective conceptualizes anxiety as malfunctioning in some areas of
the central nervous system or an-imbalace in the hormone levels
(adrenaline). The goal is to modify these factors directly by
medication (e.g. benzodiazepines, imipramine etc.).
Behavior therapists conceptualize anxiety disorders as learned
(conditioned) reactions to previously neutral stimuli. Maladaptive
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behavior like any other behavior is regarded as being acquired through
learning. Behavior therapists include only objective and observable
psychological events in their sphere of interest~ consequently focusing
directly on the maladaptive behavior and attempting to identify the"
stimululi that control the problematic behavior. The aim is~ to apply
the principles of learning, to break the stimulus-response chain
(unlearn the behavior) responsible for anxiety symptom and to get the
patient to re-learn more adaptive responses to those stimuli.
Cognitive therapists regard the client's faulty belief structures
as the cause of anxiety. The way in which the client conceptualizes
events happening in his environment, his assumptions and appraisals
about these events are considered to be the elements responsible for
the development of anxiety disorders. Following this'line of thinking
cognitive therapists~ first, try to help their clients realize the role
played by faulty belief structures, appraisals and assumptions in the
development of the psychological problems; second, working with their
clients~ therapists try to help substitute new, adaptive and rational
belief structures instead of the erroneuos one(s).
In a more simplistic and also clearer manner the differences among
the four main schools of psychology can be seen in the Table-i.
After reviewing the traditional approaches to the problem of
anxiety~ in the next secti6n the Three Systems Theory will be
present~d. This new approach, combining different conceptualizations,
offers a more comprehensive account of anxiety problems.
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School of
E§1:£QQ!.Qgy:
Aetiological
E§£tg!:.§
Psychoanalysis Unconscious affective
conflicts taking place
between the patient
and the significant
others during the
developmental stages
causing disharmonous
interaction between
the id, the ego and
the super-ego.
Physiological Mal-functioning of
certain part of the
CNS or imbalance in
the hormone levels.
Behavior Therapy Learned maladaptive
behavior patterns to
previously neutral
stimuli.
Cognitive Therapy Faulty cognitive
structures which
are eas~ly available
to the consciousness
of the client, causing
misconstruing of reality.
Treatment
§tc§tggy:
Restoring harmonious
interaction between
the id, the ego
and the super-ego
through affective
reexperience of the
unconscious con-
flictual relation-
ship between the
patient and the im-
portant figures but
this time with
regard to the ther
apist at a regressi
ve level.
Intervening at the
problematic area
directly by medi-
cation.
Re-learning adapt-
ive behavioral pat-
terns to the same
stimuli; with the
application of ex-
perimentally de-
rived learing prin-
ciples.
Changing faulty
cognitive struc-
tures through
specifically de-
veloped techiques
of persuaion (e.g.
challenging the
accuracy of the
client's assump-
tions and apprais-
als)•
TAEtLE- 1 Differences between four main scools of psychology in
terms of aetiological factors and treatment strategies for anxiety
disorders.
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1.6. THE THREE SYSTEMS THEORY
Lang (1968 and 1971) played a pioneering role in the development
of the Three Systems Theory of fear and emotion. Although Campell and
Fiske (1959) introduced the multitrait-multimethod assessment of
psychological events a decade before Lang, this approach was ignored by
American behaviorists who relied heavily upon a single index of
behavioral change (e.g. rate of pedal pushing or frequency of pecking)
(Himadi, Boice and Barlow, 1985).
1.6.1. The Development of the Three Systems Theory
The empirical finding that led Lang to propose the Three Systems
Approach to anxiety was the realization that during automated
desensitization of snake phobics (Lang and Lazovik, 1962), some
subjects showed rapid improvement in their overt behavior (phobic
avoidance) yet still regarded themselves as fearful. Furthermore, some
subjects exhibited a reduction of fear as measured by fear
questionnaires, while nevertheless showing an increased cardiovascular
tonus. Lang (1971) stated that "emotional behaviors were multiple
system responses (verbal-cognitive, behavioral-motor, and
physiological-somatic) that interact through interoceptive (neural,
hormonal) and exteroceptive channels of communication. All systems are
controlled or influenced by brain mechanisms but the level of important
centres of influence (cortical or subcortical, limbic or brainstem) are
varied, and like the resulting behaviors partially independent ••••••
Perhaps the most obvious examples of system independence are apparent
when emotion is attenuated. With-a reduction in intensity systems are
often diminished in an unbalanced way, and evidence of arousal may
/
actually disappear from one system and not from another. So called mild
feeling may involve no more than the verbal report, and we might find
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little specific activity in the autonomic or behavioral sphere"
(p • 108) •
Bernstein and Paul (1971) argued that anxiety is a tridimensional
phenomenon that includes cognitive, behavioral and physiological
components. Leitenberg, Agras, Butz and Wince (1971) showed that the
relationship between avoidance behavior and heart rate is varied. In
some cases heart rate increased as phobic behavior decreased. This
provided support for the Three Systems Theory of fear and emotion. The
studies of Bernstein and Paul (1971) and Leitenberg et.al. (1971)
support Lang's idea that anxiety comprises relatively independent
systems.
A few years later Rachman and Hodgson (1974), adopting Lang's
conceptualization of anxiety, conducted quite comprehensive
investigations. The main impetus behind their eager acceptance of the
Three Systems conceptualization of fear was their dissatisfaction with
the two-factor theories of fear and avoidance (Mowrer, 1939). Around
1974 the two-factor theory had come under heavy criticism (as stated in
the previous chapter), as fear and avoidance were often found to be
discordant. Rachman and Hodgson (1974) in support of the Three Systems
approach claimed that "avoidance can co-vary with fear or vary
inversely or vary independently" (p.311). They introduced two new
concepts to explain such inconsistent variation among the three
components of anxiety, n~mely ~!§~Qr~~Q£!and ~!§~Q~brQQ~.Discordance
mean~ a lack of co-variation within the three components at any given
time. Desynchrony ref~rs to the unequal changes between those
components within a given time period. The emphasis placed upon the
concepts of discordance and desyncrony are the innovations of the Three
Systems approach.
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Rachman and Hodgson (1974) proposed several hypotheses about the
cond itians under II-Jhichdiscordance or desyncrany can occur. In
particular they argued that:
A- Concordance between response systems is likely to be high
during strang emotions while discordance will occur when emotional~
responses are relatively mild.
This hypothesis is based an Lang's (1971) claim that mild feeling
states may be"reflected via verbal reports rather than via the
autonomic or behavi oral systems~ because verbal behavi our of humans is
capable of expressing mild affective states, whereas automatic systems
may be totally unresponsive to such states.
B- Concordance between response systems will be greater under law
levels of demand while high levels of demand will produce discordance.
This hypothesis was inferred from Miller and Bernstein's (1972)
demonstration that avoidance behavior in claustrophobic patients is,
in part, a function of instructianally mediated demand characteristics.
In their study, the low demand condition instructions were to stay in
a small dark chamber until patients got fairly uncomfortable. The
patients in the high demand condition were asked to stay in the chamber
far ten minutes. Miller and Bernsteain (1972) reported that the
correlation between heart rate, subjective anxiety and respiration rate
was higher under law demand conditions than under high demand
conditions.
-High demand conditions influence the behavioral response system
independently from the other response systems. Far example, Rachman and
Hodgson (1974) reported that highly motivated subjects were able to
control a tendency towards flight in spite of autonomic and
experiential signs of fear.
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c- The degree of synchrony that results from therapeutic
intervention will be a function of the particular therapeutic technique
employed.
The basic premise for this hypothesis is obtained from the
previous one i.e. partial uncoupling of fear and avoidance under high
demand conditions. Rachman and Hodgson (1974) suggested that clear
desynchrony could be observed in the application of flooding~ which was
assumed to put quite high demand on clients. Modelling treatment,
contrary to flooding~ was considered to produce syncronous changes by
placing considerably low levels of demand on clients (Rachman and
Hodgson 1974).
D - After treatment intervention (in the follow up period) the
degree of concordance between measures in different response systems
should increase.
The idea here is that whatever the initial level of desynchrony
is, successful treatment will result in an increased syncrony in the
three systems. That is, anxiety will decline in all the cognitive,
behavioral and physiological systems.
Sartory, Rachman and Grey (1977) investigated whether or not the
concordance between the three response systems was high during strong
emotional arousal~ and whether discordance occurs when emotional
responses are relatively mild. They used a lOO-point "fear thermometer"
to tap anxiety expressed through the cognitive system and measured
physiological arousal by heart-rate. The results were inconclusive
since they found the concordance between response systems to be high
during strong emotional arousal. Nevertheless, they reported only
slight support for the hypothesis that discordance will occur when
emotional responses are relatively mild.
Grey, Sartory and Rachman (1979) employing subjects with
circumscribed fears also investigated whether the concordance between
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the response systems will be greater under low levels of demand, and
whether high levels of demand will produce discordance. Reformulating
this hypothesis,to adapt to the limitations of their experiment, Grey
et al. (1979) proposed that "a high demand condition would produce
considerable desynchrony and, secondly, a low demand treatment
condition would produce little or no desynchrony" p.137. Three
treatment conditions (high, low and increasing demand), with the
application of in vivo presentations of the phobic situation were used.
Fear thermometer and heart rate were administered to measure the level
of anxiety in cognitive and physiological channels, respectively. The
differentiation of each treatment condition was based on the level of
fear indicated in the fear thermometer upon the presentation of the
phobic stimulus. In high demand conditions the presentation of the
phobic stimulus always happened at a distance which elicited maximum
fear ratings (100). In the increasing demand condition, confrontation
with the phobic object was graded, eliciting ratings of 50, 75 and 100
in the fear thermometer in each of the three sessions respectively.
Finally, presentation of the phobic object aroused maximum rating of
50 in the fear thermometer in the low demand group.
The hypothesis was supported by overall findings, thus providing
positive support for the Three Systems Theory.
Sallis, Lichstein and Glynn (1980) tested the first of the four
hypotheses put forward by Rachman and Hodgson (1974). They reviewed 41
clinical and 54 analogue studies to assess the relationship between the
three anxiety response channels. They assumed that "Intrinsically
motivated clinical patients were more intensely anxious than were
extrinsically constrained" ..(p.180, 1980). Of the 95 studies reviewed in
the study, 32 applied assessments on the three channels. Their review
indicates that the -level of concordance decreases as one moves from
studies employing clinical populations, to those studies that use
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analogue populations. Clinical populations are assumed to have higher
levels of anxiety in comparison to analogue popUlations. These results
offer some support to the hypothesis under investigation, that under
high levels of emotional arousal synchrony between the three response
channels is likely to occur, whereas low levels of emotional arousal
are likely to produce desynchrony.
Barlow, Mavissakalian and Schofield (1980) attempted to
investigate the level of correspondence (synchrony and desynchrony)
between heart rate and subjective anxiety during twelve sessions of
cognitive therapy in three agoraphobic women. The results showed
substantial behavioral improvement in all three cases. However,
different patterns of synchrony and desynchrony were observed between
heart rate and self-reports of anxiety. In one case they found a
substantial increase in heart rate at the end of the therapy.
Mavissakalian and Schofield concluded desynchrony as "an establised
fact in the treatment of phobias" (p.447, 1980).
Lehner and Leiblum (1981) studied physiological, behavioral and
cognitive measures of assertiveness anxiety. In this study one of their
aims was to find how closely the three dimensions of assertiveness
anxiety were related. Results revealed low correlations between the
three channels, thus giving support to the Three Systems Theory of
anxiety.
Craske and Craig (1984) approached the question of system
independence from a somewhat different angle. They compared the claims
of the Three Systems Theory and Bandura's Self-Efficacy Theory (1977)
with regard to the performance anxiety of pianists. Self-efficacy
theory supports a unit~ry model of fear, assigning cognitive variables
a causal status. Bandura's theory claims that a conviction of one's
ability to perform particular tasks determines subjective, autonomic
and behavioral anxiety. Thus, Self-Efficacy Theory views response
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systems as interlocking consequences of a more unified construct, i. e.
self-efficacy.
As a result of this claim the three sytems are viewed as
concordant in direct correspondance to the level of strength of
self-efficacy. In contrast to the Self-Efficacy Theory, Lang's (1971)
approach describes the three systems as interactive but relatively
independent. Independence is a consequence of the fact that none of the
three systems uniquely define an emotional state. The three systems
also differ in their sensitivity to stress stimuli. Autonomic indices
were found to be the least sensitive (Lang 1971; Agras and Jacob,
1981>. F<achman and Hodgson (1974) associated system concor-dance and
discordance with specific conditions. They predicted high concordance
among the three systems under high levels of anxiety. Under this
condition the Self-Efficacy Theory also predicts the same pattern of
responding, i.e. concordance. Fearful individuals, having low self
efficacy, will tend to respond with comparably high levels of anxiety
in each response system. The difference between the two theories
appears when considering situations which evoke relatively low levels
of emotional arousal. The Three Systems Theory forecasts discordance,
whereas Self-Efficacy Theory predicts just the opposite, concordance.
Self-Efficacy Theory claims that if anxiety is low self-efficacy will
be high, leading to performance mastery causing very little autonomic
arousal and subjective anxiety.
The resLllt of Craske and Craig's (1984) music performance study
offered clear support for the Three Systems Theory. Concordant
relationships between the three systems were observed in relatively
anx ious pianists, while for relatively ncn+anx ious pianists the results
indicated disconcordance between the three response systems.
The research ~resented above has aimed directly at testing the
claim of relative system independence in the area of anxiety. In
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5ummary~ studies indicate some support for the sysfem's relative
independence. While patterns of desynchrony and discordance have gained
an established acceptance~ investigations dealing with the implication
of the phenomenon of system discordance for the development of
effective treatment methods for anxiety disorders began to flourish
towards the end of the 19705 and in the early 1980s.
1.6.2. Application of the Three Systems Theory for
More Effective Treatment of Anxiety
Acceptance of anxiety consisting of three relatively independent
systems led to the idea that different components of anxiety can be
treated by different treatment methods. This idea was introduced at the
very beginning of the three systems approach by.Rachman and Ho~gson
(1974) but application of this claim had to wait until the early 1980s,
partially because of the acceptance of the triple response measurement
as the appropriate assessment method of anxiety by the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) at the Albany research conference
(1981) and partly because of experimental findings in favor of
dssynchrony and discordance. With an increased interest in the three
systems approach, different psychologists tried to formulate more
effective treatment regimens for anxiety problems based on this new
model of emotions. Their claim was quite simple and clear: since each
treatment is regarded as focusing on one specific component of anxiety
(Cobb, 1983; Jerremalm and John50n~ 1981, 1982 and 1984; Hugdahl,
1981), the aim was first to assess which of the three components plays
the prominent role in the manifestation of patients' problematic
anxiety, and then to apply the treatment method which focuses
specifically on the main problematic component. Having this idea in
mind, psychologisti (Cobb, 1983; Ost et al. 1981) classified treatment
methods for anxiety according to the following scheme.
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A - Treatment Methods Focusing on the Cognitive Component:
a- Stress inoculation
b- Coping self-statements
c- Cognitive therapy
B - Treatment Methods Focusing on the Behavioral Component:
a- Exposure in vivo
b- Reinforced practice
c- Modelling
C - Treatment Methods Focusing on the Physiological Component:
a- Progressive muscular relaxation
b- Autogenic training
c- Meditation techniques
c- Bio-feedback
(Pharmacological int{~rvention"scan be added to the treatment
methods focusing on the physiological component.)
Those psychologists who followed this approach in the assessment
and treatment of anxiety disorders emphasized individual differences in
anxiety response profiles. Furthermore, they pointed out the problems
of treating anxious pati~nts in terms of general categories provided by
the classical diagnostic approach (Ost et al. 1981, 1982 and 1984;
Hugdahl, 1981). Hugdahl (1981) for instance, suggested that "treatment
methods should be individualy tailored to the particular component
response profile displayed by each patient" (p.75). Similarly, Ost et
al. (1984) stated that "grouping patients into broad problem
categories, such as agoraphobia, ignores the fact that the individual
response pattern seems to be of great importance to obtain optimal
effectiveness in the treatment" (p.697).
At present, no reported research exists in the literature about
the relationship between the classification of anxiety disorders and
the Three Systems Theory~ Without this information ~t hand, to imply
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of general diagnostic
categories may be-an unqualified jump. ~evertheless, focusing on
individual differences, Gst et al. have carried-out studies on three
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different kinds of phobias; social phobia, claustrophobia and
agoraphobia. In each study, prior to the treatment, subjects' anxiety
when exposed to the phobic situation was assessed on both behavior and
heart rate measures. On the basis of this information the subjects were
divided into two groups as behavioral and physiological responders.-
Those subjects who displayed marked behavioral problems and less
physiological arousal under phobic conditions were assigned to the
behavioral group; and those subjects who displayed marked physiological
arousal and less behavioral problems were assigned to the physiological
group. Behaviorally focused methods included exposure in vivo for
claustrophobics and agoraphobics, and social skill training for social
phobics. Applied relaxation was used for physiologically oriented
treatments in all three studies. Half of the subjects in each group
were randomly assigned to behaviorally focused treatment while the
other half were assigned to a physiologically oriented treatment
package. It was predicted that the physiological group would benefit
'more from relaxation whereas the behavioral group would do so from
exposure in vivo: Results of the first two studies (on social phobia in
1981 and on claustrophobia in 1982) were promising. In both studies,
subjects placed in the physiological responders group benefited
preferentially from applied relaxation while behaviorally focused
methods (social skills training and exposure in vivo) were more
eff~ctive for subjects with marked behavioral reaction. In the case of
agoraphobia, although the trend of the results was in the predicted
direc.tion i.e. physiological responders obtaining more benefit from
applied relaxation while exposure in vivo was more effective for
behavioral responders, as Ost et al. (1984) state in their paper "in no
case was exposure in vivo significantly better than applied relaxation
-for the behavioral reactors, or vice ver~a for the physiological
reactors" (p.705).
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Ost and Hugdahl (1981 and 1983) set up studies which had somewhat
similar logic to those stated above, yet were quite different in terms
of the practical implications. Acceptance of anxiety comprising three
loosely coupled components constituted the basic premise of their
study, but the main aim of the study centered on Rachman's (1977)
introduction of three pathways of fear acquisition. Rachman proposed
that fears could be acquired in three different ways: by conditioning,
by vicarious learing or by transmission of instructions. In the first
study, Ost and Hugdahl (1981) investigated the different ways that
patients acquire their phobias. Results indicated that a substantial
proportion of the patients (58X) reported to have acquired phobias via
conditioning, whereas (17X) of patients attributed the acquisition of
their phobias to vicarious experiences, (lOX) to the transmission of
information and (15X) could not recall any specific onset condition.
Ost and Hugdahl (1981) did not find any clear relationship between
the ways of acquisition and the loadings on the three components of
anxiety. However, interesting findings were obtained in animal phobics.
Those lo'~hoattri buted their phobi as to condi tioning e>:periences a.lso
displayed their anxiety mainly in the physiological component. Just the
opposite response patterns appeared for subjects who had acquired their
phobias indirectly, the manifestation of their an>!iety being mainly in
the cognitive (subject~~e) component.
_ Ost and Hugdahl (1983) in another study investigated the
acquisition of phobias in eighty (80) agoraphobic patients, but they
did not find any relationship between the forms of acquisition and the
loadings in the three anxiety components.
Another line of investigation within the Jhree.Systems Theory
focused on the phenomenon of synchrony and desynchrony and their
relation to therapy Dutcome (Grey, Rachman and Sartory, 1981; Barlow
et.al., 1980; Vermilyea, Boice and Barlow, 1984; Himadi, Boice and
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Barlow~ 1985). In a recent study by Vermilyea et al. (1984) one aim was
to establish patterns of synchrony that related to treatment outcome.
Although all subjects improved overall when the same data were
sub-categorised according to synchronous and desynchronous patients,
treatment effectiveness appeared to be greater for the synchronous
group. I~ the desynchronous group there was a tendency towards
increased heart rate. The authors further subdivided the subjects into
two groups as treatment responders and treatment non-responders. The
treatment responders group consisted of twenty two (22) subjects half
of whom were synchronous~ the other half desynchronous. However, in the
treatment non-responders group which had a total of six subjects, five
were desynchronous subjects while one was synchronous.
The research cited so far can be categorised in four different
groups in terms of their focal points in the Three Systems Theory:
A- Studies that attempt to show that desynchrony and discordance
are real phenomena rather than an artifact of faulty measurement. (e.g.
Sartory et al.~ 1977; Grey et.al.~ 1979; Craske and Craig, 1984).
B- Studies aiming to indicate that anxiety problems can be
managed most effectively if the selection of treatment method is made
on the basis of the most problematic component of am:iety in a given
case (e.g. Ost et al., 1981, 1982 and 1984)
c- Studies inves~'gating the relationship between the way in
which phobias are acquired (conditioning, vicarious learning or
transmission of information) and the loading of each of the three
components of anxiety (e.g. Ost and Hugdahl, 1981 and 1983).
D- Studies examining the relationship between patterns of
synchrony and desynchrony and treatment outcome (e.g. Barlow et al.,
1980; Vermilyea et al., 1984).
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Studies in the first, second and fourtM categories are supported
by experimental data. Studies in the third category have received very
little, if any, support.
1.6.3. Criticism of the Three Systems Theory
Although the results of 'several experiments (e.g. Sallis et al.,
1980) lend support to the original claims of Lang (1971) indicating
that cognitive, behavioral and physiological sytems are loosely
coupled, the Three Systems Model of anxiety and emotion was criticised
from different perspectives.
A- The Problem of Convergent Validity: In the process of
assessment of fear the basic question is whether particular dependent
measures are suitable indices of fear (Kaloupek and Levis, 1983). In a
general sense different measures of a construct like anxiety need to
show relatively high correlation with other ways of measuring the same
construct in order to fulfil the requirements of convergent validity
(Cone, 1979). But the Three Systems Theory claims exactly the opposite,
(i.e. divergence among three components of anxiety), Himadi et al.
(1985) state "some authors •••••••thought that the triple response
measurement (TRM) produces nothing but confusion i.e. lack of
convergence, why bother" (p.315).
Lang, however, (1968 and 1971) warned that the response modes
will not necessarly correspond in expected ways. He called the
expectations of correspondence the indicant fallacy. He also argued
that the great variety of internal and external stimuli can
differentially effect responses and, therefore produce low
correspondence. He also added that assuming any single event could be
used in an exact substitutive way to index a psychological state could
lead to serious problems (Himadi et al.,- 1985). The Three Systems
Theory is built on the assumption that the three systems reveal
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different manifestations of the same phenomenon i.e. anxiety. Thus,
such critcisms can be dismissed on the grounds that the basic logic of
the theory encoul'"agesthe phenomenon of 11lW correspondence among the
three systems. Construing the phenomenon of anxiety in terms of the
three relatively independent components is gaining strength in
psychology (Kuiper et al., 1983).
B- Hugdahl (1981), Miller and Kozak (1982) have questioned the
definition of fear and anxiety in the Three Systems Theory. Hugdahl
asked which of two people can be said to be anxious if one shows an
increase in autonomic responsivity but lack of cognitive and behavioral
anxiety to a given stimulus, while the other reports cognitive anxiety
but shows no change either in behavior and physiological indices of
anxiety to the same stimulus. From the Three Systems Model's point of
view both are regarded as anxious, regardless of the component through
which the anxiety is manifested. The differentiation of anxiety into
three components helps the clinical psychologists to decide on the
appropriate treatment methods (Rachman, 1978; Ost et al., 1981, 1982
and 1984).
C- Cone (1979) posed a sertous diHicult,y for't.heThree Systems
Theory that still awaits a satisfactory outcome. Cone (1979) stated
that "failure to find a relationship among the measures may be due to
content differences, method differences or to content method
interaction differences •••it has been difficult to know whether lack
of correspondence between systems or contents was due to real
differences between them or to differences in the method used to assess
responding within them (pp.89-91).
As stated before,' the three different componerits
(cognitive/verbal, motoric/behavioral and physiological/somatic) have
been maasured by different methods. The ccqn itive component has been
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measured by different questionnaires. The fear-thermometer was the most
commonly employed scale (Hugdahl, 1981).
The BehaviOlral component has usually been measured by behavioral
avoidance tests. The nature of these tests differed as the behavior in
question changed. For example, in the case of claustrophobia COst et
al., 1982) the assessment of the behavioral component was made on the
basis of patients' behavioral reactions when asked to enter a small
chamber. The measure was obtained on a 0-34 point scale where each
number stood for a parti cuLar'kind 0+ behavior.
a = Refuse to enter
1 = Went in
2 = Closed the door, and so on.
The most commonly used physiological indicator of anxiety is heart
rate. Ost et al. (1981, 1982 and 1984), Grey, Sartory and Rachman (1979
and 1981), Craske and Craig (1984), Vermilya et al. (1984) and
Mavissakalian and Michelson (1982) all used heart rate to measure the
level of physiological arousal when working within the Three Systems
Theory paradigm.
Cone (1979) touches on an impor-tant point. The studies that
employ three different kind of measurement to assess the three
components of anxiety were bound to obtain low levels of correlation.
Cone (1979) indicated that the relationship between two behaviors th-clt
underlie the same cons~~uct (e.g. anxiety), could vary depending upon
the methods used to measure them. The relationship between two
behaviours (e.g. I tremble and I do not look) which were related to the
same underlying construct (heterosexual interpersonal anxiety) was
consistent.ly highest when measured in the same way. For e>:ample, both
behaviors are measured by observations of an assessor. The next highest
relationship occurs for the same behavior measured differently. For
instance, trembling is measured by directly asking the subject and
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also by observing the sUbjects> behavior. Lowest correlations are
obtained when different behaviors assessed in different ways (e.g.
trembling is assesssed by asking the subject and the other behavior 'I
do not look' is measured by observations of an assessor.
Cone>s criticism directly attacks the centre of the Three Systems
Model, namely the phemonenon of desynchrony. Desynchrany can be caused
by method differences or content differences or both. None of the
studies investigating desynchrony adequately dealt with this problem.
One study, however, by Lehrer and Woolfork (1982) employed self-report
assessment of anxiety in terms of cognitive, behavioral and somatic
modalities, which they subjected to a factor analysis. They found that
self-reports of cognitive, behavioral and somatic varieties could be
measured as orthogonal factors. In terms of Cone>s terminology, they
used the same method of measurement (self-report) to assess the level
of anxiety in three different content areas (cognitive, behavioral and
somatic) and obtained orthogonal factors.
Gathering some kind of support for the relative independence of
the three systems, (i.e. the three content areas) with the employment
of the same assessment method (self-report), Lehrer and Woolfork showed
that desynchrony and discordance could not be attributed to the method
differences in assessing the level of anxiety in the three differen~
systems. Thus, this low correlation among the three systems is less
lik~ly to be due to methodological error. The use of questionnaires to
tap the level of anxiety in different content areas also helps to
clarify the ambiguity in the verbal/cognitive component. Cone (1979)
argued that to equate the cognitive system with a client's verbal
statements could lead to methodological confusion. He stated that
"cognitive activity is not the only content area indexed by verbal
behavior, the referent may be some motor-or physiological activity
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(1979, p.89). Presentation of a brief example may help to clarify what
has been said on this issue.
Within the Three Systems Theory, subjects' verbal-statements,
irrespective of the content of the statements, are accepted as the
assessment of the cognitive anxiety. Consider some verbal-statements.
I usually think of the black side of events.
I per sp i r-e
My heart beats faster
I avoid behaving freely
It is quite unlikely that the above self reports will be related
to the assessment of responses in the cognitive domain. Only the first
item is related to the cognitive component. Probably, the second and
third items will be higly related to physiological measures (such as
heart rate and respiration rate), while the relationship between item
four and a behavioral avoidance test may be expected to be quite high.
In a way the problem lies in the confusion of content areas with
measurement methods. Lehrer and Woolfolk (1982) used self report as a
method of assessment of anxiety in the three reponse channels
(cognitive, behavioral and somatic), whereas Lang (1971) treated
self-reports of anxiety as assessment of the cognitive component only.
In this way Lang referred to the self-reports of anxiety as a content
area (the cognitive component). The result of Lehrer and Woolfolk's -
(1982) study supported"the validity of shifting self-report from being
rega-rded as a content area to being regarded as a method of assessment.
Factor analysis showed that "throeeorthogonal factors (sornatic,
cognitive and social avoidance) can be extracted from a pool of
self-report items of somatic, cognitive and behavioral anxiety related
complaints" (p.175, 1982). As Lehrer and Woolfolk indicated,
confirmation of t~e validity of this questionnaire requires the finding
of high correlations between direct measures of overt behavior and
physiological arousal and the corresponding components of .the measure.
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However, low correlations do not directly negate the validity of the
questionnaire if the subject's own perception of the behavioral and
physiological anxiety is accepted as the focus of attention
(Reisenzein, 1983). As long as physiological arousal does not reach the
threshold of the awareness of the person, it is not likely to be
considered as problematic. Therefore, focusing an the person's
perception of his autonomic arousal for the assessment of anxiety and
selection of the appropriate treatment method rather than focusing an
objectively measured physiological arousal alone may be a mare
pragmatic and realistic way of assessing a patient's anxiety.
Certainly, finding a high correlation between a subject's own
perception of his physiological arousal and an objective measure would
support the validity of using the subject's self-report measures.
Fortunately a promising conclusion related to this issue can be drawn
from the study of Ost et al. (1982). In this study the treatment of
social phobia was approached from the Three Systems Theory's point of
view. An Autonomic Perception Questionnaire (A.P.Q.> was used as one
of the self report assessments and heart-rate as the physiological
assessment of anxiety. Changes in the A. P. Q. were parallel to the
changes in heart-rate. Thus, this study indicates that a person's
perception of his own phYSiological changes are correlated with the -
physiological changes miasured by an objective method (heart-rate).
Befo~e considering another criticism, one more problem related to the
physiological/somatic component· is worth noting.
Although in most instances the third component of the three
systems Cjuestionnain: is termed 'physiological', it.has sometimes been
labelled as somatic (Kaloupek and Lewis, 1982; Lehrer and Woolfolk,
1982). It is not ~le terminological differences that the present author
wishes to discuss but their relation to phYSiological assessment. In
most studies, heart-rate (H-R) was regarded as being representative of
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the physiological component of anxiety, rarely being employed with
galvanic skin resistance or respiration rate. However, employing one or
two physiological measures, such as heart-rate or respiration rate, may
create problems, because indices of physiological arousal rarely
coincide (Lang, 1971; Plutchik, 1970). The somatic component of Lehrer
and Woolfolk's (1982) questionnaire overcomes this problem. Because the
somatic component consists of sixteen (16) items which assess various
somatic symptoms in different parts of the body, the present author
regards it as measuring the level of 'somatization' of anxiety.
A valid measure of the physiological component should cover the
whole range of physiological indices in order that the degree to which
an individual somatizes his anxiety can be accurately assessed.
Adequate physiological measurement of anxiety should include all
possible indices, but such an approach would be quite costly in terms
of time and finance. This conclusion brings the topic back to the
advantages of employing a questionnaire which aims to measure three
different components of anxiety. I will finish this discussion stating
once more that Lehrer and Woolfork's results (i.e. moderate correlation
among the three components ranging from .47 to .66), gives a promising
indication for the usefulness of the questionnaire method. It should
also be kept in mind that, as stated previously, the relationship is
consistently highest when two behaviors related to the same underlying
construct (e.g. anxiety) are measured in the same way (e.g. by a
questionnaire) (Cone, 1979). Thus, obtaining moderate correlations
among the three systems under the condition where highest correlations
between two different behaviors were expected, provid~s quite strong
grounds for both the conceptualization of anxiety as compriSing of
three relatively independent modalities and the application of
questionnaires to assess anxiety on these three components.
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D- The last criticism concerns the confusion about what is meant
by the cognitive component (Kozak and Miller, 1982; Cone, 1979;
Hugdahl, 1981). Although all the above psychologists have criticised
the vagueness of the term "cognitive component" of anxiety. each
" .
focused on a different area. Cone and Hugdahl drew attention to the
fact that in spite of a general agreement over what is meant by
behavioral and physiological components, there exist large
discrepancies in the definition of the cognitive / verbal component.
Hugdahl's (1981) criticism is the most significant one from the point
of view of the present study.
Lang (1971), Lang, Rice and ~ternbach (1972) included verbal
statements of the overall subjective feelings in the verbal/cognitive
component without specifying the source of statements (in Cone's terms,
without specifying whether the referrent is physiological or behavioral
activity, 1979), Sartory et a1. (19T7>, Grey et a1. (1979), and Ost et
al. (1981, 1982 and 1984) used the "fear-thermometer" (which simply
asks subjects to report their feelings when confronted with a phobic
stimulus) to asses the subjects' cognitive anxiety. The research which
employ fear-thermometers, implicitly (perhaps explicitly) assume that
cognitions and feelings are controlled by the same system. Ohmen and
Ursin (1979) contrary to above assumption, changed the referrent of the
cognitive component from subjective feeling to the awareness ~f the
irrationality of the behavior.
Hugdahl (1981) argued that due to the lack of a consistent
definition of the cognitive component it is difficult to compare
different studies that intend to measure the relation~hip among
different components. He added"that "without such clarification the
cognitive component-may mean at least three different things." (p.79).
a- First, the cognitive component can be conceptualized as the
client's perception of his autonomic arousal and labelling it as fear
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or anxiety. Such a view was apparent in the studies of Schachter
(1964), Sartory et a1. <1977>, and Grey et a1. (1979) in which linear
relationships between self-report and heart-rate have been reported. In
such a conceptualization there is no room for desynchrony and
discordance between cognitive and physiological components of anxiety
since a linear relationship has been predicted. Vermilyea et al.
(1984) and Himadi et al. (1985) have shown that desynchrony and
discordance among the three response systems are well established. Thus
it can be argued that conceptualization of the cognitive compcment as
a perception of autonomic arousal and labelling it as anxiety is not
supported by the empirical data.
b- Another alternative conceptualization of the cognitive
component is similar to those proposed by cognitive therapists (Ellis,
1962; Beck, 1976; Michenbaum, 1977) who argued that the thinking style
of the phobic patient, i.e. what he says to himself, and his faulty
cognitive structures, play an important role in the preservation of
maladaptive neurotic behavior. Inthis respect the cognitive component
can be defined as habitual automatic negative self-statements. Such a
"cognitive" component <automatic negative self-statemets) would be
impossible to measure by the usual anxiet~.measures, for example, the
fear thermometer. The fear thermometer, as stated before, does not
refer to negative thoughts at all, it just asks how a person feels in
a given situation.
c- Hugdahl (1981) suggests another way to define the cognitive
component: "subject's anticipatory fear and am:iety in the form of·
worrying and brooding about the forthcoming fear provoking events. In
this content, the cognitive verbal component denotes. negati~e thoughts
in advance of exposure, including fear of not being able to
instrumentally cope with the situation" (p.79). In this definition the
cognitive component is accepted as referring to negative thoughts
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rather than the perception of physiological arousal or subjective
feeling. Hugdahl (1981) also argued that a person might not experience
any anticipatory negative thoughts before an event, but nevertheless
could experience intense feelings of anxiety when confronted with an
anxiety arousing situation. On the basis of the two different
definitions (the cognitive component as negative thoughts or feelings
of anxiety), Hugdahl suggested further subdivision within the single
cognitive component. He, however, missed the essential point by
proposing "further subdivisions within the cognitive component". In
fact what he implied was: one individual's response could be manifested
as anticipatory negative thoughts while another person could display
his anxiety by intense feeling states (perhaps with little or
relatively less negative thoughts). In a way he proposed a kind of
distinction between cognitions and feelings, which was much more
clearly stated by Zajonc (1980). Rather than suggesting a subdivision
between the cognitive component (negative thoughts and sudden
feelings), The present author suggests a fourth component- feeling or
affect. As indicated by Kozak and Miller (1983), "there is not a
tripartite classification of responses inherent in the fear related
phenomena" (p.:::;:52) •
1.6.4. Summary
The approach proposed by the Three Systems Theory promises a
better understanding of the nature of anxiety problems. Initial studies
(Ost et al., 1981 and 1982) suggest that matching the type of treatment
with each patient's anxiety profile may be very effective in
alleviating anxiety. Nevertheless, certain issues within the Three
Systems Theory await clarification to make this approach more
effective. At present, the definition of the cognitive component seems
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the most problematic area of the Three Systems Theory (Hollingworth,
1986).
These considerations bring the topic to the discussion of whether
the affective (subjective feeling) system should be included within the
cognitive system or whether it should be treated as a relatively
independent system. This issue will be explored in the next section.
2. FEELINGS AND COGNITIONS
In this section, the question of whether feelings can be separated
from cognitions and treated as a relatively independent component will
be discussed. The implications of such a separation in the treatment of
anxiety disorders will be explained within the framework of the Three
Systems Theory.
In this study, the words 'feeling' and 'affect' are used
interchangeably. It should be noted that the word "feel" is generally
regarded as having a meaning that refers to all affective states, in
this paper, however, it will refer specifically to anxiety.
In the following pages a conceptualization of affect as a
relatively independent system will be exa~ined from a cognitive, a
psychoanalytical and a-physiological perspective. In addition,
contemporary approaches supporting the conceptualization of feeling as
a relatively independent system will be presented and possible
advantages of including feeling (affect) as a relatively independent
system in clinical psychology will be discussed. Finally, the
application of the feeling-cognition dichotomy in the present resear'ch
will be outlined.
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2. 1. THE COGN ITIVE PEF\sPECTIVE
2.1.1. Principles of Cognitive Therapy and Feeling
In philosophy, feeling and cognition have been distinguished as
two opposing faculties, (Plato, Kant and Hume). This tradition was
carried into psychology by Wundt (1907), Freud (1925) and Jung (1923).
Nevertheless with the dominance of the cognitive approach in psychology
in early 1960's, the distinction between feeling and cognition was
abandoned. The very basic assumption of Ellis (1962) is that feeling is
only post-cognitive. Kuiper and MacDonald (1983) state that "Implicit
in Ellis's approach is the fundamental assumption that irrational
cognitions are a basic cause of emotions" (p.298). Kuiper and
MacDonald quoted fr'om Beck who claimed that "irrational cognitions are
the primary cause of psychopathology" (1983, p.289). Kuiper and,
McDonald (1983) identified two assumptions that underly almost all
forms of cognitive psychotherapy:
A- Emotional and psychological disturbances are caused largely by
illogical or irrational thinking.
B- The restructuring of cognitions accessible to awareness
represents a therapeutic solution.
Cognitive therapy largely restricts itself to a narrow sphere
where only illogical thinking styles which are accessible to the
consciousness are accepted as the sources of psychological problems.
Thereby problematic thinking styles are the target of cognitive
interventions. In cognitive therapy the individujl's way of
conceptualization and interpretation of a given condition is considered
to be the determinant of the person's emotional state.
2.1.2. The Definition of Cognitions and Cognitive Therapy
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According to Plutchik (1980) "cognitions should be considered as
synonymous with thinking and should include such functions as
perceiving, conceptualizing and remembering" (p.28b).
Arnold (1970) introduced the term 'appraisal' to explain how
cognitions caused the development of emotions. This term refers to the
person's evaluation of a given situation as good or bad. Strongman
(1978) suggested that appraisals are cognitions that intervene between
environmental stimulation and physiological and behavioral responses.
He said that "Essentially appraisals were evaluations of the personal
warth of incoming stimulus" (p.l05). Peters (1970) defined appraisals
as the connections between emotions and classes of cognitions. Arnold
(1970) claimed that appraisals are the crucial elements which lead to
the development of emotions. Peters stated that "They (emotions) differ
from each other because of the differences in what is appraised
••••these differences in appraisals are largely constitutive of the
different emotions. By that I mean that at least logical necessary
condition for the use of the word-emotion is that some kind of
appraisal should be involved and that different emotions must be
involved in different appraisals. In other words, emotions are
basically forms of cognition" (p.188).
Lazarus, Averill and Opton (1970), proposed a definition of
emotion very similar_ to that of Peters. They argue that "each emotional
reaction, regardless of its content, is a function of a particular kind
of cognition or appraisal" (p.218). Arnold (1970), asserts that the
generation of emotions presupposes the evaluation of a stimulus
situation as good or bad. So cognitive appraisals are again considered
to be the sole factors in the appearance of emotions. Thus two
principles of cognitive therapy emerge.
A- A cognitive process (appraisal) is a prerequisite for the
emergence of emotions.
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B- In dealing with psychological problems, the focus of attention
is directed to the faulty appraisals (cognitions), since the problem is
held to be generated by them.
So in the case of anxiety, cognitive therapy assumes that whenever
a person encounters a particular situation he panics. This is because
his erroneous cognitive structures lead him to interpret and evaluate
<,
the condition as dangerous. The aim of the cognitive intervention is to
make the person aware of his own irrational cognitive structures and
replace them with healthier and more adaptive ones.
Certain pre-suppositions about human nature underlie the
assumptions of cognitive therapy. The human being is regarded as an
evaluating organism, searching his environment for cues about what he
needs and wants and evaluating each stimulus as to its personal
relevance and significance (Lazarus et al., 1970).
2.1.3. Cognitive Therapy and Human Nature
The picture of a human being that emerges is of a being who
controls and satisfies all of his internal needs by active scanning and
evaluating. Such a view of human nature is very similar to that of
computers. The analogy between computers and human beings led to the
development of quite novel and innovativ~ theories of the functioning
of the human psyche (e.g. cognitive theories in general). Nevertheless,
investigators need to be cautious when e>:plaining human nature in terms
of computers and feedback loops. The limits of the resemblance between
the two should not be exceeded. Neisser (1963) arguing just the
opposite of what has been put forward by cognitive therapists,
supported the idea of "cognitions being in the service of emotions". He
emphasized the point that although humans can be regarded as similar to
computers in certain respects, i.e. both are goal directed, both learn
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from experience and both can produce novel or creative output, four
major differences exist between the two.
A- Computers never get bored, but people do.
B- Computers have a single motivation "Jhereas people have many.
C- Computers' memories can be instantaneously erased but people
have little control over what they will learn or forget.
r-
D- Computers neither dream nor play.
Cognitive theolo-istsare also aware of the problems of explaining
human psychic functioning in terms of information processing systems.
Some cognitive psychologists accept that apar-t from those cognitions
(or appraisals or belief systems) there are other factors to be
considered. Arnold (1970) concludes that emotions could be
conceptualized as composed of two elements: "one static, the
appraisal, which is a mere acceptance or refusal of the expected effect
of the situation on us; another dynamic, the impulse toward what is
appraised as good and away from anything appraised as bad" (p.176).
Accordingly, emotion becomes a felt tendency towards anything appraised
as good and away from anything appraised as bad. Arnold also stated
that her definition could help to explain how emotions are generated.
"Whatever is perceived, remembered, imagined will be appraised: if it
is appraised as desirable or harmful an action tendency is aroused"
(p.176).
Furthermore, if the appraisal is intense i.e. the person evaluates
the condi tion or the object as very desirable, a person becomes awar'e
not only of the tendency toward the desirable object but also the fact
that this is an emotional tendency (Arnold, 1970). Within this ap~roach
although a cognitive appraisal conceptualization of emotion has been
-reformul ated by the introducti on o'fone more element, 1.e. a felt
tendency, the determining role in the development of an emotional state
still remains assigned to appraisals. The explanation of the
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development of unrealistic appraisals was, and still is, one of the
controversial areas within cognitive psychotherapy. Lazarus et al.
(1970) assumed that people have certain dispositions or tendencies to
respond selectively to stimuli and these dispositions may be the
product of psychogenetic, cultural and ontogenetic development,
probably a mixture of the three. On the basis of these dispositions,
the individual cognitively filters the incoming information and the
resulting "appraisals" determines whether the situation is evaluated
as threathening, relevant or something else.
The first point that needs to be elucidated is the term "tendency"
or "disposition". Unfortunately this is an area where cognitive
psychology does not offer a comprehensive explanation, and leaves the
nature of the word "disposition" rather ambiguous. A similar problem
arises in Arnold's theory of emotion. She refers to appraisals as
evaluations of situations. She also mentioned that some appraisals are
"intuitive" (1970).
2.1.4. Criticisms
Strongman (1978) pointed out the contradicton between cognitive
therapists over the definition of appraisals as intuitive. He stated
that "if cognition is heavily involved (as suggested by cognitive
therapists), the implication is that man can control his emotions. How
can this be so, if appraisals are i~nediate, intuitive and innate 7"
(1978, p.l07). Attributing an intuitive property to some appraisals is
incompatible with the definition of the same concept as an information
processing system. Also accepting some appraisal as intuitively·
determined opposes the concept of the human being as an evaluating
organism delineated by cognitive therapists.
Cognitive therapists' stress on the determining role of appraisals
in the development of emotions has also been criticised by Costello
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(1976) and Kenny (1963) on the grounds that conceptualizing emotions as
caused by appraisals implies that the object of emotion must always be
its cause. But this is not true for all cases; sometimes the cause may
be inaccessible to awareness at that moment.
The other assumption of cognitive therapy~ which regards the
restructuring of those problematic cognitions accessible to
consciousness as the therapeutic solutLon, has been criticised by Derry
and Kuiper (1981). Kuiper and MacDonald (1983) claimed that although
cognitive schemata could play an integral role in the etiology and
maintanence of depression, it was not clear whether these schemata were
readily accessible to consciousness. He argued further that cognitive
psychology has a broader definition of cognitions, which makes no
requirement for accessibility to awareness as a criterion for
acceptance as cognitions. Cognitive therapists (e.g. Beck and Ellis)
restricted the definition of cognitions to include only those
accessible to awareness. Such restriction could render cognitive
therapy ineffective due to the fact that cognitions inaccessible to
awareness may be immune to change utilizing this therapeutic procedure.
Costello (1976) questions the usefulness of focusing therapy on
the cognitive level alone. He also criticises another assumption of
cognitive therapy, namely, that negative'~motions are referred to as
disorganizing and useless, and are caused by faulty belief structures.
Castello thought that negative emotions serve a "signalling" function
and indicate that a "mismatch" exi sts between the demands of the
environment and the person's behavioral repertoire. Kuiper and
,.
MacDonald (1983), however, propose that negative emotions may have a
broader signalling function, in whi_ch irrational cognitions may not
always be the source of emotional disturbance. Psychological problems
may be brought about by a quite rational realization by the client that
his present behavior repertoire is inadequate to cope with the demands
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of the environment. Thus, Kuiper and MacDoald (1983) state that "if the
client's irrational cognitive structures are not the major source of
disturbance, it may be futile to focus the therapy on altering these
cognitions" (p.308). As an alternative treatment approach to
psychological problems Kuiper and McDonald (1983) recommend an eclectic
therapy package that places the emphasis on the modification of faulty
cognitions or on the mCldification of inadequate behavior patterns or
even on the modification of the clients' environment, depending upon
the nature of the case.
Cognitive therapy assumes affect is post-cognitive. Feelings and
cognitions are assumed to be isomorphic, with the governing function
being given to the cognitions. Within cognitive therapy there is no
place for feeling as a relatively independent system from thought.
Feeling as a relatively independent system is also overlooked by the
other psychological approaches. Scheff (1985) criticized the general
trend in psychology towards the conceptualization of 'feeling'. He
(
remarked that "in modern psychology feelings are referred to as
epiphenomena, that means they can not be considered to be the cause"
(p,849) •
2.2. THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSF'ECTIV~
2.2.1. Affect In Psychoanalytic Literature
Cantor and Gluckman (1983) after reviewing various definitions of
affect from a psychoanalytic approach, concluded that, although
variation among theories exists, certain common aspects can be
identified. Almost all psychoanalytical approaches to affect refer to
it as a subjective feeling tone or feeling quality which is often but
not invariably accompanied by discernible physiological or motoric
reactions.
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The psychoanalytical perspective assigns importance to the affect
component. For example, in af.f.~£t ~Qg t!~~Qr.1: Rapaport (1967) states
"••the field of affects and emotions, in other words non-sensory and
non-intellectual processes, has been a generally isolated field within
the sphere of psychology. The ~xplanation of them has remained
unsatisfactory, and in the main has attempted to reduce them to
physiological-sensory or at best intellective processes •••• in
psychoanaltical theory, affects and emotions are not isolated terrain;
no concept is more central to it than that of emotions, affect, drive."
(p.140).
While centrality of affect has clearly been illustrated by
several analysts (Drellich, 1981; Green, 1977), almost all agree that
psychoanalysis does not posses a unique theory of affect (Rapaport,
1953; Panel, 1974; Basch, 1976). The differences between psychoanalysts
on the theory of affect reach such a point that agreement over the
definitions of affect, emotion and_feeling becomes unattainable (Cantor
and Gluckman, 1983).
Drellich <1981> for instance, says that "some authors use the
terms affect, feeling and emotion synonymously and interchangebly,
others make sharp distinctions between the inner subjective e>:perience
and the expressive phenomena •••• Rapaport (1967) supported the use of
the term for the conscious subjective feeling exper ience and the word
emotion for the objective physiological and motor discharge
manifestations" (p.l7). Plutchik (1980) follows Rapaport's
conceptualization of emotions as a complex chain of reactions,
including inferred cognition, feeling and behavior. I will follow this
trend of thought in this paper.
Psychoanalysis attributes a primary role to affects in the process
of therapy. Drellich (1981) remarked that "The patients' affects are
among the most important data which psychoanalysts monitor in the
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psychoanalytic~l process" (p.ll). Rapaport (1953) also emphasized the
role of affects in analytical theory and he endorsed the views of
S.Freud, Fenichel and A. Freud that liberation of drives from
repression was necessarily accompanied by an appearance of affects.
Therefore, therapy depends upon mastering the appearance of these
affects in a certain way. In Green's (1977) paper the significance
attributed to the affects in the Freudian approach is indicated in the
following way, "•••analytical treatment using the transference gives
affect an increasingly large part to play •••• Nevertheless it remains
that affect ~eeps its place as the primary system in Freudian theory,
regulated by the pleasure and unpleasure principle whose possibilties
of transformation and evaluation offer less room for manoeuver than the
representations (ideas). But on the other hand, because the aim of
psychoanalysis is to gain an access to the most fundemental systems of
psychic life, those which regulate the basic functioning of the psychic
apparatus, the place taken by affect in the evolution of the theory is
completely justified" (pp.139-140).
In 1890, Freud referred to neurosis as caused by "strangulated
affect", defining affects as the libido or the psychic energy
(Sulloway, 1979). So when an affective discharge was not allowed its
expression by the process of repression, it accumulates or builds up.
This strangulated affect tries to express itself (discharge) through
indirect ways such as dreams, slips of the tongue, and in extreme
cases, by neurotic symptoms. Freud introduced the technique of
abreaction which consists of helping the client to express his built up
tension, as the therapeutic cure (Sulloway, 1979). Freud realized that
benefits of abreaction are qiute short lived - patients often relapsed
and symptoms recurred - • Freud then reformulated his therapeutic
process and called it psychoanalysis. In addition to abreaction,
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psychoanalysis includes three further processes - transference,
interpretation and working through.
2.2.2. Affect In The Psychoanalytic Process
The aim of psychoanalysis is to release repressed impulses stored
in the unconscious. To achieve this, the analytic atmosphere must
convince the patient that there is nothing to fear in letting
previously repressed impulses express themselves. The key features in
the analytical atmosphere are the permissive attitude Of.the therapist
and his encouragement of the patient to free expression of repressed
impulses (Ale>:ander, 1963). Within these conditions the infantile
oedipal relationships are recreated and the relationship between the
patient and important figures in his childhood are transferred to the
therapist. Alexander and French (1974) specified the transference as "a
kind of relationship which is obtained within the therapeutic
situation wherein the therapist is indeed the representative of a
figure of importance from out of patients past" (p.73).
The most significant feature of transference is illustrated by
Kline (1984), who states that "•••• what is normally repressed and
beyond the awareness of the patient is now literally in the open,
existing between the patient and the therapist. All deep emotion and
ambivalence of love and hate can be worked through, the feelings
expressed and come to terms with. Thus transference is the core of the
therapy" (p.35).
When Cl transference situation is created, a new phase in therapy
appears: the £Qr.::r.::~£!J.Yl@§:!!!Q:ti9D§! ~~Q§:r.::i§:!J!;§. This phase leads to the
resolution of the transference. In this new stage the aim is to
correct those emotions that were previously repressed. Alexander (1963)
writes of the corrective emotional exper ience "When the early
conflictual relationship is repeated in the transference, the
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therapist's attitude must reverse that 9f the intimidating parent. He
can be objective and understanding because he is not emotionally
involved~ this permits the patient to express himself/herself more
freely. The parental intimidation is corrected by the more tolerant and
sympathetic attitude of the therapist, who replaces the authoritarian
parents in the patient's mind. As the patient realizes that his modest
self-assertion will not be punished, he will experiment more boldly. At
the same time he can express himself more freely towards persons in
authority in his present life. This increases the ego's c_apacity to
deal "'lithaggressive attitudes "'Ihicham:iety had previously repre9.sed"
(pp.286-87). In short, the therapist emotionally responds to the
patient's transference in a way that neutralizes negative consequnces
(affects) of the parental behavior (Alexander, 1963).
In transference and corrective emotional experince, the primary
role ascribed to affects is undoubtedly clear. Nevertheless,
psychoanalysis recognizes the role of intellectual processes. The
'Intellectual insight' of a patient into the nature of the origins of
his condition is referred to as one of the most important steps towards
the cure. Alexander (1963), however, stresses that the "patient must
feel what he understands, otherwise he could be cured by a textbook"
(p.288). Intellectual insight, as a principle, is built in and
associated with emotional experiences, it helps the perpetuation of
emotional gains and improves the effects of emotional experiences.
Valenstein (1962) while he grants the fundemental significance to
emotional reliving for the achievement of insight and cure,
nevertheless appreciated the contribution of intellectual processes to
this end. He states that "Psychoanalysis can be described as an
experience in the broad sense, that is to say, both as a source of
affective connotative knowledge (consequence of awareness through
emotional and E'xperiencial acquaintanceship) and also of cognitive
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knowledge (consequent of predominantly intellectual awareness)
Sometimes the emotional state or the affect leads the thought
representations, sometimes it is the ideas which leads the affect into
consciousness and into expression. The important point is that there be
a ready association of one to the other" (pp.321-322).
2.2.3. Affect and Cognition: Two Separate Systems
In cognitive therapy, affects (feeling) are treated as an
epiphenomenon (i.e. they cannot be considered to be causes) (Scheff,
1985) and as post-cognitive, therefore, a patient·s cognitive
structures have been targeted for intervention. In the psychoanalytical
approach, h6wever, the emphasis is shifted from cognitive structures to
affects. Part of the reason for this contradiction can be found in the
differences of the models which originally informed the theorists of
each school. Psychoanalytical theory was developed when such concepts
as energy, closed systems and hydraulic models were popular in physics
whereas information-processing feedback-loops, computers are the
models adopted by cognitive theorists.
Psychoanalysts emphasize the importance of affects but also accept
the role of cognitions in psychic process~s. Cognit.ive theorists play
down emotions and emphasize cognitions. But the important difference is
that psychodynamic theory advocates a relative independence of affect'
from cognition. Freud (1915), Valenstein (1962), and Green (1977) for
example, endorse a parallelism between affective and cognitive
processes but, neVertheless, argue for their separateness. For instance
Freud in his essay on the unconscious (1915) states that "the whole
difference arises fron the fact that ideas are cathexes ultimately of
memory traces whilst affect and emotion corresponds with process of
discharge the final expression of which is perceived as feeling"
(p,111). In t:!~!1 l!J.i[Qg!:!£iQ[)! bg£.i!:!.[~§. Q!J.E§t£b.Q~!J.~!.t§!.§' (1932) Freud
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discusses the role repression plays in anxiety "It is the idea which is
subject to repression and which may be distorted to the point of being
unrecognized, but its quota of affect is regularly transformed into
anxiety" (p.115).
Valenstein"s paper (1962) reflects the cleavage in a somewhat
different manner. He held the idea.that "Affects and ideas stand in an
interesting relationship to one another developmentally. Affects being
closely related to instinctual drives and tension levels close to the
primary process, and in this sense, more archaic than ideas. Ideas as
thought representatives are expression of secondary procesess and Ego
functioning" <p.322). Valenstein's separation of affects from thought
in terms of primary and secondary processes stems from Freud's ideas in
"the Project". Ostow (1961) when refering to the Project states that
"•••an affect, Freud says, intensifies the idea to which it is
attached, inhibits thought and facilitates primary process, uninhibited
instinctual discharge. The Ego acts to inhibit futher release of affect
after a small amount has been released" (p.85).
The primary process refers to the disposition towards the
immediate discharge of psychic energy characterised by the high
mobility of instinctual impulses. Cathexes of mental energy (ideas) are
the materials that r~present the aims of discharge. In early childhood,
the primary process dominates psychic life, pushing the representations
towards discharge. Such a process is experienced by the child as a wish
Dr a desire (Arlow and Brenner, 1974). The primary process, which is
regulated by the id, includes imagination and ideas accompanying
instinctual energy.
The SEcondary process the emergence of which is tie~ up to the
development of the ego, is characterised by its ability to bound and
delay the instinctual energy. The ego which has the task of
self-preservation, evaluates and processes the incoming information and
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decides whether or not the conditions are appropriate for the
satisfaction (release) of the instinctual energy. So the secondary
process acts as the regulator of the desires and wishes generated in
the id. Nevertheless, the function of the ego is to satisfy those
drives of the id, under the conditions where its discharge does not
possess any threat to the organism. Freud stressed that the function of
the ego was to serve the desires of the id as well as preserving a
harmonious interaction between the organism and the environment (1932).
2.2.4. Affect And Cognition: Two Processes Of Mental
Functioning
To reformulate what has been said above: affects and cognitions
can be considered at least partially separate on the basis of their
mode of functioning. Some theorists (e.g. Valenstein, 1962) hold that
the operation of affect functions at the primary process level, while
cognitions function at the level-of secondary process. The point to
emphasize is that the absence or the presence of ideas are not the
discriminating factors between the primary process (feeling or affect)
and the secondary process (cognitions). That is, in the primary process
both affects and ideas exist and the ai~ of the affect is to satisfy
its idea. The diffe~entiating power is attributed to the level of
functioning and the quality of ideas. Ideas are just cathexes of the
.
psychic energy, they are brought about by this energy automatically,
and have no power of controlling the drives. The instinctual energy is
regulated by the pleasure principle, and its sole aim is to obtain
satisfaction by discharge.
In the secondary process the instinctual energy is bound and
controlled by thought processes which have emerged through relationship
between the infant and the enviroment. In the secondery process the
determining function is assigned to the ideas (thought processes) in
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this level of functioning. The secondary process is charecterised by
the binding of instinctual energy by processing the information coming
from the enviroment. Acting as a control agent, the secondary process
regulates the release of the psychic energy. Therefore, it is more
appropriate to identify those ideas in the primary process as images or
phantasies related to the instinctual energy, and those ideas in the
secondary process as thoughts. Rapaport (1959) stated that "••• Freud
contrasts the terms ideation and thinking. The implication is that
ideation pertains to drive-representations, thinking to reality
representation; these terms express the difference between the id and
the ego-organization of thought ••••• The memory trace of the excitation
and that of the need satisfying object become associated and, when the
need again arises, the memory of the need-satisfying object emerges
with hallucinatory vividness. This memory image becomes the ideational
representation of the drive underlying the need •••• Ideation yields
its place in the course of development to the process of thought in
which all ideas related to the need satisfying object are so organized
as to enable a planful search for the need satisfying object in
reality" (pp.324-325).
Arlow and Brenner (1974), suggest tJlat the terms primary and
secondary processes do not indicate the quality of the level of
functioning. A healthy mental operation does not imply the domination
of a personality by the secondary process functioning i.e. binding of
affective discharge all together. A well adapted personality has both
processes functioning harmoniously. The predominance of either,one may
be Cl precursor for the development of emotional problems.
Valenstein (1962) asserted that affects, being more ~rchaic than
cognitions, are closer to the primary process; and cognitions are the
consequence of the interaction between environment and organism and
therefore are nearer to secondary process functioning. In fact, such
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separation of affect from cognitions can be understood more clearly
when Arlow and Brenner's (1974) conceptualization of secondary process
and Plutchik's explanation of the development of cognitive processes
are considered jOintly. Arlow and Brenner (1974), in describing the
nature of the secondary process, stated that "•••this quality of mental
functioning (the secondary process) is a later acquisition of the mind.
The secondary process results from the impact of reality and of the
environment upon the developing mental apparatus. It reflects the
effects of experiences of mastering frustration, of beini rewarded by
important objects in the environment, and of socially determined moral
concepts" (p.86).
Plutchik (1980) explains the development of cognitions, from an
evolutionary perspective. He said "In the most basic sense, any
organism must predict on the basis of limited information whether there
is a danger in its environment or a food or a mate, depending on the
prediction made, the organism makes a decision to run, to attack, or to
play or to mate. From this point of view the complex processes of
sensory input, evaluation, symbolisation, comparison of memory states
and the like, those processes we call cognitive are in the service of
emotions and biological needs" (p.295)•.Plutchik reiterates, however,
that cognition developed later for more accurate prediction of the
future so that the organism could function more effectively in his/her
life. Parallelism between the authors implies that cognitions and the
secondary process can be conceptualized as being similar to each other.
I
Plutchik, in conceptualizing cognitions as in the service of emotions
seems to restate Freud's (1932) claim: the Ego is in the service of the
Id.
The functions of the ego are similar to the functions of the
secondary process, nevertheless, the total domination of a personality
by the secondary process operations i.e. excessive inhibition of drive
(affective) discharge~ does not lead to a better functioning
personality. What needs to be clarified is the nature of the secondary
process and the place of the super-ego in the interaction between the
primary and sEcondary procEsses. ThesE two processes as defined by
Arlow and Brenner (1974) refer roughly to the releasing and binding of
instinctual energy. The id then functions at the primary process and
the ego at the secondary process level. Then the super-ego~ from the
dynamic view point, can be considered to reside in the secondary rather
than the primary process. It acts as an agent of societal rul~s within
one's personality by inhibiting the impulses from the id.
There is a qualitative difference between the super-ego's
inhibitions and the ego's delay of the id drives. The aim of the ego is
to satisfy the id's drives under appropriate con~itions so that the
satisfaction does not threaten the organism's existence. The super-ego,
however, does not have such a self-preservation duty. Rather, its aim
is to supress the id's impulses indefinitely. From this point of view
the domination of a personality by the secondary process (inhibitory
forces) is as detrimental as the domination by the primary process. A
healthy ego regulated by the reality principle is one that sustains a
harmonious interaction between the primary and the secondary processes.
In other words, a h~alty ego releases the instinctual 'impulses at
appropriate occasions but also witholds them when necessary, until a
convenient situation arises again. The conceptualization of a healthy
ego in terms of harmonious interaction of the p~imary and the secondary
processes rather than the domination of the primary process by the'
secondary process have also been proposed by Green (1986). He stated
that "••in opposition to what Freud thought, it is not sb much a
question of the secondary process dominating the primary processes, but
rather that the analysand can make the most creative use of their
~Q!~!!t!Q~!and do so in the most elaborate activities of the mind just
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as he does in everyday life." (p.20). Thus, the aim of a healthy ego is
to satisfy as well as inhibit drive discharges that are represented by
affects.
2.2.5. Conclusion
The approach adopted in this paper is that affect (feeling) and
cognition can be conceptualized as two relatively independent systems.
Information presented in the above sections indicated that affect is
closer to primary process functioning (i.e. discharge of drives) and
cognition is more similar to secondary process functioning (i.e.
binding and neutralization of affective discharges). The separation of
affect from cognition implies that the psychic structure of each person
can differ in terms of the level of influence of the affective and
cognitive systems. For example, the affective (primary process) may
predominate in one person, while the cognitive (the secondary process)
may dominate in another. In the case of anxiety, the former may
experience the distress mainly in his affective domain, whereas the
latter may experience exactly the same phenomenon largely in his
cognitive domain and in terms of negative, anticipatory thoughts. Thus,
the same objective phenomenon (anxiety) fs perceived and expressed
differently. This conceptualization is similar to Kendall's (1984) who
regards affect and cognition as issues that can produce variability
among people. He thought that some people were excessively cognitive
(ruminative) whereas others were insufficientlf cognitive (impulsive).
He said "it is, in my opinion, possible for there to be individual
differences in the degree to which affect versus cognition contrib~tes
to the development and/or maintenance of certain types of
maladjustments" (p.131). Those people whose psychic life is relatively
more dominated by the primary process are characterized by the
mechanism of displacement and condensation CArlow and Brenner, 1974).
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Valenstain (1962) discusses affectualization as a defense mechanism,
which is usually emp loved by hysterical characters who are prone to
powerful and relatively primitive affect responses. He also referred to
individuals with obsessive personality as having been characterised by
the containment of drive impulses and subsequently the isolation of
affect from the idea. He stated that "In psychoanalysis such
individuals intellectualize and isolate affect from their conscious
experience and communication to ward off insight through depriving the
analytical material of the quality of emotional authenticity" (p.317).
Either of the processes (the primary and the secondary) can be employed
to avoid insight and the advance of the therapeutic procedure. Neither
one of them can be regarded as more healthy in terms of psychic "well
being" since the domination of a personality by either one of them may
result in psychological problems. Only the nature of the problem
varies. For example, if the primary process is dominant there arises an
excess of affect and hysterical symptoms, if the secondary process is
dominant, it leads to the inhibition of affect and obsessive-compulsive
symptoms.
Up to this point assumptions of cognitive and psychoanalytic
treatment approaches to emotional problems have been stated to indicate
that while in the main cognitive thera~~ leaves no room for the
-separation of feeling from cognition, such discrimination is possible
within psychoanalysis. However, to treat the topic evenly, it should be
noted that some authors (Basch, 1976; krystal, 1977 and Schur, 1969)
within the psychoanalytic school defend the inseparability of affects
from ideas, but their opposition is directed more to the complete
separation of the two. But they at least acknowledge the variability of
the role of cognitive elements from emotion to emotion (Schur, 1969).
It is important to note at this point that the separation of affect
from cognitions should not be taken to e>:treme. Their independence is
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relative, for it is a well recognized phenomenon that feelings and
cognitions are closely related, being effected by the same events and
continuously interacting through feedback mechanisms (Zajonc, 1980).
2.3. PHYSIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the psychoanalytical literature physiological arousal was
regarded as common but not a necessary accompaniment of affects
(Rapaport, 1967). Rapaport claimed that "affect could manifest itself
in the psychological level or physiological level or in both levels.
Emotion is a process which may have a great variety of phenomenological
manifestations. One could then have to deal with the process emotion
in psycho~omatic terms, maintaining that sometimes its physiological
manifestations may become more obvious to such an extent that they may
seem altogether absent" (p.ll). Plutchik (1980), however, maintained
that emotional reactions do not depend on prior presence of a
physiological state of arousal.
Schachter and Singer (1962) proposed that physiological arousal
and cognitive attribution are the necessary components of an emotional
experience. This is the cognitive arousal theory of emotion in which
affect is treated as post cognitive, in the sense that it occ~rs only
after physiological arousal and cogniti~e attribution of this arousal
-has been completed. Lader and Tyrer (1975) point to an ambiguity of the
term "arousal". They remark that Schachter's use of the word refers to
a hightened activity of the the peripheral vegetative system.
Moreover, in Schachter's theory the perceived arousal has been
employed as the measure of physiological state. The perceived arousal
refers to the perception of feed-back from the periphery, not the
peripheral physiological arousal. For Schachter then arousal and its
feed-back becomes psychologicaly significant only to a level that is
perceived by the individual (Mandler, 1975). So, those arousals which
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were unable to reach the threshold to be perceived by a person were not
taken into account in the theory. This assumption seems quite
reasonable~ for as long as a person cannot perceive his own
physiological arousal~ such changes in his body will have no relevance
in the evaluation of a situation.
Reisenzein (1983) hypothesized that if physiological arousal, more
correctly its feed-back, is crucial for the emergence of emotion, then
if either such feed-back is blocked or its intensity is reduced, the
level of the emotional experience will be reduced accordingly. To test
this assertion he examined two types of studies:
A- Studies of emotional experience in people with spinal cord
injuries. 3his type of patients were selected because functional
transsection of the spinal cord eliminates proprioceptive, cutaneous
and visceral input from a substantial portion of the body. Studies by
Janas and Hakmiller (1975) and Hohmann (1966) showed that patients'
level of subjective feeling (sexual and agressive) declined in
intensity as the lesion became more marked. In Hohmann's (1966) study
patients also reported higher levels of sentimentality after their
injuries. However, because of methodological shortcomings the results
of these studiBs were inconclusive. Several important variables were
left uncontrolled. Reisenzein stated that "considering the dramatic
life changes resulting from severe spinal-cord injuries, reports of
declined intensity of feeling could be the ~esult of psychological
adaptation the patient has to make ••• or of any number of causes other
than the injury itself" (1983, p.241).
B- Studies on the effects of adrenergic receptor blocking
sUbstances in emotion. Beta-blockers reduce peripheral arousal
reactions, that act mainly on the cardiovascular system reducing the
effect of sympathetic nerve activity (Weiner, 1980). Results of several
studies ( Liu. Debus and Janke, 1978 and Tyrer, 1976) indicate that.. .
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with the administration of beta-blockers and the expected reduction of
peripheral arousal, there is no observed reduction in the level of
reported anxiety. Reisezein, contradicting Schachter's and Singer's
assertions, suggests that the perception of physiological arousal is
not directly related to the intensity of the feeling. However, it is
difficult to arrive at a conclusion at this stage of the research
because numerous sources of autonomic feed-back were left unaffected by
beta-blocking agents. Nevertheless, it can be argued that if the link
between the perception of physiological arousal and the emotional
experience is as intimate as Schachter claims, the reduction of
cardiovascular feed-back obtained by beta-blockers would result in a
significant reduction in the level of emotional experience. This
conclusion was supported by investigations of Fahrenberg (1965) and
Shield and Stern (1979) which showed that cardiovascular feed-back
accounts for the most salient components of perceived arousal.
The upshot of this research is that subjective feeling (affect)
need not be equated with the perception of physiological arousal. The
discrepancy between bodily reaction and subjective emotional feeling is
the point where the Three Systems Theory and Schachter's theory are in
conflict (Rachman, 1978). Schachter and Singer (1962) have regarded the
physiological arousal as the "necessary condition" for the formation of
anxiety, whereas the Three Systems Approach offers grounds for the
experience of anxiety without marked physiological accompaniments
(Rachman and Hodgson, 1974).
If feelings can be conceptualized as relatively indepedent from
both cognitions and physiological arousal, then a need to reconsider
the position of feelings in modern ~sychology seems to be ~nevitable.
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2.4. AFFECTS fiNDCOGNITIONS IN THE RECENT LITERATURE
,
The relative separation of affect (feeling) from cognitions is
not confined to psychoanalysis alone. Since the 1980s studies
emphasizing the importance of feelings have flourished (Plutchik, 1980;
Zajonc, 1980, 1984; Izard, Zajonc and Kagan, 1984; Sheff, 1985).
Plutchik (1980) defined emotions as consisting of three related
but relatively independent components: cognition, feeling and behavior.
He proposed that although those three systems, (especially cognition
and feeling) are intimately related, some variations can occur among
them. He stated that "Even if the cognition is accurate, it is still
possible for the feeling aspect of the emotional chain to be blocked,
modified or distorted. This is presumably what ego defenses such as
denial and repression do. However, even if the feeling is clearly
present, ~ppropriate action mayor may not occur. This is simply
because environment or internal restraints prevent the action.
Emotions may thus be conceptualized as sequential chains of events,
involving inferred cognition, feeling states and behavioral effects"
(p.290).
His approach to emotions is from a psychoevolutionary
perspective, from which he argues for the primacy of emotions (I think
it would be more accurate to say the primacy of affect) over
cognitions. He claims that the very first organism had to "emote"
-fight or flee-, and cognitions developed later in order.to ensure
those primitive and sssentialy emotive activities had been executed in
the best interest of the organism.
The most comprehensive st.udy on t.heseparat.ion of feelings from
cognitions is Zajonc's (1980 an-d 1984). He argues <198!) "Preferences
Need No Inferences": Affects and cognitions are separable and partially
independent systems, while they usually work jointly. Nevertheless,
affect can be generated without. prior cognitive process. He criticised
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contemporary psychology on the grounds that it regards feelings (or
affects) as post-cognitive, that is, elicited only after considerable
processing of information has been completed. Zajonc, (1980) examining
mainly social psychological research conluded that "•••affect and
cognition are under the control of separate and partially independent
systems that can influence each other in a variety of ways •••"
(p.152). He goes on to say that even though both feeling and thought
involve energy and information, feeling has been described as mainly
energy, while a substantial weight has been given to lnformcltionin the
composition of the latter. Referring to this issue, Zajonc (1980)
stated that "In the pure case, the analysis of feelings attends
primarily to energy transformations, in contrast, the analysis of
thoughts focuses primarily on information transformations" (p.154).
Zajonc's debt to Freud can easily be detected. In the analytical
approach, affect is accepted as standing closer to the primary process
characterised by the continuous'striving of the psychic energy for
discharge. Similarly, Zajonc defined feeling as predominantly energy
transformation. Intellectual processes are regarded as closer to the
secondary process, which have the role both of evaluating the
environment and processing the inform~~ion in order to regulate the
discharge of the p~ychic energy. Furthermore, cognition is regarded as
consisting of mainly information transformation in Zajonc's definition.
Zajonc (1984) argued that the point in separating feeling from
cognitions is not how much information the organism requires from the
environment in order to produce an emotional reaction, but how little
work it must perform on this information to produce an emotional
reaction. He proposes that, for Cl mental phenomenon to be called a
cognition, it must involve operations of the sensory input in which
such input has been transformed into ~ form that may become
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subjectively available. The transformation of the sensory input
implicitly presupposes active involvement from the organism.
Here it is useful to refer to the distinction between ideas and
thought. In the primary process the ideas are generated by the
instinctual energy, representing the goal of the discharge. Hence, the
ideas in the primary process are completely dependent on the
instinctual impulse. Furthermore, by being generated through psychic
energy alone, processes such as information processing or evaluation of
t.heenvironment do not operate. It may be said that these ideas
manifest themselves in terms of a wish or a desire. By contrast, in the
secondary process thoughts are assumed to function via the processing
of infofmation coming from the environment. The aim of the secondary
process is to control and regulate the instinctual demands with the
help of mechanisms peculiar to the secondary process, that is, thought.
However, feeling and cognition - mentioned previously in terms of
instinctu'l energy and information processing - would best be regarded
as independent but interacting systems. Because each, cognition and
feeling, include both energy and information only their relative weight
differs (Zajonc, 1980).
Zajonc supports his theoretical ~laim by reviewing the literature
for empirical rese~rch. His arguments can be presented as follows.
A- Affective reactions show phylogenetic and ontogenetic primacy
(Izard et aI., 1984), Izard et al, (1984) after reviewing the empirical
studies pertinent to feeling-cogniti on contr-oversv, concluded that
"emotions and cogni t ions can be considered as separate but interactive
systems" (p.33).
B- Separate neuroanotomical structures can be identified for
affect and cognition.
a- Emotional reactions are likely to be under the control of
right brain hemisphere, whereas cognitive processes are predominantly
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the concern of the left hemisphere (Cacippo and Petty~ 1981; Schwarts,
Davitson and Maer, 1975).
b- Emotional features of speech are controlled by the right
hemisphere, whereas semantic and lexical aspects are controlled by the
left (Ross and Mesulam~ 1979).
C- Appraisal and affect are often uncorrelated and disjoint.
a- Affective judgements of a person are characterised by a
primacy effect, whereas appraisal informations are influenced by a
recency effect (Ander"son and Hubert, 1963; Pasner and Synder, 1975).
b- The weighting assigned to trait adjectives that
contribute to preferential judgements of hypothetical individuals are
uncorrelated with the recall of these adjectives (Dreben, Fiske and
Hastie, 1979).
c- If cognitive appraisal is the necessary determinant of
affect~ then changing the appraisals should result in a change in
affect. This is usually not so (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981).
Zajonc's approach is more constructive than that of cognitive
therapists (e.g. Lazarus~ 1982) who reject the possibility of
independence of affect from cognition. According to cognitive
therapists, appraisals are the preconditions for the emergence of
feelings. As Zajonc stated "Assuming that cognitive appraisal is always
a necessary precondition of emotion preempts research on the matter"
(p.117). His idea was to leave the final word in the problem of
separating feeling from ~ognitions to empirical findings, rather than
to assumptions and definitions.
Wilson (1983) and Rachman (1981) have discussed the implications
of referring to feelings as a relatively independent component within
clinical psychology. Rachman (1981) postUlates an asymmetrical
relationship between the two, saying that, while it is easier to find
examples in which affective reactions were triggered and intensified
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by cognitive elements, the reverse does not hold. Once an affective
reaction has been formed, it is quite difficult to alleviate it by
cognitive means. Thus, he concluded that "cognitive operations were
relatively ineffective means of reducing affective reactions but
potentially powerful means of inducing and increasing affective
reactions" (1981, p.282'. Rachman also draws attention to the current
position of cognitive therapies by indicating that" •••attempts at
overcoming psychological problems by cognitive methods have fallen
short of hopes and e>:pectations. The relative weakness of most forms of
rational psychotherapy can perhaps be traced to two assumptions that
have been challanged by Zajonc.
A - Most forms of rational psychotherapy have assumed that affect
is post-cognitive rather than pre-cognitive.
B - Rational psychotherapy is based on the implicit assumption
that cognition and affect operate within the same system" Cp.283).
In general, it appears from the foregoing that there are ample
grounds for attributing relative independence to the affective
(feeling) system. Affects can be considered as similar to a- the
primary process functioning, b- the concept of psychic: energy and c-
the dynamic component of emotion. On t.heother hand, it seems
appropriate to refer to cognitions as being nearer to a- the secondary
Iprocess functioning, b- the concept of information processing and c-
the static component of emotion.
Once the status of "feeling (or affectl" is established as a
relatively independent system, an important question arises for
clinical psychology: Given the affective system has the capacity of
relatively independent functioning, what therapeutic: methods
specifically modify the affec:tive c:omponent?
In this paper anxiety is conceptualized as consisting of four
components rather than three, feeling is given a position similar to
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those of the three systems (cognitive~ behavioral and somatic). Hugdahl
(1981) pointed out the vagueness in the definition of the cognitive
component and suggested a further subdivision within the cognitive
component. The same problem was mentioned by Izard et al. (1984). Izard
et al. (1984) drew attention to the controversial nature of the
definition of the subjective-experiential component: "The central
question is whether the third component of emotion is basically Cl
feeling state, a special type of cognitive process (e.g. "hot
coqru t ion"}, or a combination of feeling and cognition. ~Jedo not
consider it a trivial question. For those who consider the component as
consisting solely a feeling state~ there is a large and relatively
unexplored territory of the emotion-cognition relationship" Cp.3).
THE I!"IPLICAT IONS OF SEPARAT ING AFFECT FRO!"ICOGN ITION
IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Clinical psychology is currently dominated by cognitive,
behavioral and physiological approaches. The primary target of
cognitive therapy is to change a client's faulty cognitive structures.
The assumption is that such change will improve affective problems.
Behavi or ther apists~ on the other hand, focus on t.he maladapt ive
behavior pattern. The assumption is that changing maladaptive behavior
patterns will directly improve the affective problem of the person. The
physiological approach attempts to induce affective improvement in
patients through the assistance of drugs. The·Three Systems approach
..
embodies a combination of these three treatment methods. To include
affect as a separate system contradicts the underlying asessment and
treatment assumptions of these approaches since they re~ard affect as
an epiphenomenon. In contrast to the Three Systems approach,
psychoanalysis focuses on affect, and attributes a primary role to
feeling in the aetiology of anxiety. Psyihodynamic approaches,
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therefore, do not attempt to modify affects by changing a patient's
behavior or by modifying cognitive structures. Rather, the treatment
focuses on the affective relationship between the therapist and the
patient (e.g. tranference). The significance of the therapeutic
athmosphere in the process of psychoanalysis has always been stressed
as one of the most important elements determining the outcome of the
therapy (Valenstain, 1962).
If affect is incorporated into the Three Systems approach, it may
be possible to assess a patient's anxiety in a more detailed form. For
example, one person may experience anxiety with numerous anticipatory
negative ideas, a certain level of subjective feeling and behavioral
avoidance and somatic symptoms. While another person may react to the
same situation with relatively few anticipatory negative ideations, but
quite high levels of subjective feeling of anxiety. In clinical
practice there are cases where after a certain period of therapy
patients state that although he/she knows that nothing aversive is
going to happen, he/she still experiences an uneasy feeling. The
response of a cognitive therapist, usually, is to suggest that although
the patient reports no irrational or negative cognitions about the
sit.uatt on, he/she sti11 exhibits automatic thoughts that are outsi de
of his/her awareness.
For the same case, however, a psychoanalyst would assert that the
problem is mainly unconscious and the patient's affective problem
should be dealt with first, but certainly not through intellectual
..
processes alone. Hence, when subjective feelings playa dominant role
in the manifestation of anxiety, psychoanalytically oriented treatment
packages may be more effective.
In summary, I suggest that conceptualization of feeling (affect)
as a relatively independent system may improve assessment and treatment -
of an~iety disorders. The treatment methods for anxiety disorders could
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change depending on whether patients are affectively oriented or
cognitively oriented. Because, affectively oriented clients may be more
responsive to certain aspects of the treatment which may have
relatively less curative property for cognitively oriented clients.
Since the advent of cognitive psychology, cognitive (behavior)
therapy techniques have been routinely applied to each patient without
considering each patient's personality structure and without paying
enough attention to affective component during the therapy. Thus,
instead of the Three Systems conceptualization, I propose a Four
Systems Approach, adding an affective (feeling) system as the fourth
component. I also suggest that psychoanalytic therapy is an appropriate
method of modifying the affective system.
2.6. APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT RESEARCH
To examine whether feelings and cognitions can be conceptualized
as interacting but relatively separate systems in the manifestation of
anxiety, the following groups will be compared:
A - Male and female subjects.
B - Obsessive-compulsive patients and all other DSM-III anxiety
patients.
A- Male female differences
I suggest that females will experience anxiety relatively evenly
on cognitive and feeling components. Malesi on the other hand, will
--tend to experience anxiety more in the cognitive domain and relatively
less in the feeling when compared to the female sample. Such
differences are thought to appear due to relatively different
personality structures of male and female subjects as proposed by
Freud (1925) and Torgerson (1980).
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IPsychoanalytic and social psychological investigations provide the
rationale for this claim. Psychoanalysts (e.g. Freud, 1913) clearly
state that the male personality structure is closer to the obsessive
type while females have personality disposition similar to hysterical
traits. Adams (1973) and Freud (1925) point out that
obsessive-compulsive disorders are mainly found in male patients, Abse
(1975), Arieti (1975), Torgerson (1980) argued that hysterical
personality structure and hysterical problems are closely related to
the female personality. Torgersen (1980) in a study to replicate the
factor structure demonstrated by Lazare et al. (1966 and 1970) on oral,
obsessive and hysterical personality syndromes, found that a hysterical
-factor structure is poorly replicated in a male sample, but clearly
appeared in a female sample. He suggests that "perhaps it was true that
the hysterical personality was a typical female characteristic"
(p.1276).
Both, obsessive-compulsive personality and obsessive compulsive
disorder are characterised by certain defense mechanisms such as
undoing, isolation and reaction formation (Salzman and Frank, 1981;
Insel, 1982). In this study isolation is the focus of interest. This
defense mechanism denotes the separation of affect from the idea. A
person who employs this defense mechanism has been described as
"exerting severe control over his emotions, thereby producing a
pseudoplacid unaffect, flattened emotional state "( Salzman and Frank,
1981, p.287). Lazare et al. (1966) in their study investigating the
validity of the psychoanalytic obsessive type include nine adjectives
that are supposed to indicate the features of an obsessive personality.
One of these adjectives is "emotional constriction", referring to the
use of the isolation defense mechanism. They defined emotional
constriction in terms of a narrow range of affective reaction;
difficulty in warm outgoing contact; cold; abstract and emotionless,
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and avowed rationality. In sharp contrast to this obsessive type, a
hysterical personality structure is marked by high levels of
emotionality. Valenstein (1962) referred to affectualization as a
typical defense deployed by hysterical personalities. Lazare et al.
(1966) regard emotionality as one of the important denominators of a
hysterical personality structure. These people are characterised by: an
easy excitability; an inconsistency in reactions; labile affectivity;
irrational emotional outbreaks; intenstiy of expression of feelings,
deficiency in emotional control; a lack of emotional inhibition and.an
extravagance of emotional color.
In the light of this, males can be considered to be closer to the
obsessive type personality structure, and will exhibit less
-emotionality but higher levels of emotional constriction when compared
to females. In general the opposite is true for women. The female
personality is generally a hysterical type and is characterised by
higher emotionality and less emotional constriction.
Social psychologists explain the male-female differences in
emotional and intellectual functioning in terms of the differences in
socialization. Spence and Helmrich (1978), for instance, suggested that
through societal rules and pressures, females are forced to accept a
more feminine identity which result$ in a personality structure that is
characterised b~ emotionality and sensitivity. Males, on the other
hand, are required to take on a masculine identity which is more
competitive, more active, more independent and less emotional.
Lateralization studies (Buffery and Gray, 1972; Levy and Reid,
1976) indicated that females were less lateralized than mal~s. That
means that the left hemisphere, which organizes mainly cognitive
processes, is more dominant in males. Whereas in females lateralization
is less complete. These findings also suggest that males, having
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greater lateralization, will exhibit more separation between their
feelings and cognitions than females.
In terms of the feeling versus cognitive issue, females will
reveal anxiety in both cognitive and feeling components more or less
equally, while males will manifest higher differences between
cognitive and feeling domains of an>:iety in the direction of the
cognitive component.
2- Obsessive-compulsive and all other DSM-III anxiety patients.
Secondly, the anxiety manifestation patterns of
obsessive-compulsives and remaining anxiety patients of DSM-III
(hysterical) on the feeling and the cognitive components are planned to
be compared. First of all, I would like to clarify the meaning of the
term 'hysteric' as used here. In this study this term is viewed
completely from a psychoanalytical perspective.
The term "hysteric' has been used in the past to refer to a
particular female psychological problem. Freud revolutionized the
meaning of this term by claiming that the title of hysteric should be
used for both sexes. He used the term to refer to a particular
personality structure. Freud contrasted the hysterical personality with
the obsessive-compulSive. He suggested that these two types of
personality structures were different in terms of types of defense
mechanisms employed and the stage of fixation at their psychosexual
development. He further suggested that the terms obsessive and hysteric
could apply to both sexes. In general, however, male personality
structures are similar to the obsessive type, whereas female
personality structures are similar to hysterical. Later on, the term
hysteric in psychoanalysis has been applied to certain groups of
patients who are suffering from either generalized anxiety and panic or
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various phobias. In this research the term hysteric will be applied to
all other DSM-III anxiety disorder patients apart from obsessives.
The logic behind the comparison of obsessive compulsive patients
with all other anxiety patients relates to two different areas of
psychology: psychoanalysis and neuropsychology. Individuals with
obsessive-compulsive traits or disorders tend to separate the affect
from the t.houqht and to present an emoti onless personali ty structur'e.
By contrast, individuals with hysterical personality structures tend to
exhibit excessive affect in their interactions.
Neuropsychological data pertinent to the pr'esent discussion come
from lateralization studies (Tucker, 1981; Gur and Gur, 1975). The
studies show that the two hemispheres have different involvements in
cognitive and emotional operations. The left hemisphere is lateralized
for linguistic functioning and other tasks involving cognitive
operations "Ihile the right hemisphere is lateralized for emotional
functioning. SmokIer and Shervin (1979) report that subjects who have
hysterical personality styles have right hemisphericity, while those
who have obsessive personality styles have left hemisphericity. The
authors suggest that the emotionality of hysterical personalities and
the ruminative and less affective nature of obsessive personalities can
be explained in terms of difference's in their lat.eralization.
In the present study it is hypothesized that the difference
between the cognitive and feeling components of anxiety will be higher
in obsessive-compulsive patients than that in a group of other anxiety
patients. Furthermore, obsessive-compulsives are expected to reveal
this difference in the direction of the cognitive component.
2.6.1. Summary
In this study males and obsessive compulsives are expected to show
greater difference between the cognitive and feeling components of
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anxiety than females and hysterics. The logic behind these assumptions
is as follows: Male and obsessive-compulsive personality structures are
emotionally constricted in comparison to females and hysterics for
various reasons. Males and obsessives cognitively apprehend anxiety,
but because of their emotional constriction, the manifestation of
anxiety in terms of feeling will be relatively low, and the discrepancy
between the two components wi11 be 1arger. Females and hysteri cs,
however, after cognitively apprehending anxiety, will express its
corresponding affective charge. Furthermore, males and obsessives will
e>:perience anxiety more in the cognitive component in comparison with
females and hysterics. A reverse pattern will be observed in the
feeling component: females and hysterics will experience an>:iety more
intensely on this component than male and obsessives.
The aim is to examine whether cognitions and feelings could be
conceptualized as two interacting but relatively independent systems.
Cognitive therapy's assumptions about feeling are that they are post
cognitive, that they appear only atter cognitive appraisals, and that
they are completely dependent on cognitive structures. If these
assumptions are correct, then affect will always be determined by
cognitions, irrespective of sex differences or personality structure or
type of anxiety disorder. This meani that, if one individual
experiences a hi~her level of anxiety on the cognitive component than
another, the first individual should exhibit a higher level of anxiety
on the affective component as well. Suppose, however, that a higher
level of cognitive anxiety is not followed by a higher level of the
feeling component of anxiety. If this were the case then the
assumptions of cognitive therapy will have to be reevaluated.
Furthermore, Zajonc's claim that affect and cognition are interacting
but relatively independent systems, will have been vindicated.
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3. DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICAL MANUAL - III (DSM-III) ?\NDANXIETY
DISORDERS
3. 1. AN OVERV IEW OF DSM- I II
In this section, first, a general overview of the DSM-III
classification on which the categorization of anxiety disorders are
based will be presented. Secondly, specific features of each anxiety
disorder relevant to the study will be discussed.
3.1.1. Important Features of DSM-III
DSM-III or any other descriptive diagnostic nosology is, in a way,
a development from Kraepelin tradition. As Frances and Cooper (1981)
state "If most contributions to psychoanalysis were made by Freud, a
parallel observation applies to descriptive psychiatry and Kraepelin"
(p.1198l. According to their view, DSM-III, with its descriptive
emphasis, is more close to Kraepelian approach than DSM-I or II. The
major reason for such a descriptive emphasis in DSM-III was the general
dissatisfaction over the categories of DSM-II.
Because explicit definitions and diagnostic criteria were not
provided in DSM-I, DSM-II and International Classification of Diseases
..
(ICD-9), clinicians had to decide on their own judgement in defining
-the content and boundaries of the diagnostic categories. Such practice
caused quite unreliable diagnostic classifications. When DSM-III began
to be developed between the years of 1974-1980, the Task Force on
Nomenclature and Statistics, the responsible body for reviewing the
drafts of DSM-III and guiding its development, placed a,great emphasis
on the problem of reliability of the diagnostic categories.
DSM-III came into effect in the United States in 1980. Some
important features of this new edition of DSM can be described as
follows.
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A- The Process of Development: Spitzer, Wi11iams and Scodol (1980)
regard the developmental process of DSM-III as of major importance.
Field trials and involvement of a great number of clinicians are two
elements to be identified as important in this period.
The Task Force believed that field trials on the drafts of DSM-III
should be performed in the development period to identify the problem
areas in the classification systems and to offer solutions to
problematic categories. The predecessors of DSM-III, i.e. DSM-II and
ICD-9 were not field tested adequately (APA, 1984).
B- Descriptive Approach: The system of classification adopted by
the DSM-III designers was said to be descriptive, in other words, the
definitions of mental disorders generally consist of descriptions of
the clinical features of the disorders. So the method adopted by
DSM-III was atheoretical with regard to aetiology. Apart from some of
the mental disorders, organic mental disorders (organic factors
necessary for the development of disorders have been identified) and
adjustment disorders (the disturbance is a reaction to psychological
stressor) where aetiology was known, DSM-III exclude any implications
to aetiology. This approach was deliberately selected for two reasons.
a- Descriptive criteria can be framed in relatively clear
statements which achieve higher reliability (Frances and Cooper, 1981).
b- Inclusion of an aetiologicai' approach would be an obstacle for
the use of the m~nual by clinicians of different theoretical
orientations. So the aim of constructing a nonaetiological,
atheoretical and descriptive diagnostic classification was not to
alienate potential users from various theoretical orientations
(Eysenck, Wakefield and Friedman, 1983).
Related to the issue of the descriptive approach of DSM-III was
the inclusion of diagnostic criteria. Neither DSM-II nor ICD~9 had
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diagnostic criteria, both left the definition of the content and
boundaries of the diagnostic categories to each clinician. These
criteria were included in DSM-III to increase the reliability of
diagnosis, since it had been demonstrated that the use of such criteria
improves diagnostic agreement among clinicians (Spitzer et al., 1980).
In fact, the aim of both the descriptive approach and the
diagnostic criteria were the same: to achieve better diagnostic
reliability. Hyler, Williams and Spitzer (1982), e>(amining reliability
of DSM-III between two clinicians interviewing over 150 patients,
obtained a satisfactory level of correlation (.67).
C- Multiaxial Evaluation: Multiaxial evaluation provides for the
assessment of an individual along several variables (axes)
quasi-independent of each other. (Spitzer et al., 1980). With the use of
multiaxial classification diverse patterns of patients' features could
be accommodated into the diagnostic process. In this way DSM-III tries
to take into consideration the uniqueness of each individual patient.
DSM-III is made up of five axes each representing different classes of
information. The first two axes include the entire set of categories
(18 groups) relevant in making a diagnosis, though the first three axes
constitute the offical diagnostic assessment.
D- Definition of Mental Disorders
Critics of diagnostic classifications often raised the question of
the absence of a definition of mental disorders. To overcome this
definition the Task Force, after several unsuccessful attempts,
proposed an acceptable definition which had some novel and important
implications. In DSM-III, a mental disorder has been defined as "a
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern
that occurs in an individual and that is typically associated with
either a painful symptom (distr"8ss) or impairment in of}eor more
important areas of functioning (disability). In addition, there is an
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inference that there is a behavioral, psychological, or biological
dysfunction, and that the disturbance is not only in the relationship
between an individual and society" (APA, 1984, p.6).
E- Exclusion of The Category of Neurotic Disorders
One of the peculiarities of the third edition of DSM was its
exclusion of the category of neurotic disorders as a distinct category
from its classification system. The Task Force claimed that the term
neurosis has been variously used in the clinical setting, sometimes
implying a total personality trait and on some other occasions
referring to specific symptomatic disorders (Frances and Cooper, 1981).
In other words, the concept of neurotic disorder has two quite
different implications and usages, one referring to a descriptive
phenomenon and the other to the process. While the descriptive
implications of the term neurotic disorder are in line with the
atheoretical, nonaetiological approach adopted by DSM-III, the term
neurotic process directly refers to a specific aetiological approach
involving a psychodynamic explanation of the phenomenon. DSM-III
applied the descriptive usage indicating that neurotic disorders refer
to a mental disorder "in which the predominant disturbance is a symptom
or group of symptoms that is distressing to the individual, and is
recognized by him or her as an unacceptable and alien; reality testing
is grossly intact; behavior does not actively violate gross social
norms; the disturbance is relatively enduring or recurrent without
treatment and is not limited to a transitory reaction to stressor;
there is demonstrable organic aetiology" (APA, 1984, pp.9-10). Thus,
the term 'neurotic disorders' has been used in DSM-III without any
implication of a special aetiological process. DSM-III also avoided
having a discre~e category of neurotic disorders such as was included
in DSM-II; instead "neurotic disorders appear in a bold type within
the classification to announce the new categories under which the
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formerly unified neuroses are now subsumed" (Frances and Cooper, 1981,
p.120l) •
DSM-III as outlined above has been studied extensively by
clinicians of different orientations. Some positive and negative
approaches towards this new sytem of categorization of mental disorders
will be presented below.
3.1.2. Criticisms of DSM-III
Skinner (1981) considered DSM-III as a scientific theory that
should be open to empirical falsification, and as a diagnostic system
that could be subjected to standards similar to those required for a
psychological test.
Cantar, Smith, French and Mezzief (1980) referred to psychiatric
diagnosis made with DSM-III as an example of prototype classification
whereas DSM-II classification was considered to be similar to classical
diagnosis. They indicated that prototype classification consists of
larger sets of correlated features rather than selected defining
features as in the classical diagnostic system. Prototype
classification mainly tries to overcome such problems as heterogeneity
of category membership, borderline cases and imperfect reliability
which cause problems in classical diagnostic system.
On the other hand, some clinicians adopted a rather sceptical and
critical attitude towards this new diagnostic system. McReynolds
(1979), Gormezy (1978) and lubin (1977) criticised the Neo-Kraepelian,
descriptive, medical model of DSM-III. They referred to DSM-III as an
extension of a medical approach to behavioral disturbances. In fact,
this was a point criticised by many pscyhologists.
Schacht and Nothan (1977) noted a possible negative impact of
DSI'1-IIIon psychologists. They-think DSM-III increases the domain of
psychiatry while reducing that of mental health workers, as DSM-III
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considered mental disorders as a subset of medical disorders, and
required a statement about nonmental medical disorders on the axis-III
to complete diagnostic evaluation. They have warned psychologists about
possible misuse of DSM-III, in which legislators and insurers could use
the adoption of DSM-III to require that mental disorders should first
be diagnosed by physicians who would then decide whether psychologists
might treat them.
Foltz (1980) indicated his worries over the use of DSM-III in that
DSM-III had extended the definition of mental illness into areas not
included in the domain of psychiatry (e.g. malingering, gambling etc.).
One of the most important problems in DSM-III was the validity of
the diagnostic categories. This question of the level of validity in
discriminating among the categories of DSM-III was listed as one of the
areas_of ambiguity by its designers in the manual of DSM-III. The
problem of validity of the categories was also raised by many
clinicians (Eysenck et al., 1983). The popular scepticism was brought
about by the fact that, differentiation between DSM-III categories was
based on nothing else but a degree of consensus among members of the
Task Force. Referring to th~s problem, Eysenck et al. (1983) stated that
"consensus of opinions among psychiatrists had been of central
importance in determining whether any particular category was included
in DSM-III" (p.169). Construction of the diagnostic categories on the
basis of agreement places the validity of this diagnostic system in a
highly questionable position which can only be solved by the results of
future reseach carried out on actual data. Nevertheless, this situation
has been acknowledged by the designers of the third edition of DSM,
"••for most of the categories the diagnostic criteria are based on
clinical judgement, have not been fully validated by data about such
important correlates as clinic~l course, outcome, fam~ly history and
- 112 -
treatment response. Undoubtedly, with further study the criteria for
many of the categories will be revised" (APA, 1984, p.8).
Psychoanalytical clinicians also c.riticized DSM-III for
sacrificing validity in favour of reliability (Valliant, 1984). The
architects of DSM-III in reply indicated that reliability was a
prerequisite for validity (Klerman, 1984). Vaillant (1984) insisted
that "although reliability is a prerequisite of validity this did not
mean that the fastest route to validity is to start with maximum
reliability. It was easy to establish reliable categories that have no
relevance or validity. The strategy of science was to construct
hypotheses that seem to be good candidates for validity .... and then
to make these hypotheses as reliable as possible wihthout relinquishing
their relevance" (p.549). Vaillant, in the same article, suggests that
the designers of DSM-III performed a perfect job in implementing the
goals of the nomenclature, but were quite inefficient in defining those
goals. In this aspect he criticised DSM-III for excessive emphasis on
methodological issues (e.g. reliability), and negligence of theoretical
matters. Vaillant pointed to an error made several decades ago by
psychoanalytical clinicians who were only interested in the mind and
its workings, and neglected the social and biological as well as
psychic determinants of mental behavior. He argued that "DSM-III does
not correct their error, it repeats it. Dr. Spitzer and his group has
led us from the brainless psychiatry of the 1950s to the threat of
mindless psychiatry for the 1980s. We await the integration"
(pp.550-551).
In spite of the criticisms listed above, it can be said that
DSM-III has achieved some of its main objectives, specifically one,
higher reliability (Hyler et al., 1982). Now, with the help of higher
reliability, investigators have a common language, with which they can
communicate about their research and they can rely on its diagnosis. It
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is obvious that DSM-III has many disadvantages (such as, too medically
oriented, too descriptive, too much emphasis on reliability, ignores
validity etc.) but when compared with the other available diagnostic
systems, it appears to be the most widely accepted. In fact, when
examined, it becomes clear that DSM-III is accepted as the best among
all existing nosological systems, although the critics suggest that it
could be further improved.
3.2. DSM-III ANXIETY DISORDERS
Having looked at DSM-III categorization in general,the focus of
attention will now be limited to the anxiety disorders. Anxiety is
regarded as an ubiquitous phenomenon. A survey of a large sample in
Virginia in the United States indicated that anxiety was the 5th most
common diagnosis in medical practice (Marsland, Wood and Mayo 1976).
Hoehn-Saric (1979) reported that using the Morbid Anxiety Inventory (a
scale which correlates highly with autonomic indices of anxiety) a
British survey classified 44% of the adult population as anxious. In
the same research 31% were classified as suffering from sub-clinical
anxiety and 5% from life long anxiety state.
DSM-III divided the anxiety disorders into two main categories as
phobic and non-phobic am:iety disorders.
Phobic an>:iety disorders include four main types:
1- Agoraphobia
a- with panic attacks
b- without panic attacks
3- Social phobia
4- Simple phobia
And non-phobic anxiety (anxiety states} disorders consists of five
essential categories:
1- Panic Disorder (PO)
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2- Generalized anxiety disorders (GAOl
3- ObsessiYe-compulsive disorders
4- Post traumatic disorders
5- Atypical anxiety disorders
Although most of above stated disorders have been recognized and
studied for many years, panic disorders and.post traumatic stress
disorders are the innovations of DSM-III (Cerny, Himadi and Barlow~
1984). Cerny et al. also indicated that the new composition of the
classification of anxiety disorders was an important attempt to apply
an empirical approach to the diagnosis of clinical problems. The
~
findings of two people played a key role in the construction of anxiety
disorders in DSM-III. As clearly indicated by Spitzer and Williams
(1983) the DSM-III classification of phobias was influenced by Marks'
diagno-stic system (1970). Following Marks' suggestions, aqor aphcbfe "las
divided into two categories; with or without panic attacks. The first
considerations for division of phobic anxiety into three general
categories as agoraphobia, social phobia and simple phobia can be found
in his 1970 paper.
Klein (1964) was the second major influence on the
conceptualization of anxiety disorders in DSM-III. His results,
suggesting that imipramine could alleviate panic attacks, indicated
that persons with panic attacks diff.red from those people who were
suffering from generalized am:iety. This finding led to the
differentiation of panic disorder from generalized anxiety disorder in
DSM-III. Refering to DSM-III anxiety disorders categorization
Freedman, Dornbush and Shapire wrote that ~different diagnostic and
specific differential treatment is now emerging in sharp contrasf to
the pr evt oua tendency to lump together all anxi ety as a universal
symptom to be treated always in the same fashion" (p.44, 1981J.
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Because a statistical approach has been advocated in DSM-III~
classification of anxiety disorders in this diagnostic system permits
the generation of testable hypotheses through which validity of such
sub-categorizing can be tested (Leckman~ Weisman and Merikangos~ 1983).
If~ for example~ it can be shown that social phobia can be
differentiated from simple phobia in terms of different variables
(e.g. age of onset~ severity, manifestation of anxiety) the validity
of separating social from simple phobia would be more strongly
justified. Pointing to the heterogeneous nature of anxiety disorders~
Sheehan (1984) stated that "anxiet.vdt sorders were multidimensional in
nature that could manifest themselves in many different parts of the
body" (p.141). In the following part of this section six different
categories of anxiety disorders will be presented (post traumatic
stress disorders and atypical anxiety disorders are not included in
t.hisstudy due to the very low number of patients reported thr"oughout
the literature) from the point of view of the Three Systems Theory of
anxiety. Possible ways of discriminating each anxiety disorder from
the others in terms of the the way in which anxiety is manifested will
also be discused.
3.2.1. Phobic Amdety DisC"lrders
In DSM-III (1980) th~ main features of phobic anxiety disorders
are been defined-as the presence of persistent and irrational fear of a
specific object, activity or"situation which brings about an
involuntary desire to avoid the dreaded Object, activity or situation
(the phobic stimulus). The fear is recognized by the individual as
excessive and unreasonable in proportion to the actual dang~rousness of
the object, activity or situation.
It has been pointed out by Emmelkamp (1982) that, although a
moderately high proportion of the adult population have various
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phobi as, only a minor propoe..tion of those Io'ihoal""eaffected seek out
psychological 01"" medical treatment. Agras~ Silvester and Oliveau (1969)
estimated the prevalance of phobias in general population at 77/1000.
However only 9 out of 1000 had consulted health authorities for
treatment of their phobias. Mal""ks(1970) indicated that although
phobias were common in other psychiatric disorders, the frequency of
phobic disorders in clinical practice was about 3%. As stated before,
phobic anxiety disorders were further divided into three
sub-categor"ies.
3.2.1.1. Agoraphobia
The central features of this anxiety disorder are defined as a
marked fear of being alone, or being in public places "Ihere escape may
be difficult or help may not be easily obtainable, as in the case of an
Lme>:pected am:iety attack. Agoraphobic patients tend to avoid numer-ous
situations including busy streets or stores, crowds, tunnels, bridges
or public transportation (AF'A,1984). This is the commonest phobia for
which people seek out professional help, although other types of fears
(snake, rat etc.) are more pervasive in the general population (Agras
et al., 1969). Agoraphobia is one of the most disabling types of
phobias (Marks, 1970). Marks indicated that 60% of all phobias seen at
the Maudsley were agoraphobic. Agras et al. (1969) investigated the
prevalance of agoraphobia and concluded that si>:out of every 1000
individuals were agoraphobic. Using these figures Chambless and
Goldstein (1980) estimated the number of agoraphobics in The United
States as being 1.25 million. It was reported (Buns and Thorpe, 1977;
Chambless, 1982) that agoraphobia covers 50 to 80 % of all the phobic
population seeking some kind of professional help. F'revalance rates of
agoraphobia have been estimated at from .06 to 3.76 % (Meyers,
.Weissman, Tischler, Holzer, Leaf, Orvaschel, Antony, Boyd, Burke,
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Kramer, and Staltzman, 1984; Uhlenhunth, Balter, Melliger, Ci~ins and
Clinthorne, 1981).
In terms of sex ratio, agoraphobia is dominated by females. Marks'
research (1970) revealed that 75% of all agoraphobics in his study were
women. The domination of this phobic disorder by female patients was
also indicated in the DSM-III manual (1980).
Clear delineation of the symptoms of agoraphobia is difficult.
Marks (1970) claimed that the term "agoraphobia" did not clearly
riflect the nature of the problem. The difficulty arouse because the
patients with this disorder did not only avoid open spaces and going
into public places as the name implied, but also avoided other
condi tions such as travel Iing or closed spaces. However, Marks (1970)
pointed that "fear of going out was probably the most frequent symptom·
from which others developed" (p.380). Later, modifications towards a
clearer definiton of the problem have been offered. Most investigators
agreed that it is reasonable to refer to agoraphobia as the fear of
fear (Golstein and Chambless, 1978; Mavissakalian, 1983). That means,
the essential element in agoraphobia involves a fear of one's own
physiological responses in various situations rather than as Marks
suggested (1970), phobic avoidance and fear of multiple panic
situations (Cerny et al., 1984).
It is thought that these patients are mainly afraid of their own
somatic reactiorts and panics, therefore avoid situations where help is
not easily available. Most agoraphobics feel relatively relieved when
accompanied by a person whom they can trust. Attacks of panics and
somatic symptoms of anxiety can be consid~red to be significant
characteristics of an agoraphobic syndrome. Marks (1970) had pointed
out that agoraphobia could manifest itself without any incidence of
panic attacks.
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Following Marks' suggestion, DSM-III has divided this phobic
disorder into two categories as agoraphobia with panic attacks and
without panic attacks. But the validity of this two-fold representation
,
of agoraphobia have been questioned by Cerny et a1. (1984) on the
grounds that agoraphobia develops after exper iencinq a first panic
attack. DSM-III indicates that in order to make a diagnosis of
agoraphobia without panic attacks there should be no history of panic
attacks accompanied with the phobic avoidance. Barlow (1985) was able
to diagnose only one case of agoraphobia without panic out of 41
agoraphobics. In the reliability study of An>:iety Disorder Interview
Scale (ADIS) conducted by Di Nardo, O'Brain, Barlow, Waddel and
Blanchard (1983) none of the 23 agoraphobic patients fulfilled DSM-III
criteria to be diagnosed as agoraphobic without panic, and all had
displayed panic attackCs). Goldstein and Chambless (1978) referred to
the fear of panic attacks of agoraphobics as the discriminating element
of these patients from simple phobics. Faa, Steketee and Young (1984)
pointed to the fact that "the incidence of panic attacks among
agoraphobic patients varied from one sample to another, and greatly
depended upon the criteria by which patients were selected" (p.433).
However,it is suggested that as long as existing DSM-III criteria are
applied to the diagnosis of agoraphobia to identify the presence or
absence of panic attacks, it seems ~lmost inevitable that an extremely
low number of patients will meet the criteria for agoraphobia without
panic attacks. DSM-III stipulates that even occurrence of only one
panic attack is enough to place cases into the category of agoraphobia
with panic attack. Since the onset of this problem has been considered
to be closely related to the occurrence of apparently spontaneous panic
attacks (Mendel, 1969), the cpndition naturally leads to dia~nosis of
almost all cases of agoraphobia into the category of "with panic
attacks". For those cases of agoraphobia where no history of panic
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attacks are reported, it may be due to a patient being unable to
remember an early panic attack especially if the person has been
sufferring from aqoraphob ia for long time.
In order to sub-divide phobic disorders further into three
separate categories the discriminating features of these three
categories should be clearly defined. Several studies have been carried
out to test the validity of the three-fold separation of phobic
disorders in DSM-III.
It has been generally agreed that agoraphobics usually have higher
,
levels of physiological arousal than patients with other phobias
(Snaith, 1968). On the other hand, Kelly (1980) and Lader (1978) have
indicated that although increased autonomic arousal was found to be
characteristic of agoraphobics, the same factor was also characteristic
of obsessive-compulsive disorders and anxiety neurosis. In the study
conducted by Fisher and Wilson (1985) in spite of the physiological
finding that agoraphobics did not show significantly higher levels of
autonomic arousal (heart-rate and skin -conductance) than
non-agoraphobics, somatic complaint ratings of agoraphobics were
significantly higher than those of non-agoraphobics. This finding
supports the conceptualization of agoraphobia as the fear of fear.
Arrindel (1980) and Gardos (1981) revealed that in their study
agoraphobic patients reported high-levels of somatic symptoms. The
-above investigations suggest that a high level of somatic
symptomatology may be regar-ded as an important feature of agoraphobi a.
Although an agoraphobic syndrome may be differentiated from other
phobic disorders, it is difficult to differentiate agoraphobia from
anxiety states (Fisher and Wilson, 1985; Turner, MacCann, Beidel, and
Mezzich, 1986). Hallam (1978>_claimed that agoraphobia should not be
classified with the phobic disorders, it was rather a variable feature
of patients suffering from anxiety neurosis. He further suggested that
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("agoraphobia merges imperceptively with anxiety states, affective
disorders and obsessive-compulsive neurosis" (p.314). In 1972 Gurney,
Roth, Gardise, Kerr and Schapiro found, in a discriminant function
analysis, the presence of panic attacks and agoraphobia as a predictor
of a diagnosis of anxiety state. They also reported that a mild form
.of agoraphobia was common in patients with anxiety state and
depression. The marked phobic avoidance present in agoraphobia
constituted the most important feature \I-~hichseparated this phobia from
the non-phobic anxiety states (Marks, 1970). So it can be asserted that
though manifestation of agoraphobia resembles anxiety states, a higher
level of avoidance behavior would be considered as the dicriminating
feature of this phobic disorder from anxiety states.
Snaith (1968) and Marks (1970) revealed that agoraphobic patients
exhibited high levels of diffuse anxiety in comparison with other types
of phobias. Fisher and Wilson (1985) have replicated the findings of
Marks and Snaith by showing that agOl~aphobics, when compared to
non-agoraphobics, had significantly higher scores in the Global
Severity Index (GSI) which measures general anxiety level.
In summary, agoraphobic patients can be said to have higher levels
of somatic complaints than patients with other types of phobias.
Agoraphobics also resemble patients with non-phobic: an>dety (such as
generalized anxiety disorders or panic disorders) but exhibit higher
behavioral avoidance. In general agoraphobics are expected to exhibit
high levels of anxiety in all components, especially on the somatic and
the behavioral.
3.2.1.2. Social Phobia
The first attempt of representing social phobia as a distinct
phobic disorder came from Marks (1970) who differentiated social phobia
from agoraphobia on the grounds that although agoraphobics also have
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fear of crowds, their fear is related to the apprehension about a mass
of people together~ rather than about the individuals who make up the
crowd. Pasnau (1984), following the diagnostic criteria provided by
DSM-III, defined social phobia as "a persistent ifTational fear of, and
compelling desire to avoid situations in which the patient may be
exposed to the scrutiny of others~ there is also fear that the
individual will behave in a manner that will be humiliating or
embarrassing" (p.12).
Initially Marks (1970) reported that 8% of patients treated at a
general psychiatric treatment centre in Europe were_social phobics. In
a questionnaire survey by Byrant and Trower approximately 3 to 10 % of
first year British college students were found to have a typical social
phobic sydrome. Di Nardo et al. (1983) reported that 13.3 % (8 out of
51) patients diagnosed as anxiety disorders were social phobics. A
study conducted by Currant., Mi11er, Zwick, Mant i and Stout (1980>
revealed that social phobia covered the complaints of approximately 7%
of psychiatric inpatient population. Leibowitz, Garman, Fyerand and
Klein (1985) reported that in their anxiety disorder clinic, social
phobia was the third most common anxiety disorder after panic disorder
and agoraphobia.
Research indicates that the sex ratio of social phobia is almost
equal with a slight dominance of males. Marks (1970) indicated that
this type of phobia could occur" in men or women with equal fr·equency.
Amies and Gelder (1983) stated that in their sample of 87 social
phobics 60% were male. Late childhood and early adolescence was found
to be the most common age of onset (Cerny et al., 1984).
In comparing social phobia with agoraphobia and animal phobia,
Marks stated that social phobia had characteristics intermediate
between those of the latter two. Social phobics were found to have more
phobias (i.e. tend to avoid variety of situations) than animal phobics
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(I<Jhoreported very specific phobias) ~ but felljel~than agoraphobics. Also
in terms of overt anxiety Marks placed social anxiety midway between
agoraphobia and animal phobia, indicating that agoraphobics had the
highest level of overt anxiety.
Resemblance between agoraphobia and social phobia i~ terms of the
manifestation of the problem has been reported by Marks (1970)~ Foa~
Steketee and Young (1984) and Arrindel (1980). Some other investigators
(Goldstein and Chambless, 1980) raised doubts about the validity of
social phobia as a distinct syndrome. In contrast to these
psychologists various others (Liebowitz, 1985; AmieQs~ 1983) indicated
that to separate social phobia from agoraphobia promised better
diagnosis and prognosis. Marks (1970) suggested the discriminating
elements between social phobia and agoraphobia as being sex ratio,
number of symptoms and level of overt snxietv, ~Jhile agoraphobia was
dominated by female patients (75%), only half of social phobics were
women. Social phobics reported more scecific phobias than those having
agorophobia, who displayed numerous other symptoms. Amies and Gelder
(1983) have conducted research with the aim of identifying factors that
help to discriminate social phobia from agoraphobia. They again found
that in social phobia the male ratio was higher than in agoraphobia
(percentage of males in social phobia 60% and in agoraphobia 14%).
Although Marks observed no diHerence in terms of age of onset behleen
the two phobic conditions, Amiens and Gelder (1983) reported that age
of onset of social phobia was earlier than that of agoraphobic
individuals (incidence of social phobia and agoraphobia reach their
peaks around the age of 10-19 and 20~24~ respectively).
An important feature of social phobia that causes confusion with
agoraphobia is the presence of panic attacks in both disorders.
Although Barlow, Vermilyea, Blanchard, Vermiyea, DiNardo and Cerny
(1985) reported that most social phobics displayed panic attacks only
- 123 -
in social situations, they drew attention to the fact that 3 out of 19
(15.79 %) patients with social phobia exhibited unpredictable panic
attacks in non-phobic situations.
To investigate whether social phobia differs from agoraphobia with
panic attacks and panic disorders Leibowitz et al. (1985) set up a
study in which the reaction of patients, diagnosed as one of the three
anxiety disorders stated above, to lactate infusion was examined. As
judged by a psychiatric evaluator "blind" to patient diagnoses, it was
found that four of nine (44%) agoraphobics displayed panic reaction to
lactate infusion, in contrast to one of fifteen (7%l social phobics.
Although this finding supports the separation of the two disorders, it
is too early to derive a clear conclusion. Another attempt at
separati ng social phobi a from agoraphobi a +ocused on the occurence of
panic attacks (Leibowitz et al., 1985). It was thought that social
phobics were experiencing somatic symptoms when under ~crutiny, whereas
in panic disorder and agoraphobia, somatic reaction (panic) occurs
unpredictably. Furthermore, panic disorder and agoraphobic patients'
•
avoidant behavior seems to.be linked to situations where the patient
would be unable to get help if he/she had a panic attack rather than
general fear of humiliation as in the case of social phobia.
The difference between social and simple phobias was also
investigated by Marks (1970) who stated that social phobia could be
placed midway between agoraphobia and animal (simple) phobia. Social
phobics were observed to complain of more fears and other symptoms than
do simple phobics whose problems are concentrated on a specific object
or situation. Simple phobics, in co~parison with social ph~bics.(where
the sex ratio was 1:1), had been found to be dominated by females
(95%). General overt anxiety level of simple phobics was observed to be
the lowest in Marks' research whereas social phobics obtained the
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second highest score in this measure. Age of onset was later for social
phobics when compared to patients with simple phobias.
Golden (1981) reported that social anxiety and irrational belief
were closely related. In his study subjects who displayed irrational
beliefs indicated high levels of social anxiety when compared with
individuals who did not report such beliefs. Mandel and Shrauger's
(1980) reported similar results in regard to non-assertiveness. Their
research illustrated the importance of cognitive factors in social
anxiety. Mandel and Shrauger (1980) study was, however, inconclusive,
because they did not report any information with F'~~pect to the level
of irrational belief of other individuals who had different types of
anxiety disorders (agoraphobia, simple phobia ect.).
On the basis of the information obtained from the above studies,
social phobics are expected to show anxiety profiles similar to
agoraphobics. However social phobics are expected to indicate their
highest levels of anxiety on the cognitive and behavioral components.
3.2.1.3. Simple Phobia
These type of phobias are conceptualized as a persiste~t,
irrational fear of and compelling desire to avoid an object or
situation other than (1) being alone in a public place away from home
...
(agoraphobia) or (2) being humiliated or embarrassed in certain social.
situations (social phobia) (Pasnau , 1984, p.12). The patient is aware
of the fact that his fear is unreason~ble and excessive (DSM-III,
1980). Although simple phobias are quite common in the general
population, (Agras et al. (1969) reported that approximately 18X of the
general population experienced this disorder), in clinical samples the
number of cases is quite low_ DiNardo et al. (1983) reported that 2 out
of 51 patients with DSM-III anxiety disorde~s were diagnosed as simple
phobias. Barlow (1985) reported that 6.8X of all cases seen at a phobia
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and anxiety disorders clinic were diagnosed as simple phobias. Marks
(1970) found the majority of animal phobics to be females (95%).
The introduction of this category in the clinical realm can be
attributed to the study of Marks (1970)~ however his categories were
somewhat different from those offered in DSM-III. After differentiating
two distinct phobic disorders (agoraphobia and social phobia) Marks
introduced a third distinct phobic disorder: animal phobia. When these
three phobias were put into a hierarchy in terms of severity of the
problem~ animal phobics exhibited the least anxiety. Animal phobics
exhibited no tension or panic in the absence (both in vivo and in
vitro) of the phobic object, they were the group of phobics that
resembled normal people most; physiological measures (e.g. galvanic
skin resistance, fore-arm blood flow) were parallel to the clinical
observations which indicated the absence of diffuse anxiety (Marks,
1970). In Marks's study another characteristic of animal phobias
appeared; the specifity of symptoms. Although animal phobias start
usually in early childhood and persist for a long time, they usually
stay specific i. e. monosyptomatic~ with little generalization.
Occasionally other symptoms develop but they are usually quite few.
Marks thought that the monosymptomatic nature of animal phobias was the
main reason why these individuals usually have low scores on overt
anxiety measures. As long as they can avoid the phobic situation (which
is assumed to be quite specific therefore usually relatively easy to
avoid) they can function as a normal individual. In some cases animal
phobics were reported to have more extensive symptoms, nevertheless~ it
was found that in these cases animal phobia happened to be asso~iated
with another disturbance (e.g. agoraphobia, personality disturbance>.
In his article Marks (1970) differentiated another group calling
it miscellaneous specific phobias. In fact, this group was very similar
to animal phobias in many respects. This group of patients was also
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characterised by a low level of overt anxiety and as having
monosymptomatic phobias. The nature of these phobias varied fr"omcase
to case but in general remained fairly specific for a given case.
Examples of such situations include fear of heights, wind, darkness
etc •• Marks (1970) placed claustrophobia in this category, indicating
that despite the fact that agoraphobics also report fears of closed
places such as lifts and tubes, the reverse is not always found.
Patients with claustrophobia tend to have relatively isolated fears. In
the end of the discussion on miscellaneous specific phobias, Marks
suggested that these hlo groups of phobi as, animal and miscell aneous ,
might have been indistinguishable from one another apart from the sex
incidence and age of onset.
In his study he did not report any information about sex-ratio of
miscellaneous phobias. In terms of age of onset, despite the fact that
miscellenous phobias exhibited greater variability, both animal and
miscellenous groups reached their peak prevalance rate around the
childhood ages of 3-6 years. Based on the common nature of the two
groups of phobias (monosymptomatic and relatively mild), DSM-III has
combined these phobias under the title of "simple phobic disorders".
Literature about simple phobias is relatively rare. One of the reasons
for this can be related to the very small number of patients consulting
professionals with the problem of simple phobia. This assertion can be
related to Marks' finding that simple (animal and miscellaneous)
phobias were the mildest form of all three.
Seif and Atkins (1979) tried to determine the most prominent
defensive styles of various types of phobias. In fact they were
investigating the controversy between one group of psychoanalysts
(Freud, 1925; Fenichel, 1945t who asserted that phobics usually had
hysterical characters and repression could be regarded as the central
defense mechanism, and an opposing group (Glover, 1939; Salzman, 1965)
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who postulated that phobias resembled obsessive phenomena relying
mainly on the defense mechanism called "isolation". In the view of
Sheif and Atkins (1979), the source of controversy stems from the
failure to recognize that different forms of phobias may be the
manifestations of different dynamics. In their study Seif and Atkins
(1979) divided phobias into two categories of animal and situational
phobias and attempted to differentiate these two groups in terms of
the type of defense mechanism employed. The central hypothesis examined
in the study claimed that animal phobics were expected to exhibit
greater use of obsessional defenses such as intellectualization and
isolation when compared with situational phobics (agoraphobics and
social phobics) who were assumed to display more hysterical defenses
with the predominance of repression and displacement. Although the
results they obtained confirmed their hypotheses~ it is difficult to
derive any conclusion from this study in terms of the DSM-III anxiety
disorders classification for it was not clearly indicated what kinds
of patients were included in each group <animal and situational}. For
examp le no information was given about claustrophobic and acrophobic.
Although such phobias appear to be Situational, a closer examination
reveals that they share common characteristics with animal phobias
(Marks, 1970).
If the above information is considered in terms of the Three
Systems Theory~ the following summary about the nature of simple
phobias can be presented.
The general overt anxiety scores of simple phobics are assumed to
be the lowest among all am:iety disoders classified in D51"1-11L
In the anxiety profile of simple phobics, the cognitive component,
in comparison to other compdnents of anxiety, is considered to be the
highest. The behavioral component of anxiety is expected to be very
low. Low behavioral scores of simple phobics are also predicted, giv~n
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that the questionnaires (the assessment scales will be explained in the
method chapter) employed in the present study are supposed to measure
general or social avoidance and are, therefore, more relevant for
agoraphobics and social phobics. Simple phobic patients, due to the
mild nature of this anxiety disorder, are expected to show low somatic
anxiety as "Jell.
3.2.2. Non-Phobic Anxiety Disorders (Anxiety States)
As noted before, the anxiety disorders have been divided into two
categories of phobic and non-phobic (an>:ietystates). Non-phobic
anxiety disorders are thought to have quite a high level of prevalance
(Barlow, Cohen, Waddel, Vermilyea, klosko, Blanchard and DiNardo,
1984). It is estimated that this category covers 15% of all out patient
problems (Lader, 1978). In DSM-III, after taking into consideration the
findings of psychopharmacological research, (klein and Fink, 1962) a
division of non-phobic anxiety states into two categories of panic
disorders (PO) and generalized anxiety disorders (GAD) was introduced.
Obsessive-compulsive disorders are also included under the non-phobic
anx iet.vdiso,"ders category because of the important role played by
anxiety in the formation of this problem (APA, 1980).
3.2.2.1. Panic Disorder (PO)
This anxiety disorder has been defined in DSM-III as the
occurrance of recurrent unpredictable anxiety attacKs which consist of
discrete and sudden onset of apprehension of fear and at least four of
the following twelve symptoms; dyspnea, palpitations, chest pain or
discomfort, choking sensations, dizziness, feelings of unreality,
paresthesias, hot and cold flashes, sweating, faintness, trembling and
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fear of dying, going crazy, or doing something uncontrolled. Also,
panic attacks must not be precipitated by exposure to a circumscribed
phobic stimulus, they must occur at least three times within a three
week period, and finally, the panic should not be due to a physical
disorder or associated with agoraphobia.
The NIMH (National Institute of Mental Health) found a six-months
incidence of PO in approximately IX of the population (Myers et al.,
1984). life-time incidence was reported to be around 1.5X (Robins,
Helzer, Weisman, Orcaschel, Gruenberg, Burke, and Reiger, 1984).
DiNardo et al., (1983) reported that 8 out of 51 anxiety disorder
patients were diagnosed as panic disorders. Also an excess of females
among patients with panic disorders has been repdrted by Marks and
lader (1973). A study conducted by Crowe, Noyes, Pauls and Slymen
(1983) has confirmed the high ratio of women in PD. In fact, their
result which included a family study of patients diagnosed as PD,
provided better representation of the sex-ratio in comparison with
other studies in which only the percentage of women in a sample of PO
was reported. Simply reporting the percentage of females in a sample
may reflect a sex preference to seek treatment. Family studies provide
a unique opportunity to eliminate the effect of a sex preference to
seek treatment in examining the sex ratio. Crowe et al., (1983) found
that women were more affected with this disorder, the sex ratio being
2:1. Thus they concluded that the predominance of women in this anxiety
problem could be regarded as a gender characteristic of this disorder,
rather than a selection bias.
As stated at the beginning, the initial impetus which promoted the
separation of PD from the GAD came from psychopharmacological studies
of klein (1964) and klein and Fink (1962) in which it was demonstrated
that the pharmacological treatment of panic attacks differs from that
of GAD. Panic attacks were best controlled by antidepressants. such as, .
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monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs) and tricyclic antidepressants
<TACs) (Gt-unhause,·Gloger and (,tleisstub,1981). (,tlhereasminor
tranquilizers were effective in alleviating generalized anxiety
disorders (Raskin, Peeke, Dickman and Pinsker, 1982). Although Barlow
and Beck (1984) raised doubts as to the qualitative differentiation of
PO and GAD, because of the presence of panic attacks in GAD,
psychopharmacological findings indicated that panic and anticipatory
anxiety responded differently to different medication. A number of
investigators (Rickel, 1981; Schuck i t , 1981; Greenblatt and Shader,
1978) replicated Klein's (1964) finding that minor tranquilizers
(benzodiazepines) were the most effective anxiolytic agents in the
treatment of GAD, however, they were not effecti~e in the management of
panic disorders where somatic and autonomic manifestations of anxiety
were the predominating symptoms. On the other hand, anti-depressants
and beta-blockers (proorano!01) have been found to be effecti ve in
reducing unpredictable panic attacks with high autonomic component.
Contrary to the effect of benzodiazepines, anti-depressants were not
effective in alleviating the cognitive (anticipatory) component of
anxiety. Furthermore, anxiolytfcs were not effective in reducing phobic
behavior (Freedman et al., 1981).
A number of studies have been conducted with the purpose of
identifying certain factors which could differentiate PO from GAD
<Raskin et al., 1982; Anderson, ~?yes and Crowe 1984; Hoehn-Saric,
1982, Barlow, Cohen, Waddel, Vermilyea, Klosko, Blanchard and DiNardo,
1984; Crowe et al., 1983). In all these studies the factor that
appeared to discriminate PD from GAD most clearly was the high
intensity of somatic symptoms in the former. Hoehn-Saric (1982) failed
to find a difference between patients with PO and GAD in term~ of their
childhood history. In their study PO patients were found to exhibit
more somatic symptoms and with higher frequency than were those of GAD.
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Reported somatic symptoms were most notably related to the
cardiovascular system (Hoehll-Saric~ 1982). Nortoll~ Bryall~ Haunchand and
Rhodes (1985) found more somatic symptoms and somatic anxiety in PD
patients in comparison with GAD patients. Barlow et aI., (1984)
revealed a similar finding by indicating that PD patients demonstrated
Cl stronger somatic am:iety component than patients diagnosed as GAD on
both physiological assessment and questionnaire measures of anxiety.
Finally Barlow et al. (1984) noted the severity of somatic symptoms in
PD as the primarY element differentiating this disorder from GAD.
A high level of somatic anxiety and different psychopharma-
cological treatment outcome support DSM-III's contention that PO may be
qualitatively different from GAD. Apart from these two differentiating
points PD and GAD can be separated along other lines. When PD patients
have been compared with GAD patients, those with PD have reported:
- A- More negative cognitions associated with social, psychological
and physiological disasters (Hibbert, 1984).
B- Higher overt anxiety scores on standardised tests (STAI trait
form, Affect Balace Scale) (Hoehn-Saric, 1982).
C- More grossly disturbed childhood environment (Raskin~ 1982).
Torgersen (1983) noted that genetic factors may possibly be
involved in the aetiology of PD. Crowe, Pauls and Slymen (1980) and
Crowe et al. (1983) also indicated that PD could be familial and most
likely genetic. Patients with PD ~id not have an increased incidence of
GAD among famijy members but the incidence of PD was markedly higher.
The lifetime morbidity risk for definite and probable panic disorders
among the first degree relatives of persons with panic disorder was
nearly 25%. Consistent with the separation of PD from GAD in DSM-III, a
study of Cro"le et al. (1980) showed no clustering of GAD in famil ies of
patients with PD. It was evenly distributed between patients and
control families. In short, these studies contributed to the
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qualitative differentiation of the two disorders~ as well as referring
to the possible involvement of genetic factors in PD.
The other point worth noting is related to the ambiguities in the
diagnosis of PD. As Cerny et al., (1984) pointed out, a high frequency
of additional diagnoses given to PO patients complicated the diagnostic
process. Data reported by Barlow et al., (1985) demonstrated that 88%
of PD cases received an additional diagnosis. In most cases of PD
simple and social phobias were common, nevertheless, they were not
severe enough to merit a separate diagnosis. Panic attacks were not
peculiar to PD patients, 83% of the patients in all other anxiety
disorders reported the experience of at least one panic attack which
was cued or uncued. Half of the patients with GAD had expeiienced at
least one unpredictable panic, also 33% of social and simple phobic
patients indicated that they had unpredictable panic attacks. The
frequency criterion (at least 3 panic at.tacks in a 3 weeks period)
imposed by DSM-III for the diagnoses of a panic disorder was thought to
be very useful in discriminating patients with PD from the rest of
anxiety disorders (Cerny et al., 1984; Norton, Bryan, Haunch and
Rhodes, 1985).
When PO has been evaluated on the basis of the information
provided in the above pages, and taking the Three Systems Approach into
consideration, the following summary on the PD can be pr"esented.
The manifestation of anxiety. on the somatic component is
considered to _be the most salient one for PD patients. E}( pressi on of
anx ietv of PD patients on the behavior component is expect ed to be low
due to the absence of both, avoidance responses and avoided places or
conditions. Due to the lack of information it is difficult to say how
PD patients will score on the cognitive component. The results of t.his
study are expected to clarify this point.
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3.2.2.2. Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD)
GAD has been identified as a residual category of anxiety states
with continuous, persistent generalized anxiety which is manifested in
autonomic hyperactivity, motor tension, apprehensive expectation,
vigilance and scanning (APA, 1980; Cerny et al., 1984). As noted in the
PD section, the study which provided the data for the division of
anxiety states into two categories as generalized anxiety and panic
anxiety came from Klein and Fink (1962).
These investigations demonstrated that patients with panic attacks
responded better when treated with tricyclic anti-depressants while
those without panic attacks showed significant improvement to
benzodiazepines. As a result of these findings, patients who do not
report panic attacks are now diagnosed as generalized anxiety
disorders.
The prevalence of generalized anxiety disorders has been reported
to vary from 2.5 to 6.4% (Weissman, 1983). Anderson et al., (1984) have
reported the prevalence of generalized anxiety disorders as 2.5% in the
families of patients with panic disorders. Di Nardo et al., (1983)
indicated that the number of patients diagnosed as GAD was 6 out of 51
anxiety patients. Although the sex ratio of this anxiety disorder has
been estimated to be 1 to 1, Anderson et al., (1984) found that females
had a higher ratio. In their study 66.5% of GAD patients were females.
In this aspect GAD and PD were demonstrated to be very similar (70.8%
of panic disorders patients were female).
In the diagnosis of GAD, occurence of panic attacks among patients
acts to reduce the reliability and validity of this anxiety disorder.
As Cerny et al., (1984) stated "••in the DSM-III patients are diagnosed
..
as GAD if they report both chronic anxiety and panic attacks, if the
panic attacks do not occur often enough to meet the panic frequency
criterion of panic disorders. This diagnostic proc~ss reflects both the
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residual nature of GAD and the potentially mixed nature of this
anxiety state" (p.310). Barlow (1985) and Di Nardo et al.~ (1983) have
demonstrated the diagnostic reliability (Kappa) of GAD as .571 which
was below the reliability level of other anxiety disorders. Cerny et
al., (1984) have suggested that the finding of lower reliability of GAD
in comparison \I~ithother am:iety disorders could be attributed to
several factors. First of all, the number of subjects in these stUdies
was quite low. Secondly, 841. of patients diagnosed as agoraphobia wi.th
panic attacks and 78.6 I. of those diagnosed as panic disorders met
the diagnostic criteria for GAD. And also 501. of GAD cases reported
uncued panic attacks, but the frequency was not high enough to place
these patients in the panic disorders category. Thus the data presented
above indicate that the symptoms characteristic of GAD seem to be
frequentl y represented in other amd ety disorders and panic attacks
c)ccur in GAD as well, but with low frequency.
The heterogeneous nature of the GAD category has been discussed by
Hoehn-Saric (1981). In order to clarify the nature of this anxiety
disor-der , he proposed a further sub-di vision of GAD as GAD wi th or
without panic attacks. In his study Hoehn-Saric indicated that patients
with panic attacks reported both more severe and frequent headaches,
palpitations, perspiration, hot flushes and respiratory symptoms than
did non-panic GAD patients. As Cerny et al., (1984) noted that such
findings should be viewed with caution because the group of anxiety
patients with-panic attacks included cases of phobic,
obsessive-compulsive and transitory depression patients. While the
discussion of a further subdivision of GAD seems unwarranted at the
moment, GAD patients as diagnosed by DSM-III criteria have been shown,
by various psychologists (Hibbert, 1984 and Raskin, 19825, to have more
distinct features than patients diagnosed as panic disorders.
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As noted in the previous discussion~ the clear cut distinction
bebo'Jeenthe two disorders (GAD and PO) is related to the somatic
component of am:iety. Barlow, Cohen, et al. (1984) reported GAD
patients having lower patterns of electromyogram (EMG) scoring and
heart rate during pre-treatment physiological assesment. The patients
also scored lm·jeron a pre-treatment somatic am:iety questionnaire in
comparison with PO patients. A study conducted by Anderson et al.,
(1984) revealed that subjects with PO report a greater number of
autonomic symptoms than patients with GAD. Hoehn-Saric (1981) has also
pointed to the higher level of physical symptoms found in PD when
compared with GAD. Higher scores of patients with PO on the somatic
aspect of am:iety seems highly 1ikely because of the autonomic symptoms
that clearly accompany panic attacks (Hoehn-Saric, 1981).
While PO patients score higher on the somatic component of anxiety
the same phenomenon was not observed on the cognitive component. In the
study conducted by Barlow et ~l., (1984) a cognitive-somatic anxiety
questionnaire was administered to PO and GAD patients. PO patients'
scores on the somatic component of anxiety were significantly higher
than those of GAD. On the cognitive component just the opposite pattern
was observed, i.e. GAD patients scored higher than that of PO patients,
however, the difference was not found to be significant.
A study conducted by Hoehn-Saric (1982) demonstrated a similar
result to that reported above. He concluded his study by stating that
his investigat-ion confirmed previous findings indicating higher scores
for PO patients an somatic anxiety but not on psychic anxiety when
compared with GAD patients. In his study Hoehn-Saric (1982) applied a
number of questionnaires such as Hamilt6n Anxiety Scale, Global Rating
of General Anxiety, State-Trai t Am:iety Inventory (STAI) and Eysenck
Personality Inventory (EPI)~ On questionnaires measuring somatic
anxiety~ PO patients scared significantly higher than patients
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diagnosed as GAD. On questionnaires measuring psychic (cognitive)
anxiety, although GAD patients seemed to score a little higher than PD
patients, the difference was not significant.
Anderson et al., (1984) reported that PD and GAD patients did not
differ in terms of STAI and EPI. Barlow et al., (1985) suggested that
it could be useful to conceptualize GAD not as a residual category of
~nxiety disorders, but rather, as a primary diagnostic category whose
cardinal feature is based on the focus of apprehensive expectation. If
, ,
this diagnostic suggestion for GAD is accepted, patients should be
included in this disorder only if the apprehensive expectation is
focused on multiple life circumstances which are not related to the
anticipatory anxiety of the phobic exposure of a panic attack. In this
way GAD obtains the status of being a primary rather than a residual
diagnostic category.
The nature of GAD, when viewed from the Three Systems perspective,
can be summarized in the following way:
The overall anxiety levels of GAD patients are suggested to be
relatively high. These type of patients are expected to express their
anxiety mainly on the cognitive component. The somatic component of
their anxiety is also thought to be high due to the substantial
involvement of bodily symptoms in the diagnosis of this disorder. The
behavioral avoidance component of anxiety may be predicted to be
relatively low because of the abs.nce of an overt avoidance behavior.
3.2.2.3. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders
Obsessive-compulsive disorder is defined as recurrent persistent
ideas, thoughts, images or impulses that are experienced as
ego-synchtonic (involuntary). Senseless or repugnant compulsions are
said to be stereotyped repe~itive behaviors that are seemingly
purposeless, but are in fact emitted in order to produce or prevent
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some future event or situations. The person usually recognizes the
meaninglessness of his behavior, but continues to do so because the
behavior releases tension (APA~ 1980; Cerny et al., 1984). This
category has been incorporated into the anxiety disorders because
whenever individuals attempt to master their symptoms i.e. to resist
obsessions and compulsions, a very high level of an>:iety is
e>:perienced.
Obsessive-compulsive disorder is regarded as the least common of
all anxiety disorders. Myers et al.~ (1984) obtained a six months
prevalence rate of 1.3 to 2% in the general population. Udangui (1977)
in a group of 3400 cases with ages ranging between 50-60~ obtained a
prevalence rate of 0.32%.The incidence among out patients seen at a
clinic specializing in anxiety disorders was predicted to be 0.3 to
0.6% (Cerny et al., 1984). leitenberg (1976) indicated that
approximately 1% of psychiatric in-patients and out-patients were
diagnosed as obsessive-compulsive. Nemiah (1975) estimated the rate of
obsessive-compulsive patients among neurotics at approximately 5%.
Yayruka-Tobias and Neziroglu (1983) sugessted that the real ratio of
obsessive-compulsive patients in the general population could be
higher, because these patients tend to be selective and usually do not
consult professionals for help unless the problem becomes too intense
to cope with. Therefore present estimates may be misleading.
Regarding the se>:ratio of'"thisanx t etv disorder, the reported
-numbers reflect conflicting theoretical approaches. Both DSM-III and
Judd (1965) report the ratio to be 1 to 1. But conversly~ figures
reported by Freud (1925), Adams (1973) and Hollingworth (1980) suggest
a dominance of males. Adams (1973) reported that obsessive-compulsives
were predominantly male. He obtained 39males to 10 females, 4:1 ratio.
In Hollingworth's study (1980) the male to female ratio ·of
obsessive-compulsive patients was 3:1. Initially Freud (1925)
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indicated that obsessive illness had a greater frequency in males.
While the discussion on the sex ratio seems unclear at the pre5ent~
another point of disagreement closely related to sex ratio concerns the
question of the disctinction between obsessive-compulsive personality
and obsessi ve-compul sive disoy-del".
Yayruka-Tobias and Neziroglu (1983) noted that the distinction
between obsessive-compulsive personality and obsessive-compulsive
disorder has gained considerable support in the clinical realm. Sandler
and Hazari (1960), Foulds (1965), Kline (1967) and Cooper (1970)
investigated this issue. As reported by Insel (1984) 10 to 36% of
obsessive compulsive patients display no evidence of premorbid
obsessional traits. However, research indicating that
obsessive-compulsive personality and obsessive-compulsive disorder are
two different points in the same continuum has also been supported.
Half a century ago Masserman (1946), Benet (1949) and Noyes (1949)
claimed that obsessive-compulsive neurosis appears when thoughts and
acts of a person with an obsessive-compulsive character become
disrupted or deviant. Rapaport (1948) also suggested that the
breakdown of an obsessive-compulsive character was unavoidably followed
by the development of obsessive-compulsive neurosis. Kringlen (1965)
after comparing an obsessional adult group with a control neurotic
qroup , (anxiety state~ hysted a, depression) concluded that obsessi ves
<>
had significantly more obsessive premorbidity than the control group.
As noted above, controversy regarding the sex-ratio of
obsessive-compulsive disorder is closely related to the question of
whether obsessive-personality traits are a precondition (or at least
related) to obsessive-compulsive disorder. These two areas of dispute
are closely related to each other because Freudian theory suggests that
obsessive-compulsive personality traits are characteristic of the male
personality (Freud, 1925) and hysterical traits are characteristics of
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the female personality (Arieti, 1975). If obsessive-compulsive
personality traits are related to the development of
obsessive-compulsive disorder, this may explain the high ratio of males
to females in this anxiety disorder.
Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients are assumed to have a
stereotyped personality structure which is reflected in the defense
mechanism t.h(~Ylltilize.vJhile several defense mechanisms are important
in the development of this anxiety problem (undoing, intellectu-
alization, reactilln-formation) (Naqera, 19'76), isolation of affect from
the content (thought), will be specifically stressed in the present
st.udy. As Freud (1909) stated "contrasted with ~yst.eria, where
repression leads to amnesia, other defense mechanisms were said to be
more typical of obsessive-compulsive neurosis. Although repression
takes place it is often incomplete" (pp.195-196). Obsessive-compulsive
patients resort to another way of handling their unwanted drives. Freud
emphasized the defense mechanism called, 'isolation', where an
important phenomenon is deprived of its affect rather than forgetting
(repressing) the significant experience as in hysteria. White and
Gilliland (1976) defined this defense mechanism as follows "•••the
unconsciously instituted, automatic, and involuntary separation of idea
of an unconscious impulse from its appropriate affect, thus allowing
only the idea and not the associated affect to enter awareness."
(p.70). This process results in the personality being affectless or
acting with very little affect. The constriction of affect in
obsessive-compulsive patients has been reported by many investigators
(Turns, 1985; Goldstein, 1985; Yayruka-Tobias and Neziroglu, 1983).
The presence of other symptoms often acts as an obstacle for the
reliable diagnosis of this anxiety disorder. Cerny et al. (1984)
reported that in a sample-of 111 patients diagnosed in the Albany
Phobia and Anxiety Disorders CliniC, obsessive-compulsive symptoms have
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been revealed by 32% of agoraphobics with panic, 14% of simple phobias,
16% of social phobias and 17% of GAD. In the same study 83% of
obsessive compulsive patients reported having panic attacks. However,
clinicians were able to diagnose obsessive-compulsive disorder quite
reliably (interrater raliability 0.82) (Barlow et al., 1985).
Taking the information presented above into account, the following
brief review of obsesive-compulsive disorders from the Three Sytems
Theory can be presented.
Patients in this category are expected to exhibit their anxiety
mainly on the cognitive component because of the primacy of cognitions
(negative thoughts) in the development of this problem.
The most important prediction regardi ng obsessi va-compul sive
disorder is related to the difference between the feeling and cognitive
components of anxiety in this disorder compared with other DSM-III
anxiety disorders. If psychoanalytic claims concerning the use of the
isolation defense mechani sm are correct, it can be expected that
anxiety scores on the cognitive component will be much higher than
scores on the feeling component. More importantly, the difference
between the cognitive and feeling components of anxiety will be
significantly more marked in obsessive-compulsives when compared with
other anxiety disorders. As noted previously, findings of studies
investigating the lateralization and personality styles yield support
to psychoanalytical claims. In fact, the cognitive component is
expected to be highest and feeling relatively low in
obsessive-compulsives. In other anxiety disorders feeling and cognitive
components aroepredicted to be more less the same, or at least the
difference between cognitive and feeling components will not be as
great as it is in obsessive-compulSives. The reason for high cognitive
and low feeling scores in"obsessive-compulsive patients, apart from the
analytic assumption that the isolation defense mechanism is playing a
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predominant role in this disorder by causing suppresion of affect an~
leaving personalities of these types of patients relatively emotionless
in their experiences, may be explained by other approaches. For
instance, the lateralization studies indicate that the left hemisphere,
which controls mainly cognitive operations, is more dominant in
obsessive-compulsives.
It can be,concluded that, regardles of the source, e.g.
psychoanalytic, physiological etc., all arguments suggest the
dominance of cognitive structures in obsessive-compulsives. In other
words, obsessi ve-compul sives can be e>:pected to score very high on the
cognitive component of anxiety. Due to the nature of this anxiety
disorder, obsessive compulsive patients are thought to score
substantially lower on the remaining, especially on the behavioral
avoidance, components of anxiety.
4. AIM OF THE RESEARCH
The aim of this study is mainly three-fold. The first aim is to
investigate whether it is possible to conceptualize feeling and
cognition as two interacting but relatively independent systems. The
second aim is, applying The Three Systems Theory, to identify the
predominant component of anxiety in each of the DSM-III anxiety
disorder categories and to examine the validity of the DSM-III
classification of anxiety disorders. The third aim is to develop a new
questionnaire to measure anxiety in terms of four components (feeling,
cognitive, behavior and somatic).
To investigate the relationship between feeling (affect) and
cognition, human sex differences and differences between patients with
obsessi ve-compul sive disorder" and other DSM- III an>:iety disorder
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sub-categories will be examined in terms of the manifestation of
anxiety on cognitive and feeling componenti. It is suggested that
females experience anxiety relatively evenly between cognitive and
feeling components~ while males tend to experience anxiety more in the
cognitive domain and relatively less in th~ feeling domain when
compared with the female sample. Such differences can be attributed to
variou~ sources: relatively different personality structures of male
and female subjects (Freud , 1909; Torgerson, 1980), different
socialization processes of sexes (Hayenga and Hoyenga, 1979) or to sex
differences in lateralization (Baeton, 1985). For the anxiety patients
the same hypothesis is put forward, indicating that in the case of
obsessive-compulsive disorder manifestation of anxiety is expected to
be relatively more in the cognitive component and less in the feeling
component in comparison to patients with other types of anxiety
disorders where the cognitive and feeling components of anxiety are
predicted to be at the similar level. This difference may be caused by
various factors: different personality structures or different
lateralization.
Thus, the difference between feeling and cognitive components in
males and obsessives is supposed to be higher Cin the direction of the
cognitive component) than .the difference between these ~omponents in
females and other types of anxiety disorder patients.
By showing that higher cognitive scores do not necessarily go
together with higher scores on the feeling component regardless of any
intervening variables, the purpose is to suggest that feeling and
cognition can be considered as relatively independent systems.
The second aim of this research is to identify the salient
componentCs) of anxiety in each sub-categories of DSM-III anxiety
disorder classification from the Thr'ee Systems I"lodelpoint o·fview. The
three response systems (cognitive~ behavioral and somatic) are assumed
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to be separately influenced by different environmental conditions
i ~
: ~.
(Borkovec~ 1976) and a particular therapeutic intervention 'is suggested
to attenuate a specific component of anxiety (Schwartz, Davitson and ',' -
Goleman, 1978). Thus, identification of salient component(s) in each
anxiety disorder can assist in choosing more effective treatment
methods for each an>:iety disorder. Furthermore, an investigation of the
validity of OSM-III classification of anxiety disorders is another aim
"
in the present study. As stated by Spitzer and William (1983)
diagnostic categories of OSM-III were determined by compromise between 11"
~:
clinicians rater than empirical findings. Therefore~ as they have
indicated, future research will decide about the validity of these
categories. So, the aim of this reserach is to examine the differences
in the manifestation of anxiety among patients of various anxiety
disorders from the Three Systems Theory point of view. If the anxiety
is found to have different manifestations in different anxiety
disorders, it will be further evidence for the validity of OSM-III for
differentiating the anxiety disorders in the manner it presents.
"Apart from these two central aims the present study regards the
development of a new questionnaire, which can measure anxiety in terms
of four different components, as another purpose of this research. A
detailed explanation as to the nature of the questionnaire will be
presented in the method chapter~.
",
, ...
NET HOD
In this part, first the process of the construction of a new self
report measure for the assessment of anxiety (the Four Systems Anxiety
Questionnaire) will be introduced. Secondly the assessment measures
used in the study will be presented, then the three studies, first,
with university students, second, with anxiety patients and, third,
with only agoraphobic patients as subjects, will be outlined.
5. DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW ANXIETY MEASUF:E
5.1. THE REASONS FOR DEVELOPING A NEillANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE
The need to develop a new anx iatv queat ionnat ra stems from two
sources. The first one is related to one of the purposes of this study,
namely, to investigate the relationship between the feeling and the
cognitive components of anxiety. Since there is no anxiety
questionnaire that can be utilized for this end, it was necessary to
develop a new anxiety measure which distinguishes feeling and
cognitive components.·Secondly,the two existing Likert type anxiety
questionnaires- Three Systems Anxiety Questionnaire (TSAQ) (Lehrer and
Woolfolk, 1982) and the Cognitive Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (CSAQ)
(Schwartz, Davitson and Goleman, 1978), (,olhichincorporate
mUlti-systems conceptualizations of anxiety CLang, 1971; Rachman and
Hodgson, 1974) have a number of shortcomings in terms nf p~actical
usefulness and psychometric properties. Although CSAQ is.reported to
have high levels of validity and reliability (Schwartz et al., 1978;
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Delmonte and Ryan~ 1983)~ the questionnaire~ nevertheless~ has an
important drawback arising from the small number of items included in
each of the somatic and the cognitive components of anxiety. With the
inclusion of only seven items in each component~ the level of variation
in the manifestation of anxiety across individuals is poorly reflected.
The low number of items is one of the factors which may reduce the
soundness of a given Likert scale (Maranell~ 1974). As the number of
items increases~ the scale satisfies the condition of interval
~easurement (Bailey, 1978) and reliability also improves (Kerlinger,
1973),
The TSAQ has the defect of having an unequal number of items in
each of the cognitive~ the behavioral and the somatic components of
anxiety. The inclusion of different numbers of items in each component
(16 items in the somatic, 11 in the behavioral and 9 in the cognitive)
makes it particularly difficult to compare the scores of each
component. Further calculations are required to permit comparison of
anxiety scores on each component within each individual and across
different individuals.
5.2. THE F:EASONS FOR DEVELOP ING A THURSTONE TYPE SCALE
In order to develop the new questionnaire to measure anxiety in
terms of four different components (feeling, cognitive, behavioral and
somatic), a design yielding a Thurstone scale was chosen. The reasons
underlying the selection of this type of questionnaire can be given as
follows:
A- One of the important features of the Thurstone scale~ which
Likert or Guttman type questionnaires lack, is that it claims to
measure the psych?logical property under scrutiny in terms of an
interval scale (Bailey, 1978; Blalock and Blalock, 1968). Bailey
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(1978) states that "Summated rating, Likert scaling and Guttman
scalogram analysis techniques all construct scales that are at most
ordinal rather than interval ••••There are at least two good reasons for
attempting to construct an interval scale: (a) the added information
available from the knowledge that the intervals between any two
adjacent points on the scale are equal and Cb) the requirement of many
statistical techniques for interval data. One technique designed to
construct an interval scale is the Thurstone method of equal appearing
intervals." (p.364)
B- Thurstone scales permit differentiation between large numbers
of people regarding their attitudinal position (Black and Champion,
1976). The scores obtained in a Thurstone scale reveal a greater
variety of attitudinal positions in comparison with Likert scales.
C- Black and Champion (1976) see the employment of judges ih the
development of a Thurstone scale as another advantage. They think that
the judges, who are usually professionals in the area to be measured,
perform a quite effective screening function by eliminating ambiguous
items that yield little or no agreement.
D- The last reason for selecting a Thurstone type scale rather
than a Likert type has to do with the number of choices in each item.
In Likert scales each item is responded to by selecting one from
several choices, usually 4 or 5 although the number can range from 3 to
9. It is a common observation that scales with items that allow 3 or
more choices encourage a response bias. That is , subjects tend to
avoid the extreme answers and select their choices from the middle of
the range and disregard the meaning of the item. This problem does not
arise wJth Thurstone type scales for the items are responded to only
-either by agreement or disagreement.
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5.3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE SCALE
An item pool of 142 statements was formed to develop a Thurstone
type scale. Some items were taken from various well known anxiety
scales and some were prepared by the investigator. To select the items
for inclusion in the questionnaire, an item selection process for the
development of a Thurstone scale has been employed to these 142
statements. In the first step of this procedure a total of 25 judges
consisting of 21 clinical psychologists at an anxiety workshop in
Glasgow Southern General Hospital and 4 psychology postgraduates at the
University of Stirling were employed to determine the items to be
included in the final version of the questionnaire. Edwards (1957)
reports that reliable scale values can be obtained with small groups
of judges. Correlations as high as .99 were reported (Edwards, 1~57)
for scale values obtained independently from two groups with 15 judges
in each group. Black and Champion (1974) suggest that as few as 15
judges can be employed, but in general at least 25 judges should be
included for a soundly constructed Thurstone scale. As to the type of
judges they recommend the use of professional persons in social
sciences or students majoring in social sciences, because these
individuals are considered to have more experience with social
measurement. Furthermore, they can use their knowledge and experience
to classify items better than a lay person.
5.3.1. Application Of 142 Items To The Judges
"The 142 items were presented to each judge with the instructions
to rate each item on an 11 point scale (Table-2) accbrding to the level
of anxiety being implied by each.
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Low Anxiety Moderate Anxiety High Anxiety
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Table-2 The eleven point scale on which the judges rated the
anxiety level of each item.
The 142 items were ordered in terms of the four components
(starting with the 41 items related to the feeling component, then 37
items in the cognitive, 36 in the behavior and finally 28 items
referring to the somatic component). At the top of each page the
numbers from 1 to 11 were printed evenly spaced in order to give the
impression that intervals between the 11 catagories (scale-points) were
equal. If an item was indicative of low levels of anxiety it was rated
at the lower end of the s~ale (into either of 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th
categories). If the item implied high levels of anxiety it was placed
somewhere in the higher end of the continuum (into either of 8th 9th
10th or 11th categories). The judges wrote their ratings into the
brackets provided at the right side of each question. After obtaining
these ratings selection of~ite~s proceeded in the following manner.
5.3.2. Evaluation And Selection Of The Items
The selection of an item for the final questionnaire is contingent
on two parameters. One captures the level of an>:iety attributed to each
item. This is called the scale value or the weight of the item. The
other·parameter measures the ambiguity of the item and is called the
quartile deviation.
Several methods are available to calculate these values (Edwards,
1957). In this study, an ogive for each of the 142 items was drawn by
taking the cumulative frequency of the allocation of each statement
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along the categories between 1 and 11. In this ogive the median value
(50%) denotes to the weight of the item, and the quartile deviation
(75% - 25%) indicates it~ ambiguity. The quartile deviation refers to a
measure of the variation of the distribution of the values attributed
to a statement by a group of judges. It contains the middle 50 % of the
judgements (Edwards, 1957).
To find these values three perpendicular lines were dropped from
each ogive to the base line at the values of cummulative frequency
(proportion) equal to 25%, 50% and 75% respectively. The point \o'lhere
the perpendicular line dropped from the 50% value intersects the base
line gives the scale value (weight) of an item. The difference between
the two points, where the other two perpendicular lines dropped from
the graph at the values of cummulative proportion equal to 25% and 75%,
intersects with the base line, gives the value of the quartile
deviation. The purpose of the Thurstone scale is to include items with
different weights covering the range between 1 to 11, and also to
include those items that have low quartile deviations which indicates
that the judges are more or less agree about the level of anxiety
reflected in the item. The higher the quartile deviation the more
ambigious the item is and therefore should be dropped from the
questionnaire.
In this manner, 142 ogives were obtained and scale values and
quartile deviations were calculated. Based on these criteria sixty
(60) items including 15 in each four components of anxiety were
selected for the final questionnaire. In this selection pr6cess items
in each of the four components were evaluated separately. This added a
third selection criterion for the items. The'third selection criterion
was that the means and standard deviations of the weights and quartile
deviations of items in each of the four components should be quite
similar. This eriables a person's scores across different components of
- 150 -
anxiety to be compared. Thus, on the basis of these criteria 60 items
for the final version of the questionnaire were selected.
5.3.3. Examination Of The Four Anxiety Components Of The
Scale.
Each component of anxiety has been separated by semantlc
differences in the items. Those statemets which are assumed to be
related to the feeling component always included the word 'feel' (e.g.
A jittery feeling has become a part of my life). Statements in the
cognitive component were made up of the words 'negative thoughts,
ideas or worry' (e.g. I sometimes think of myself as an inefficient
person). Items in the behavioral component referred to the avoidance of
executing certain behaviors (the items were not specifically related to
any particular type of avoidance, rather covering range of everday
situations) (e.g. I avoid participating in discussions). Finally, the
items assessing the somatic component of anxiety included various
bodily sensations (e.g. I often have a headache).
One point needs to be clarified here, the inclusion of 'worrying'
in the cognitive component rather than feeling. The word 'worry' has
both, cognitive and feeling connotations. In this study following
Rado's (1969) classification, it was thought that inclusion of worrying
in the cognitive component would be appropriate. Rado considered
'worry' between feeling and cognition, because worrying implied
consideration and evaluation of the situation rather than a direct
affective reaction. Although it has affective implications, worrying
indicates negative assumptions and ideations. Also inclusion of
worrying in the cognitive component could improve assessment of the
difference between the cognitive and affective components of an>:iety of
sUbjects. If worrying was not included in the study at all, the
-differences between ~ognitive and feeling component of anxiety would be
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reflected by the words of 'feeling versus thinking' alone, subjects
could identify the two components very easily, and might give
intentionally or unitentionally distorted responses to the questions.
The next step was to test if the questionnaire was really made
up of four different components of anxiety. To examine this issue, the
selected 60 items, with 15 in each component, were presented in a
random order to 15 first year undergraduate students in the University
of Stirling with the instruction to assign each item to one of the four
categories (feeling, cognitive, behavioral and somatic). This was all
the information given to these sUbjects. They were totally blind to the
purpose of the application. Subjects did not know how many items were
in the each category and how each category had been defined. Subjects
just read the items and allocated them into one of the four categories.
This method of testing, which examines if the questionnaire is made up
of the number of components that it is claiming to contain has been
called 'the torting technique' (similar analyses have been reported by
Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976). Mean of the incorrectly allocated
items has been found to be 5.7 out of 60 (9.5%). In other words 90.5%
of the items were correctly located into the categories in which they
were supposed to be. These values indicated a high degree of agreement
about the allocation of items into four different categories. Therefore
it was concluded that the 60 item~ in the questionnaire could be
systematicaly differentiated, with the accuracy of 90.5% into the four
different components of anxiety which have been claimed to be assessed
by the questionnaire.
5.3.4. The Method Of Scoring The Scale
Before finishing this section of the scale construction process,
an important point related to the scoring of Thurstone type scales
med ts attention. In"a Thurs tone scale, subjects' scores are determined
- 152 -
by computing the mean or median value of the scale scores of the items
agreed as indicative of the construct in question. (Edwards, 1957;
Blalock and Black, 1968) However, an important problem which is related
to the number of statements agreed with and the range of the scale
covered, have been noted by Guilford (1954). He indicated that those
who mark more statements tend to obtain average values closer to the
middle point. This is a regression phenomenon which mainly effects
individuals with extreme scale positions. In other words, when a
subject agrees with more statements, regardless of his real position in
the scale, his score approaches to middle scale values (mean of all
scale values). To avoid this phenomenon Guilford (1954) recommended
constricting subjects choices to a certain number, in this way subjects
could concentrate on the statements which are nearest to their own
positions. Instead of solving the.regression problem by implementing
limitations to the number of items subjects can choose, in the present
research another way of tackling this problem was considered. Basically
the subjects scores have been calculated by simply adding the scale
values (weights) of items with which they agreed.
6. ASSESSMENT SCALES USED IN THE STUDY
In this study four different questionnaires have been employed to
measure the anxiety level of the sUbjects.
6.1. THE FOUR SYSTEMS ANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE (FSAQ)
A comprehensive account of this questionnaire has already been
presented in the previous section. The above section can briefly be
summarized as follows: The FSAQ has been developed specifically for the
present study by the investigator. It consists of sixty (60) Thurstone
type (yes-no) items. This instrument aims to measure anxiety in terms
of four (feeling, cognitive, behavioral and somatic) relatively
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independent components. Each component of am:iety has been measured by
the same number of items (15) which have been developed so that mean
weights of each component ~ere almost equal (5.50). Information about
the psychometric properties (reliability and validity levels) of the
questionnaire will be presented in the results section.
6.2. The THREE SYSTEMS ANX IETY QUESTI ONNA IRE (TSAQ)
Developed by Lehrer and Woolfolk (1982). Supporting the
_ conceptualization of anxiety as a multidimensional phenomenon, Lehrer
and Woolfolk undertook a study to find out whether self-reported
cognitive, behavioral and somatic varieties of anxiety could be
measured as orthogonal factors. Assessments of anxiety by
questionnaires in terms of two-subsets, as somatic and psychic
(cognitive) have been reported in the literature (Hamilton, 1959).
However there was no reported reseach referring to the examination of
items that measure behavioral manifestation of anxiety. This was the
novelty introduced by Lehrer and Woolfolk (1982) in their study.
To begin with, drawing items from the MMPI, Speilberger's STA! and
their own clinical experience, Lehrer and Woolfolk constructed a Likert
.'type scale in which each item was rated on a 9-point, ranging from
'never' to 'almost always'.
Two studies were constructed, each with different versions of the
questionnaire. In each case three factors were extracted and submitted
to a varimax rotation. In the present study the second version of the
questionnair~ is employed, as it has been noted by Lehrer and Woolfolk
(1982) that the second form has been found to have a greater number of
items (36) in comparison with the number of items included in the first
form (30).
This second version was administered by Lehrer and Woolfolk (1982)
to a sample of 70 neurotic clients of mental health practitioners, 289
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night school students at Rutgers University and 67 participants in a
stress workshop. For this version the reliability was .93 for the
cognitive (worrying factor), .91 for the behavioral and .92 for the
somatic. As a validation of the inventory derived from the second
study, 65 of the subjects in that study were administered the trait
form of State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Speilberger, Gorsuch and
Lushere, 1970). Subjects scores on the STAI correlated highly with the
items that load greater than .50 on each of the three factors,
- indicating that the three factors (cognitive, behavioral and somatic)
are closely related to measure of trait anxiety. The correlation of
STAI with the cognitive anxiety sub-scale was somewhat higher than the
correl at ion ~dth the other two sub-scales.
A 36-item inventory was then constructed consisting of those
items which loaded greater than .50 on one of the three rotated
factors in the second study. This scale was then administered along
with various other psychometric inventories to three sets of sUbjects.
(see Table-3 below).
Q!;!§§t.iQQQ2ic§ ~ §QIT!2t.i£ ~~h~tiQC~!. (;QgQit.it~
Trait Form of
STAI 65 .79 .60 .86
Hamilton An>:iety
Inventory
General An>:iety 57 .51 .19 .24
Physiological 57 "'..,. .08 .16• tJ ....\
Psychic 57 .07 .22 .24
IPAT An>:iety
Inventory 140 .39 .34 .51
Table-3: Showing correlations between the components of the
TSAQ and other scales.
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As a result Lehrer and ~loolfork concluded that their data had
indicated three orthogonal factors from a pool of self report items of
somatic, cognitive and behavioral anxiety related complaints and these
factors corresponded to the three hypothesized dimensions. Initial
examination of the questionnaire (36-items) obtained out of a factor
analysis in the second study suggested that this scale was a highly
reliable and valid measure of the three kinds of anxiety. However it is
suggested by the present author that the Lehrer and Woolfolk's scale
-has a number of shortcomings as previously mentioned.
6.3. THE COGNITIVE SOMATIC ANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE (CSAQ)
The CSAQ has been developed by Schwartz, Davidson and Goleman in
1978. The idea which led to the development of this questionnaire came
from the Three Sytems Model of emotion (Lang, 1971; Rachman and
Hodgson, 1974). Schwartz et al. (1978) taking into consideration the
multi-dimensional nature of anxiety, thought that two relatively
independent types of anxiety, cognitive (psychic)and somatic could
reliably be measured.
In the study designed for the development and validity testing of
CSAQ 77 subjects were included. The CSAQ was constructed by selecting
items from well known questionnaires that three independent judges had
unanimously agreed to reflect cognitive or somatic anxiety. The
questionnaire was completed with 14 items, half of the items measuring
somatic anxiety and the other half cognitive anxiety. The 77 subjects
participating in the study were instructed to rate the degree to which
they generally or typically e>:perience these symptoms when enxious , by
c~rcling a number from 1 to 5 with 1 representing 'not at all' and 5
representing 'very much so'. The sum of the circled ratings was
separately computed for cognitive and somatic items which appeared in
random order in the questionnaire.
co
To measure the validity of eSAQ, correlations between this
questionnaire and the trait form of STAI (Speilberger et al., 1970)
were calculated using the same 77 sUbjects. Significant results were
found, r=0.67, r=0.40 (p < 0.001) for the cognitive and somatic anxiety ,I
respectively. The correlation between the somatic and the cognitive
sub-scales of eSAQ was r=O.42 indicating a moderate level of
relationship.
In the study reported above, no information was given regarding
"the level of reliability of eSAQ. In 1983, Delmonte and Ryan undertook
another study to invEstigate the level of reliability of CSAO and to
examine whether the discrimination of items as cognitive or somatic had
any statistical validity. Employing 100 subjects and a method of factor
analysis, they examined the validity of separation of items in eSAO
into two sub-categories as cognitive and somatic. Factor loadings for
the 14 items of CSAO strongly corresponded with the cognitive and
somatic items of CSAQ, especially with respect to the somatic items.
One item in the cognitive sub-scale did not reach the cut off point and
another-loaded with the somatic items. Overall the results lend support
for the twofold separation o~ items in the questionnaire.
The reliability of the eSAO as calculated by Cronbach's Alpha
(measure of internal reliability) was reported to be quite high 0.81
and 0.85 for somatic and cognitive componants respectively. In this
study (Delmonte and Ryan, 1983), the correlation between the cognitive
and the somatic sub-scales was found to be higher (0.64) than that
reported in Schwartz et al., (1978).
The~~ reported studies suggest that eSAQ c~n be considered as a
reliable and valid instrument in the measurement of anxiety in terms of
cognitive and somatic sub-scales. The reason why CSAQ was selected to
be used in the present research is related to the fact that both in the
development of eSAQ and in the present research the phenomenon of
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anxiety was conceptualized as multidimensional. It was thought that
application of CSAQ along with the the Four Systems Anxiety
Questionnaire (FSAQ) could supply useful information about the validity
of the newly developed questionnaire (FSAQ) and its components as well
as yielding some information about the nature and level of anxiety of
the patients.
6.4. STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY (STAI)
STAI developed by Speilberger, Goursh and Lushene (1970) is made
up of two separate self-report scales for measuring two different types
of anxiety, state anxiety (A-state) and trait anxiety (A-trait), both
of which consist of 20 4-point Likert type items.
The A-trait items ask people to describe how they generally feel.
The A-trait scale provides a means for measuring the anxiety proneness
of sUbjects. In other words A-trait refers to relatively stable
individual differences in anxiety proneness. The A-state scores
indicate how individuals feel at a particular moment in time.
Speilberger et al. (1970) conceptualized A-state as a transitory
emotional state and condition_that is characterised by subjective,
consciously perceived feelings of tension and apprehension and
heightened automatic nervous system activity (1966).
The split-half reliabilites of the STAI A-state and A-trait scales
using over 1500 college and high-school students have been calculated.
The results indicated that both of the scales have quite high levels of
reliability (between the ranges of .92-.83) Test re-test reliabilites
of the measure over 1 hour, 20 days and 104 days intervals employing
different number of subjects (197, 113 and 47 respectively) indicated
that although A-trait scores were quite reliable, ranging from .86 to
.73, A-state scares.were found to have very low levels of reliability,
ranging from .16 to .54. Nevertheless, low correlations of A-state
C"8 -
scores are anticipated, because by definition A-state refers to a
transient level of anxiety in a given situation.
Given these figures and the nature of the concept of A-state
Speilberger et al., (1970) commented that measures of internal
consistency would be a more appropriate index of reliability of A-state
than test-retest correlation.
Concurrent validity of A-trait has been evaluated by calculating
the correlation between A-trait and IPAT (Cattell and Scheier, 1963),
-the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (1953) and the Zuckerman Affective
Checklist (1960). The results indicated that A-trait has a satisfactory
level of validity (ranging from .52 to .84).
Construct validity of the A-state scale has been calculated by
administering this questonnaire to 977 university students. The
students were given the A-state with the standard instructions first,
then they were asked to respond according to • how they think they
would feel just prior to the final examination in an important course'.
The mean scores of the A-state scale was considerably higher in the
exam condition than the normal condition in for both sexes.
Overall psychometric evaluation of A-state and A-trait forms
indicate that both scales were reliable and valid instruments in the
measurement of anxiety.
6.5. SELF-DIAGNOSTIC FORM
This self-diagnostic form was adapted from the DSM-III Decision
Tree for-Anxiety Disorders and converted to a form applicable to
patients. The self-diagnostic form consists of brief descriptions of
each of the six DSM-III anxiety disorders included in the present
study. The patients were instructed to select two of the descriptions
which represented their problem best.
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The reason behind the application of the self-diagnostic form was
to obtain some information regarding the relationship between patients'
conceptualization of their own problems and clinicians' diagnoses of
the patients problem.
7. APPLICATION OF THE SCALES TO THE SUBJECTS
Mainly two groups of subjects were included in the study; a-
university students~ b-anxiety patients. In addition to these two
groups, a group of agoraphobics were also included but only for the
examination of the sensitivity of the FSAQ to pre and post treatment
changes in level of anxiety.
7.1. APPLICATION OF FSAQ AND TSAQ TO
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
7.1.1. Subjects:
In the first study 218 first year undergraduate university
students were included as subjects, comprising 143 females and 71
males (4 subjects did not indicate their sex on the questionnaires).
Mean age was, 20.3 for females,_and 21.8 for males.
7.1.2. Procedure:
The TSAQ and FCAQ were administered to first year Stirling
university students on three different occasions in academic sessions
1985 and 1986. On each occasion, before the beginning of the practical
session, students were asked to complete the questionnaires (TSAQ and
FCAQ) and return them to the investigator at the end of each session.
Students were informed that participation was 'totally voluntary. In the
first application 74 and in the second 80 students participated in the
study. The third and the last application took place in the education
department, 64 subJ!=!ctsparticipated, adding up the total number of
subjects to 218.
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7.2. AF'PLICAT ION OF ,FSAQ, TSAQ, CSAQ, STAI and
SELF-DIAGNOSTIC FORM TO ANXIETY PATIENTS
7.2.1. Subjects:
Fifty four anxiety patients who were referred from GF'sto
different clinical psychologists were included as sUbjects. Among the
subjects 18 were male and 36 were female. The age of males ranged
between 19 and 59 with a mean of 36.5 and of females ranged between 24
and 68 with a mean of 39.5.
7.2.2. Procedure:
Due to having no direct patient contact, the experimenter himself
could not participate in the process of distributing the questionnaires
to the anxiety patients. The process of distributing and recollecting
the questionnaires was co-ordinated by K. Power. The present author
prepared the instructions for the clinical psychologists, indicating
the use of DSM-III anxiety disorders diagnostic system in recruiting
and diagnosing the patients. Each patient·s voluntary consent was
obtained before completing the questionnaires and he/she was informed
of confidentiality. In order to avoid biases in the selection of
patients, the clinicians were required to ask all anxiety patients who
were referred whether they would like to participate. The clinicians
were urged not to include patients following their own preferences.
Although the data about the patients came mainly from their
self-r~ports, information as to the nature of the patients' anxiety
problems was obtained by the clinicians' rati~gs. For each patient the
clinicians were requested to complete the 'therapist assesment sheets'
which aimed to obtain information regarding the type of diagnosis,
length of treatment, (both psychological and medical), and severity of
the illness. The severity of the i Ll nes.s was assessed on a 7-point
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scale (1 indicating normal and 7 severe conditions). Those patients who
consented to participate in the study were asked to complete a booklet
of questionnaires consisting of FSAD, TSAD, CSAD, both forms of STAl
together with a self-diagnostic form. Using these criteria over a
period of 1.5 year (from 1985 March to 1986 December) 54 am:iety
patients were recruited to the study.
7.3. APPLICATION OF FSAD TO AGORAPHOBICS
BEFORE AND AFTER BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT
7.3.1. Sub jeets:
The subjects of this study were 14 agoraphobics. Only 2 of the
subjects were male. The ages of the subjects ranged between 20 and 72
with the mean age of 46.
7.3.2. Procedure
A study undertaken by K. Smith, as a part of his master thesis,
and supervised by K. Power, provided the present author with the
opportunity to apply the FSAQ prior to and following a structured
treatment programme. The study conducted by K. Smith aimed to assess
the effectiveness of a b~havioral intervention technique developed by
Mathews, Gelder and Johnston (1981) in the treatment of agoraphobia.
The FSAQ was administered to patients with the aim of assessing whether
the scale was able to reveal differences in the anxiety levels before
and after treatment. A brief description of K. Smith's study is as
follows.
Patients were taken directly from GPs' referrals. To select
pati~nts appropriate for K. Smith's study ~ semi-structured interview
was conducted. Patients who met DSM-III criteria for the diagnosis of
agoraphobia (with or without panic attacks) were included into the
study. Followi~g the initial interview, the patients were seen for five
consecutive weekly appointments, they then missed a week and were then
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seen again in the seventh week. They were not seen again until five
weeks later for the concluding appointment. Thus, the process of the
therapy lasted for twelve weeks. The FSAQ together with other anxiety
questionnaires and assessment measures, specifically designed for K.
Smith's study, was administered to the agoraphobic patients at the
initial interview and at the last session.
The content of the treatment was mainly behavioral (graded
exposure) with some cognitive elements included. Each patient was
issued with a copy of Mathews et a1.'s (1981) Programmed Practice for
Agoraphobia: Clients Manual.
In summary, the subject groups of the present study are as .
follows.
A- The sample of university students included 218 sUbjects. The
anxiety scales administered to this sample were FSAQ and TSAQ.
B- The anxiety disorders group included 54 patients, diagnosed
according to DSM-III an>:iety disorders criteria. The scales
administered to this group were FSAQ, TSAQ, CSAQ, STAI and a
self-diagnostic form.
C- The FSAQ was administered to the agoraphobics patients (N=14)
of K. Smith's study in order to examine the sensitivity of FSAQ to the
pre and post treatment differences on the an>:iety level of agoraphobic
patients.
- 163 -
RES U L T S
In this section~ demographic data of each category of anxietv
patients and comparison of the self-diagnostic form with clinicians'
diagnoses will briefly be presented. Secondly, psychometric evaluation
of FSAQ will be reported. Thirdly~ test results pertinent to the issue
of separating affect fron cognition will be introduced, and finally~
psychometric examination of DSM-III anxiety disorders classification
will be given.
8. DEMOGRAPHIC EVALUATION OF ANXIETY PATIENTS
The number of male and female patients in each category of anxiety
disorders has been calculated (Table-4). Means and standard deviations
of patients' age, length of treatment (psychological and/or
pharmachological) and severity of the problem have been calculated for
each sub-category of anxiety disorders (Table-5). Analysis of variance
tests have been performed between sub-categories of anxiety disorders
~
on each of the variables presented above. The results indicated no
significant difference between the six sub-categories of anxiety
disorders on the these three variables.
9. COPMPARISON OF PATIENTS' SELF-DIAGNOSES WITH CLINICIANS'
DIAGNOSES
In this study, patients were placed into DSM-III anxiety disorder
categories according to the clinicians' primary diagnosis. However.
patients' self-diaqnoses were also included in order to examine the
relationship between the diagnoses~f the patients and the clinicans.
In the self-diagnostic form. patients were presented with a description
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AEi--P ~9:e ?!:1:f_~: PO GAD DB-CO TOTAL
MALE 4 3 4 4 1 18
FEMALE 9 6 6 .,. 6 6 3t)~,
TOH',L 10 10 9 7 10 8 54
TABLE-4 Number of male and female anxiety patients in each
sub-category of DSH-III anxiety disorders.
t~.~1:E so-r- St1-P ER GI~D Q~:~Q E=\!~l:~!=;?
AGE 47 7-" 47 40 37 32 2.37~\ ..>~\
(14 ) (4. 1) (14.2) (10.1) (13.1) (9.8)
LENGTH OF S' .., 31 17.6 6 c· 46.4 0.5 1. 13.L • ..J
TF:EATi'tEl'H (12.5) (68. 7) (4:~. 1) (10.1) (13.7) (0.8)
<IN MONTHS)
F:~HINGS DF 4.9 C" c- L:" -:r 5.1 4.6 5.4 1.61,.J • ..J ..J.">
SEVEFIITY (0.9) <0.7) (1) (0.4) (1. 2) (0.7)
TA8LF-5 Means and standard deviations of each sub-cateQory of
DSM-III anxiety patients on aqe, lenqth of treatment and sEverity; and
comparison (analvsis of variance) of anxiety categories on these three
variables.
I<E'( TO I i~Hl.I::[~:
_ •• ~ __ • • ••• H
AG-P~ Agoraphobi~ PD= Panic Disorders
SO-P= Social Phobia GAo= Generalized Anxietv Disorders
SM-P= Simole PhobIa OB-CO= Obsessive-Compulsive Dis.
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of each DSM-III anxietv disorder sub-categories and they were required
to tick the best suited two. In the clinicians' diagnoses and the
subjects' self-diagnoses. two separate diagnoses - as primary
diagnosis and secondary diagnosis - were allowed.
Table- 6 shows the frequencies of patients in DSM-III anxiety
disorders diagnosed by different methods.
Table-7 shows the number of agreements and names of disagreed
categories between clinicians' primary diagnosis and patients'
self-diagnoses (primary and secondary). The results indicated that
patients' primary self-diagnosis was more related to the clinicians'
primary diagnosis than patients' secondary self-diagnosis. Therefore,
in the remaining calculations only patients' primary self-diagnosis was
included.
Furthermore, ratio of agreement and kappa (k) correlation
coefficient between clinician's primary diagnosis and patients'
self-diagnosis was calculated (Table~8). The ratio of agreements
between various diagnostic methods were calculated by dividing the
number of times twa diagnostic approaches allocated patients into the
same anxiety disorder category over the total number of cases.
~K"s and ratios of agreement between patients' self-diagnosis and
the clinicians' primary diagnosis have been computed for each
sub-category of anxiety disorders (see Table- 9). In each anxiety
sub-cateqory. the total number' of times clinician's primary diagnosis
agreed with the diagnosis carried out by patients was divided by the
number tif patients included in that category according to the
clinicians' primarv diaqnosis. This gave the ratio (%) of agreements
between clinician's prImary diagnosis and different types of subjects'
self-diaqnosis in each anxiety disorder.
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CLINICIANS' PRIMARY
DIAGNOSIS
CLINICIANS' SECONDARY
DIAGNOSIS
PATIENTS' SELF-
DIAGNOSIS (PRIMARY)
PATIENTS' SELF-
DIAGNOSIS (SECONDARY)
10 10 9 7 10 8 54
5 ....~, 1 4 ....~, 1 37 54
12 13 8 4 10 7 54
4 12 5 8 12 4 9 54
TABLE-6 Frequencies nf each sub-category of DSM-III anxiety
disorder patients across different diagnostic methods.
!:;!;Y IQ IBfl!::s;.
AG-P= Agoraphobia
SO-P= Social Phobia
"
SM·-P= Simple Phobia
MIS= Missing Cases
PD= Panic Disorder
GAD= Generalized Anxiety Disorder
OB-CO= Obsessive Compulsive Dis.
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CLINICIANS' PRIMARY DIAGNOSIS
N= 10
B§Q8aetiQ~16
NO OF
DISAGREE--------
N=10
§Q~IB!::=etiQ!nB
NO OF
AGREE DISAGREE------_._
N=9
§1t!e!::s=etiQ~IB
NO OF
AGREE Q!§e§B~~
PATIENTS' 7 1 SO-P
SELF-DIAGN. 1 SM-P
(PRIMARY) 1 GAD
PATIENTS' 1 4 SO-P
SELF-DIAGN. 2 PO
(SECONDARY) 2 GAD
1 SM-P
CLINICIANS'
N=7 N=10
EB~l~ Ql§Q8Q· § B Q
NO OF NO OF
6§8ss P.!§B§8ss 6§Bss
9 1 AG-P 4 2 AG-P
2 GAD
1 PO
1 4 MIS 1 ..,. SO-P,_,
2 AG-P 2 PO
2 GAD 1 AG-P
lOB-CO 1 GAD
lOB-CO
PRIMARY DIAGNOSIS
N=8
Q§§s§§l~s=~Qt!E!.
NO OF
QI§6§8ss 6§Bss QI§6§8ss
PATIENTS' ..,. 2 GAD 5 2 AG-P 7 1 SM-P~,
SELF-DIAGN. 1 SO-P 2 SO-P
(PRIMARY) 1 SM-P 1 SM-P
PATIENTS' (I 2 GAD 2 4 PO (I 3 GAD
SELF-DIAGN. 2 MIS 1 SO-P 2 SO-P
(SECONDARY) 1 SO-P 1 SM-P 2 MIS
1 SM-P 1 GAD 1 SM-P
1 OB-CO 1 OB-CO
TABLE-7 Number of agreements and disgareements between
clinicians' primary diagnosis and patients' self-diagnoses (primary and
secondary) in each sub-caiegory of DSM-III anxiety disorders.
tsY IQ IB£b§::
AG-P= Agoraphobia
SO-P= Social Phobia
SM-P= Simple Phobia
PD= Panic Disorders
GAD= Generalized Anxiety Disorders
OB-CO= Obsessive Compulsive Disorders
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EBIIst.:!I§:§sbE=121B§t.:!Q§I§JEBI~BBYl
CLINICIANS'
(PRIMARY)
64 I.
k = 0.58
DIAGNOSIS N = 54
TABLE-8 Percentage of agreement and kappa (k) correlation
values between clinicians' primary diagnosis and patients'
self-diagnosis (primary).
B~=E §Q=E §t!=E Ell §BIl Q~=~Q
I. OF AGREE~lENT 0.70 0.90 0.44 0.43 0.50 0.88
k=.55 k=.72 k=.38 k=.50 k=.61 k=.94
N= 10 N= 10 N= 9 N= 7 N= 10 N= 8
TABLE-9 Percentages (I.) of patients' self-diagnosis (primary)
which agrees with the diagnosis carried by clinicians (primary) for
each sub-category of DSM-III anxiety disorders and~ kappa (k)
correlation coefficients between the diagnostic methods for each
sub-category of DSM-III anxiety disorders.
tgy IQ IB~bs
AG-P= Agoraphobia
SO-P= Social Phobia
SM-P= Simple Phobia
PD= Panic Disorders
GAD= Generalized Anxiety Disorders
OB-CO= Obsessive-Compulsive Dis.
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10. PSYCHOMETRIC EVALUATION FSAQ
As noted in the previous chapter FSAQ is a 60-item Thurstone scale
and aims to measure anxiety in four different components. The process
of determining the weights and quartile deviations of the 60 items
selected according to the ratings of 25 judges (clinical psychologists
and psychology postgraduates), has been outlined in the method chapter.
The weights, quartile deviations and number of items included in each
component of the questionnaire are presented in Table-la.
Means and standard deviations of weights and quartile deviations
of the items comprising each component of the questionnaire have been
calculated and found to be very similar to each other (see Table-ll).
10.1. RELIABILITY (INTERNAL CONSISTENCY)
First~ ~Icluding all subjects (university students and anxiety
patients) the split-half (Alpha) reliability -and confidence intervals
(%95) of the reliability coefficients- of the questionnaire~ as a whole
and for each of the four components separately, have been evaluated.
The confidence intervals were found with the use of statistical tables
(Neave, 1978), therefore the values reflect approximate rather than
exact boundaries. The results were found to be satisfactory (n~ 272)
(r=O.92. 0.89(p<0.94 for total anxiety score, r= 0.82, O.76<p< 0.86;
r= 0.81~ 0.71<p(O.85; r= 0.68. 0.59<p< 0.74 and r=0.68
0.59<p<O.74 for feeling, cognitive, behavioral and somatic anXiety).
Secondly, reliabilities and confidence intervals of the scale were
calculated separatelv for two different subject groups (anxiety
patients and university students) (Table-121. Results indicated that
feeling and cognitive components of the scale were more reliable than
behavioral and somatic components.
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Sub-Ca t egad es o·f The Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire
E~~'=l~§ ~Q§t:!ln~s ~~t!6:lIQ!::!B6'= §QtjBII~
item's item's item's item's
~Q l1~igt:!t QQ ~Q ~l.~igt!t.QD No ~~igbt OD ~9 ~gigtd; QQ
2 8.6 2.0 10 8.1 1.8 4 3.6 2.8 1 6.6 1.7
7 4.4 2.4 13 8.5 1.9 5 9.0 1.0 " 7.9 1.7~.
8 7.8 1.8 15 7.8 1.3 16 7.4 2.5 6 6.7 1.7
12 1.0 1.0 17 4 e:.- .., e:.- 21 1.1 0.9 9 8.5 2.0• .J k ....,
14 2.8 1.8 19 6.4 2.4 25 7.0 2.4 11 1.4 1.0
18 8 ,.,2.6 27 1.0 1.0 28 6.8 Ii C' 'iI', 1.3 O.}..... ..... .J .... ....
20 3.1 2.8 29 7.0 1.8 30 6.4 3.0 24 8.2 2.4
,.,.,. 1.9 0.8 31 1.1 1.0 3:3 6.0 1.7 26 :i.7 2.8,I.;.._,
..,.,., 7.9 2.4 36 4.7 2.0 38 1.1 0.7 34 1.4 1.0~'.4
.,.e: 0::- ..... 1.9 40 8.1 1.7 45 1.1 0.8 37 4.8 2.8,_'"", ..I.",
39 3.7 2.2 42 8.5 2.0 46 6.8 2.6 41 1.5 1.6
44 6.9 2.1 47 1.0 1.0 "".., 7.7 2.1 43 8.2 2.4.J ...
50 6.1 L9 49 5.9 .., " 54 7.5 ., ..,. 48 6.7 3.1_ .... - .J • ._\
I::"'':'' - '" 2.0 57 3.1 l.1 56 4.6 2.7 51 7.2 ~I C'""'-\ I • ..J J:". ~
e-e- 7.3 .-, .,. 59 6.7 2.1 60 6.4 .., ., 58 6.3 2.4.J •.J ,,- . ._\ .£.4
TABLE -10 Showing items numbers (in the questionnaire), weights and
quartile deviations (aD) in each component of FSAO. Weights and
quartile deviations were determined by the ratings of the judges.
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6!J~ig!1: gQ!!)QQ!Jg!J! t!g~!J s. Qg~
FEELING
~Jeight 5.49 2.51
Q. Dev. 2.00 0.54
COGNITIVE
Weight 5.49 2.78
Q. Dev. 1.86 0.60
BEHAVIORAL
~Jeight 5.50 2.60
Q. Dev. 2.08 0.85
SOMATIC -Weight 5.49 2.73
Q. Dev. 1.98 0.72
TABLE- 11 Means and standard deviations of weights and quartile
deviations of the items included in each component of FSAQ.
t:!QQE t:!QOF t:!QOF t:!QQE NO OF
!I~t1§=l~ !Ist1§=l~ !Ist!§=!~ !Ist1§=!~ !Ist!§=~Q
Essb!t:!§ gQ§mI!~s ~s!:!6~!Q8 §Qt!6I!g IQI6!: §g~!:s
UNI. .73 .73 •54 C' .... .85• ~.J..
STUDENTS •64<p<.79 •64(p<'79 .41<p<61 .40<p<.60 •79<p<.86
N=218
ANXIETY
PATIENTS .80 .84 .77 .66 .92
1'1=54 .68<p<.88 .71<p<'89 .61<p<'83 .47<p<.79 .84<p<.94
BOTH
GROUPS
N=272
.82
.76<p<.86
.81 .68
.59<p<.74
.68 .92
•72<p<.85 .59<p(.74 .89<p<.94
TABLE- 12 Reliability (alpha) levels a~d confidence intervals of
the reliability correlation coefficients of FSAQ in different subject
groups (university students, anxiety patients and both).
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10.2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF THE FSAQ
Including all subjects of the study, correlations between four
components of FSAQ have been calculated and confidence intervals
presented (Table-13). Then the same computation was carried out in two
different subject groups of the study (anxiety patients and univer~ity
students) separately (Tables 14-15). The results indicated that the
correlation between the cognitive and feeling components of FSAQ was
the highest in comparison with the correlations between other
components of the scale.
A clarification of the higher correlation between feeling and
cognitive components, in comparison with the reliability levels of
these two components, is appropriate. Although it seems on the Table-13
that the correlation between these two components (r=O.83) is higher
than the reliability level (internal consistency) of the feeling
component (r= 0.82) the figures are misleading, because the former
correlation (between feeling and cognitive components of FSAQ) includes
15 items in each component whereas in the latter (reliability of
feeling component) reflects the correlation between 7 items. The
application of Spearman Brown formula indicated that had the item
number been increased to 15, the reliability of the feeling component
would have been much higher (r= 0.89'.
10.3. VALIDITY
In the assessment of the validity level of the qUEstionnaire two
different methods were used.
10.3.1. Concurrent Validity
Correlations between FSAQ and TSAQ including all subjects and on
each different subject groups (university students and anxiety
patients) were calculated (Table-161. The results indicated acceptable
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N=272
1.00 .83
.81<p<'88
.74
.65<p<.79
.68
.59<p<.72
1.00 .68 .61
.59<p<.72 .52<p<.68
1.00 .60
.50<p<.67
§Q!:':!6I!Q 1.00
TABLE-13 CQrrelation~ (confidence intervals - <p< - of
correlations) between the components of FSAQ including all subjects
(university students and anxiety patients).
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N=218
FEELING
Ess!:'I~§ ~Q!2~III~s BEHAVIORAL §Qlj6ng----------
1.00 .77 r:~ .44• ~ ..J
.70<p<'81 •43(p<' 62 .33<p<.53
1.00 .60 .45
.50<p<.69 •34<p<. 54
COGNITIVE
", BEHAV IORAL 1.00 .40
.38<p<.51
SOMATIC 1.00
TABLE-14 Correlations ( and confidence intervals - (p< -,of
correlations) between components oL FSAQ in a sample of university
students.
N=54
1.00 .75
.60<p<.84
.75
.60<p<.84
.63
44<p<.77
1.00 .39
.32<p<.71 .14<p<.60
.54
.~.1<p<.69
1.00
TABLE-i5 Correlations (and confidence intervals - <p< - of the
correlations) between components of FSAQ in anxiety patients.
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IQI6b
INCLUDING BOTH
SUBJECT GROUPS (UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND ANXIETY PATIENTS)
N=272
THREE-SYSTEMS
ANXIETY DUES.
Cogniti ve
Behavior
Somatic
Total score
.75 .82 .63 .62 .81
.70 .64 .78 .54 .76
.67 .61 .60 .78 .74
.80 .78 .76 .71 .87
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ONLY
N=218
THREE-SYSTEMS
ANXIETY DUES.
Cognitive .68 .77 COr::" .50 .78• ..J..J
Behavior 1:".., C'C' .65 .40 .63• ..J.I- • ..J..J
Somatic .45 .50 .39 .64 .59
Total score .65 .71 .64 .57 .79
ANXIETY PATIENTS ONLY
N=54
THF:EE-SYSTEMS
ANXIETY DUES.
Cognitive
Behavior
Somatic
Total score
.75
.56
.56
o:::'CO .56• ..J..J
.83 .44
co'"' .74.~L
.73 .66
.79
.78
.64
.85
.71 .81
.38
.80 .66
,
TABLE- 16 Correlations between FSAQ and Three System~Anxiety
questionnaire in three different subject groups.
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level of validity. As seen in Table-16~ correlations between
corresponding components of anxiety in the two scales are higher than
correlations between different components of anxiety.
Significance-testing showed that, when both subject groups are
included~ correlations between corresponding components of FSAQ and
TSAQ, except the behavior component, were significantly higher than the
correlations between non-corresponding components of the two anxiety
questionnaires. Also correlations between FSAQ and other anxiety
questionnaires, Cognitive-Somatic Anxiety Scale (CSAQ) and State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI), in anxiety patients are calculated (Table-
17). The level of validity is found to be satisfactory. FSAQ was found
to be more correlated with trait form of STAI than the state from. The
highest correlation between FSAQ and CSAQ was between the cognitive
components of both scales.
10.3.2. Criterion Validity
FSAQ scores of the university students and the anxiety patients
were compared. First of all, means and standard deviations of the Four
Svstems Questionnaire (FSAQ)scores of anxiety patients and university
students were calculated (Table-lS). On the basis of this information,
anxiety profiles of both groups were obtained (Figure-I). Analysis of
variance have been performed between each group's anxiety scores
assessed by FSAQ CTable-19). The two groups were found be significantly
different on the anxiety profiles. T-tests between university students
and ~nxiety patients scores were performed (Table-l8). The results of
these tests indicated that FSAQ is well able to discriminate anxious
people from non-anxic~s (criterion validity). Total anxietv scores of
the university students as measured by the FSAQ, were found to be
significantly 19wer than that of the anxiety patients Ct=9.9 df=266
p<O.OOl, two-tail). Furthermore~ an~iety scores of the university
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FOUR §Y§Is!:1§ 6t:!l;!sIYQ!:!s§I!Qt:!t:!6J..Bs
Fssb!t:!§ !;;Q§!~J..I!~s~s!:l6~!QB6b §Qt1eIl!;; ~!jQb£
§!;;ebs
ANXIETY PATIENTS
N=54
- COGNITIVE-SOMATIC
ANXIETY QUES.
Cognitive .54 .75 .38 .32 .61
Somatic .62 .39 .39 .46 c:-c·• ..J..J
Total score .67 .66 .50 .47 .69
STATE-TRAIT
ANXIETY INV.
AO):iety-State .50 .45 .59 .43 .62
An>:iety-Trai t .75 .76 .62 .47 .80
TABLE-17 Correlations between FSAQ and two other
(Cognitive-Somatic anxiety questionnaire and State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory) anxiety questionnair~s.
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N=218 N=54
TOTAL FSAQ
SCORES 20.21 11.77 46.10 18.08 9.88 iU
FEELING 17.33 14.02 48.49 21.93 12.82 Ui
COGNITIVE 23.98 18.22 53.91 23.60 8.68 *u
BEHAVIOR 20.08 13.05 40.29 22.16 6.37 Ui
SOMATIC 18.89 11.98 41.09 18.12 8.54 u*
df=266
*** p< 0.001
TABLE- 18 Comparison (t-test) of university students with
anxiety patients on FSAQ scores.
~6B16~!:S;§~QJjE6BsR RE t:!s6~§Q!:'6Bs F 161!:=EBQ~
GROUPS 1 120181.69 171.98 0.000 *U
ERROR 270 698.80
C ..,. 2997.88 24.53 0.000 Ui..'
GROUPS X C ..,. 1469.27 12.02 0.000 ***..'
ERROR 810 122.23
***P<O.OOl
TABLE- 19 Results of analysis of variance comparing university
students with anxiety patients on FSAQ scores.
GROUPS= Univeristy students - anxiety patients.
c= Components of FSAO.
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FIGURE- 1 Am:iety profiles of university students and
patients assessed by FSAQ.
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students in each four component of anxiety have been found to be
significantly lower than those of anxiety patients, (p<O.001 two-tail
in all tests) (see Table-18).
10.4. F'HE ?\ND POST TREATMENT ASSESSt'lENT OF AGORAPHOBICS
BY FSAQ
The FSAQ was administered to an agoraphobic group (N=14) before
- and after treatment. The purpose of this application was to examine
whether FSAQ was able to assess the changes on the anxiety levels of
these patients following psychological treatment. With this purpose,
FSAQ was included into another study in which various other anxiety
scales were applied as well. Means and standard deviations of FSAQ
scores of patients before and after treatment were calculated
(Table-20, Figure-2). Analysis of variance was carried out ( Table-21).
The results showed that the anxiety profile of the patients were
significantly reduced after the treatment (Figure-2). Furthermore,
t-tests were performed (Table-20). Apart from the cognitive component,
all other components of FSAO and the total anxiety level were
significantlv reduced after the treatment. On the cognitive component
although pre-post treatment difference was obvious, it just failed to
achieve significance. Possible reasons for this latter finding was the
relatively low pre-treatment scores of agoraphobics on the cognitive
component (X=35.2) and inclusion of a rather small number of patients
(3 patients ·were not included in the statistical anal~sis due to
m:i ssing va luas ), Overall. findinqs indic~ted that FSAO was well able to
, ~
detect be'fore-aftel~ treatment changes in the anx iety pro+i Ies of
aqor sphob i cs ,
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!'IEAN
TOTAL FSAQ
SCORES 41.44 15.30 23.89 19.64 4.80 **
FEELING 43.16 18.63 25.68 ...,..,.C'C" 4.75 **4 ..\. ,j,J
COGNITIVE 35.22 22.76 24.29 24.49 2.19
BEHAVIOR 48.92 13.81 21. 91 20.96 co ~co Ut..J • ._'..J
SOMATIC 38.46 14.74 23.69 15.40 3.36 *
df=10
tU p<'001** pc , 01* p c , 05
TABLE 2~ Comparison (paired T-test) of agoraphobic patients' FSAQ
scores before and after treatment.
~B8.!BE!L-:·s§~Q!jE:t)RsQ DF !jsB~ §g~~Bs E IBlb=EBQE!.:.
GROUPS 18061.94 24.32 0.003 u*
ERROR 13 742.79
C .,. 192.73 1.34 0.275~,
ERROR 39 144.02
GROUPS X C ..,. 274.90 3.98 0.014 *-»
ERF:OR .39 69.10
***p<0.001
*p<0.05
. TABLE- 21(omparison (analysis of variance) of agoraphobic
patients' FSAQ scores before and after treatmet.
KEY TO TABLE:
GROUPS= Before treatment - after treatment
c= Components of, FSAU
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FIGURE-2 Anxiety profiles of agoraphobic patients before and after
treatment, assessed by FSAQ.
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11. ANXIETY PROFILES OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND ANXIETY
P~TIENTS ASSESSED BY FSAQ
An overall analysis of variance was carried out to compare two
different subject groups (university students and anxiety patients) and
different sexes on the scores of FSAQ. The results indicated (Tables-22
and 23) (Figure-3) that FSAQ total anxiety scores of the subject groups
were significantly different. However, total anxiety scores of male and
female subjects did not differ significantly.
When the scores on the different component of FSAQ was taken into
consideration, the interaction of these scores with sex and with groups
was significant (Table-23). The results suggest that dividing anxiety
into four different components could reveal more about the nature of
anxiety. The results show that females score higher on all components
of FSAQ except on the cognitive component. On this component males
scored higher than females (Table- 22).
In the following section, though similar analysis will be applied,
the interest will be focused on the relationship between feeling and
cognitive components across sexes and different categories of anxiety
disorder.
12. COMPARISON OF ANXIETY SCORES ON FEELING AND COGNITIVE
COMPONENTS OF FSAQ
12.1 SEX DIFFERENCES
T~ree analysis of variance tests were perfcwmed to investigate the
effect of the feeling and cognitive scores on sex differences in both
subject groups.
The means and standard deviations of feelinQ and cognitive scores- - .
of sexes in each subject group were presented before (Table-22).
Analysis of variance to examine the scores on feelinq and cognitive
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IQIBb
16.8 25.7 20.0 17.3 19.9
MALE (15.0) (18.5) ,(11.9) (10.4) (11.3)
UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS
17.7 23.1 20.0 19.5 20.4
FEMALE (14.9) (18.4) (13.5) (12.7) (12.1>
46.8 56.1 36.4
(23.1)
36.2 44.8
(16.5)MALE (22.3) (21.7) (15.3)
ANXIETY
PATIENTS
FEMALE
49.3
(22.0)
52.8
(24.7)
41.1
(22.6)
43.5 46.7
(18.9)(19.1>
TABLE-22 Means and standard deviations of male and female
subjects' FSAQ scores in t~o different (university students and anxiety
patients) groups.
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~~B!~fi~f:§~QIjE:~BsQ DF 1jf:e.I~ §Q!H:!BS: F I~Ib=Ef.;Q~1!.
GROUPS 1 97764.01 135.00 0.000 tu
SEX 1 32:3.13 0.45 0.503
GF:OlJPSX SEX 1 2B2.69 0.39 0.531
ERROR '1<="'") 751. 264..)4
C 7 .3544.07 30.48 0.000 Ut~,
C X GROUPS 7 135:,.89 11.64 0.000 ***~,
c X SEX 3 338.69 3.34 0.018 *
C X GROUPS X SEX 3 7"7.03 0.66 0.575
ERROR 756 116.26
tu p<0.001
* p<0.05
TABlE- 23 Comparison (analysis of variance) of groups and sex on
FSAQ components.
GROUPS= University students - anxiety patients
SEX= Male - female
c= Anxietv scares on four components of FSAU
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FIGURE- 3 Anxiety profiles of males and females in two
different subject groups (university students and anxiety patient
measured by FSAQ.
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components of FSAQ across two different subject groups (university
students and anxiety patients) and different sexes was performed. The
findings suggest that sex differences have a significant effect on
feeling and cognitive scores (Table- 24, Figure-4). Secondly, analysis
of variance between sexes, for university students alone, on the
feeling and cognitive anxiety scores was applied (Table-24, Figure-4).
The results indicate that scores on the feeling and cognitive
components of FSAQ are significantly influenced by sex differences in
the university students group. Thirdly, with regard to anxiety patients
only, analysis of variance between sexes on the scores of feeling and
cognitive components was carried out. The results indicate that FSAQ
feeling and cognitive anxiety component scores are not significantly
influenced by sex differences (Table-24, Figure-4). As seen in
Figure-4, the absolute difference between male and female-scores on
feeling and cognitive components of FSAQ is greater in the anxiety
patients than in the university students. Nevertheless, feeling and
cognitive components of FSAQ were found to be significantly affected by
sex differences in the university students, but not in the anxiety
patients. A possible"reason for having non-significant results in the
anxiety patients may be related to the relatively low number of
subjects (N=18 for males, N=36 for females) in this group.
Overall, the results indicate that the feeling and cognition
scares were significantly affected by sex differences in qeneral. In
order to examine sex differences further t~te5ts were applied in two
different subject groups.
12.1.2. Universitv Students
Paired t-tests between the feeling and the coqnitive comoonents of
-FSAQ for each sex were carried out. The results indicated that the
difference between coonitive a~d feelinq components of FSAQ was
- 188 -
INCLUDING BOTH SUBJECT GROUPS (UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND ANXIETY
PATIENTS)
~6BI6~6s§ COMPARED OF !js6~ §Q!:!6Bs F 1616=EBQ~!.--------
GROUPS 1 70341.50 123.23 0.000 ***SEX 1 27.97 0.05 0.825
GROUPS X SEX 1 3.13 0.01 0.941
ERF:OR 251 570.80
FC 1 3429.17 42.77 0.000 *u
FC X GROUPS 1 8.57 O. 11 0.744
FC X SEX 1 385.86 4.81 0.029 *FC X GROUPS X SEX 1 30.18 0.38 0.540
EF:ROR 251 80.18
UNIVERESITY STUDENTS ONLY
SEX 1 59.95 0.13 0.723
ERROR 200 476.07
FC 1 4640.29' 69.10 0.000 u*
FC X SEX 1 265.29 3.95 0.048 *ERROR 200 67.1.5
AN1:IETY PATIENTS ONLY
SEX 1
ERROR 52
FC 1
FC X SEX 1
z. 92 0.00 0.948
924.19
980.05 7.54 0.008 **200.10 1.54 0.220
*** p<0.001** p<0.01* p<O.05
TABLE- 24 Comparison (analysis of variance) of FSAQ feeling and
cognitive anxiety scores, first~ between sexes and conditions~
secondly~ between sexes in each condition.
GROUPS= University students - anxiety patients
SEX= Male - female
Fe= Feeling and cogntive components of FSAQ
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FIGURE-4 Feeling and cognitive scores of male and female
-subjects of both groups (university students and anxiety patients)
measured by FSAQ.
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significant for both cases (t=5.79 df=69. t=5.43 df=132. D (0.001,
two-ta.il. for male and female subjects). Then t+t as t s behleen male and
female university students' scores on feeling and COqnitlve cc~ponents
of FSAQ were performed. The results were found to be non-significant
(t=O.43 df=206 for feelinq~ t= 0.82 df=203 for coonitive components,
t~~o-tai1)•
The mean differences between coonitive and feelinq components of
both sexes were calculated (X=B.9 Sd=12.7, X=5.4 Sd=10.9 for male and
female subjects respectivelv). A difference of means t-test was carried
out between male and female university students on the differences
bptwP€'n cocm i tl on and fteEd ino components o·fF[";AQ.The discrepancy
between cognitive and feeling components of FSAQ in males was
significantlv hiaher than that in females (t= 1.99, df= 200 p(0.05,
tvlO-tai I).
12.1.2. Anxiety Patients
Similar statistical analyses have been carried out for male and
female anxiety patients scores on FSAQ.
Paired t-tests between feeling and cognitive components scores of
each sex were evaluated. It was found that the difference between the
feeling and the cognitive components of male anxiety patients was
siqnificant (t=2.36, df=17, P (0.05, two-tail) whereas the same
difference was observed to be non-significant for female patients
(t=1.32, df=35). Secondly, t-tests between male and female anxiety
p~tients scores on feelinq and coqnitive components of FSAQ were
carried out. The results indicated no siqnlficant difference between
sexes on these comnonents (t=0.39 df= 42 for feeling, t=O.48 df=52 for
cogni ti Vf-) components, hlO--tai1).
Differencf scores between the cognitive and the feeling components
of FSAQ for male and female anxiety patients were computed. The mean
- 191 _.
difference was found to be X=9.3 SD=~6.6 for males and X=3.5 SD=5.9
for females. The differences between male and female anxiety patients
on the feelinq and the cognitive components of FSAQ are presented in
the Fiaure- 4. A differences of mean t-test between male and female
anxiety patients in terms of their difference scores was perfomed. The
result was found te be non-significant Ct= 1.24 df=52). Figure- 5
shows the discrepancy between the coqnitive and the feeling compnents.
assesed by FSAQ, of male and female subjects belonging to both groups;
university students and anxiety patients.
12.2. OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDERS AND THE REST OF DSM-III
ANXIETY DISORDERS
Means and standard deviations of the scores on the feeling and the
cognitive components of FSAQ were calculated for each sub-category of
DSM-III anxiety disorders (Table-25).
Again, an analysis of variance between six sub-categories of
anxietv disorder patients on feeling and cognitive scores was applied
(Table-26). The results showed that the differeces between the six
sub-categories of anxiety disorder on feeling and cognitive components
were significant.
Paired t-tests between the cognitive and the feeling components of
each sub-cateQory of anxiety disorder have been performed. Apart from
patIents in the obsessive-compulsive disorder category, no significant
differences between the cognitive and the feeling components of FSAQ in
the ather sub-qroups of anxiety disorder were observed. In the case of
obsessive-compulsive disorders the difference between the coqnitive and
the feeling components was significant (p (0.01, two-tail) (Table-25).
The difference scores between coqnitive and feeling components of
FSAQ for each anxiety disorder were calculated, means and standard
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on the cognitive and the feeling components of anxiety in
both subJEct groups (universltv students and anxiety patients)
-assessed by FSAO.
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QE
AGORAPHOBIA 51.9 20.5 47.3 24.5 9 1.80
SOCIAL PHOBIA 67.1 12.1 67.8 12.4 9 0.15
SIMPLE PHOBIA 33.1 20.5 36.9 20.3 8 0.61
PANIC DIS. 37.4 27.8 39.9 34.7 6 0.55
GENERALIZED
ANXIETY DIS. 54.6 20.3 59.8 17.7 9 1.93
OBSESSIVE-
COMPo DIS. 40.3 13.1 68.6 11.7 7 6.84***
** * p<O.OOl
TABLE-25 Means~ standard deviations and paired t-test results of
each sub-category of anxiety-disorder patients' scores on feeling and
cognitive components of FSAQ.
--194 -
~6Bl.e~b~§ (:;Qt:!E68§;Q t:!§;6!:l§Q!J68§; !lE ' E 16!b=EBQ~~
GROUPS 2622.06 5 3.60 0.007 **
ERROR 728.16 48
FC 962.53 1 11.00 0.002 **
FC X GROUPS 2760.42 5 6.31 0.000 ***
EF:ROR 4201.00 48
*** p<O.OOl
** p<O.Ol
TABLE-26 Comparison (analysis of variance) of sub-categories of
anxiety disorders on FSAQ feeling and cognitive scores.
t§;I IQ I6~!::§;
GROUPS= Six sub-categories of anxiety disorders
Fe= Feeling and cognitive compoents of FSAQ
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deviations of the differece scores of each anxiety disorder were
presented (Table-27 and Figure- 6).
In terms of the relationship between cognitive and feeling
(affect) components~ obsessive-compulsive patients were conceptualized
to be different from other anxiety disorders, in the introduction
chapter. Therefore~ t-tests between the obsessive-compulsive disorder
patients and the patients belonging to each of the remaining the
anxietv disorders on the difference scores of cognitive and feeling
components were performed. The t-test (two-tail) results indicated that
the difference scores of cognitive and feeling components of FSAQ of
obsessive-compulsive patients were significantly greater than those of
the patients in each of the remaining sub-categories of DSM-III anxiety
disorder (Table-28).
The six anxiety disorder categories were grouped into two, the
first group including only obsessive-compulsive patients, and the
second group including all other anxiety disorders. Means and standard
deviations of the scores of patients in each group on feeling and
cognitive components of FSAQ were calculated. (Table-29, Figure-7). An
analysis of variance betltJeen.obsessive-compulsive patients and the
remainder of anxiety patients on feelinq and cognitive component of
FSAQ was carried out. The results indicated that feeling and cognitive
scores were different across the two groups (Table-30). To evaluate
this point further t-tests were employed.
Paired t-tests between feeling and cognitive scores of patients in
each c ateqor v were oer+ormed , Pr evi ous ly, the re su lt o+ pai red t-test
had shown that the difference between feeling and cognitive scores of
obsessive-compulsive patients was significant (t=6.84 df=8, p< .O.OOl~
tl.-m·-·taill.HCH,jf::!\/er', the saili(? di'Hf~r·~=ncf.~is found to be non+s iqn i f icarrt
for the group ~hich included the remainder of anxiety patients (t~O.73.
df=46). T-tests between theSE two ~rrnJPs on the feelinq and cognitive
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AGOF:APHOBIA -4.7 8 '")....
SOCIAL PHOBIA 0.7 16. 1
SI~lF'LEPHOB IA 3.8 18.9
PANIC DIS. 2.6 12.6
GENERALIZED
ANXIETY DIS. 5.2 8.5
OBSESSIVE
COMPo DIS. 28.3 11.7
iABLE- 27 Means and standard deviations of the differences
between FSAQ cognitive and feeling scores of each sub-category of
anxiety disorders.
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FIGURE-6 The difference between the cognitive and the
feeling components of anxiety in each of the anxiety disorder~
assessed by FSAQ.
_ t r
DF I:~B~~~ 2:I~I~EB.Q~~
AGORAPHOBIA 16 7.04 0.000 ***
SOCIAL PHOBIA 16 4.05 0.001 **
SIMPLE PHOBIA 15 3.16 0.006 **
PANIC DIS. 17 4.09 0.001 **~
GENERALIZED
ANXIETY DIS. 16 4.66 0.000 ***
*** p<O.OOl
TABLE- 28 T-tests results between obsessive-compulsive disorder
patients and patients in others categories of an"iety disorder on the
difference between cognitive and feeling scores of FSAQ.
-t99-
E~~b!.ljG
t:!~€!!j §!.Q~~!.
~Q§~II!~~ ~=E Q!EE!.
t:!~e!j §!.Q~~ t:!~€!!j §!.Q~~!.
OBSESSIVE
COMPULSIVE DIS. 40.2 13.0 68.6 22.9 28.4 11.7
REMAINING ANXIETY
PATIENTS 49.9 22.9 51.4 24.3 1.5 13.4
TABLE-29 Means and standard deviations of obsessive compulsive
patients and remaining anxiety patients scores on feeling, cognitive
and the difference between cognitive and feeling components of FSAQ.
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FIGURE- 7 The scores of obsessive-compulsives and the
rem~ining anxiety patients on the cognitive and the feeling
components of anxiety measured by FSAQ.
OF E
GF:OUPS 197.27 1 0.21 0.645
ERROR 920.48 C''"'..I":
FC 3026.26 1 35.04 0.000***
FC X GROUP 2469.92 1 28.60 0.000***
EF:ROR 86.37 52
U* p<O.OOl
TABLE-30 Comparison (analysis of variance) of
obsessive-compulsives with remaining anxiety patients on the FSAQ
feeling and cognitive components scores.
!SsI IQ I6~'=s
GROUPS= Obsessive compulsives - remaining anxiety disorders
Fe= Feeling and cognitive components of FSAQ
- 2(.2 -
scores of FSAO were performed. On the feeling and cognitive components
of FSAQ~ the differences between the scores of the obsessive-compulsive
group and the group of ~emaining anxiety patients were found to be
non-significant (t~1.69, df=52 for feeling, t=1.96, df=52 for
cognitive). Regarding the difference between cognitive and feeling
scores of FSAQ~ however, the obsessive-compulsive group (X=28.4,
sd=11.7) was found to be significantly higher than the group of
remaining anxiety disorder patients ( X=1.4, 5D=13.3) (t=5.35, df=52,
p<O.001~ two-tail).
13. EVALUATION OF DSM-III ANXIETY DISORDERS CLASSIFICATION
WITHIN THREE SYSTEMS THEORY FRAMEWORK
In this section. scores of patients on FSAQ and TSAQ anxiety
profiles and the most salient component of each sub-category of anxiety
disorder will be investigated. Anxiety disorders will then be compared
with each other to examine the differences and similarities between
them regarding the manifestation of anxiety components. However, first
of all, a general analysis of variance including different components
of anxiety in each anxiety questionnaire in all of the six anxiety
sub-categories will be perfo;med.
13.1. GENERAL EVALUATION OF ANXIETY DISORDER SUB-CATEGORIES
In this analysis of variance, six anxiety disorder sub-categories
have been compared on each of the scales included in the study, i.e.
FSAO. TS~Q. CSAQ and both forms of STAI. Firstly, means and standard
deviations of scores of each of the six sub-categories of anxiety
disorder on all qu~stionnaires have been calculated (Table-31). Anxiety
profiles of each sub-category of anxiety patients on FSAO and rSAO have
been obtai ned (Fiqur·e·~-Band -9). and tT-leanal y~.is of var iance was
applied. The results (Table-32) indicated that in terms of overall
.-.).~ ":rr
~G6b~§6~~!~IX§~6b~§ AG-P SO-P SM-P
FEELING
COGNITIVE
FSAQ BEHAVIOR
SOMATIC
TOTAL
ANXIETY
COGNITIVE
BEHAVIOR
TSAQ SOl1ATIC
TOTAL
ANXIETY
COGNITIVE
CSAQ SOMATIC
TOTAL
ANXIETY
STATE
STAr TF:AIT
DP
(20.5) (12.1) (20.5)
47.3 67.8 37.0
(24.4) (12.4) (20.3)
37.4 54.6 40.3
(27.8) (20.3) (13.1)
40.0 59.8 68.6
(43.7> <17.7> <11.7>
51.2 67.1 33.2
53.9 58.8
(20.3) (15.0)
52.6 39.5
28.6 27.5 36.2 24.4
(16.5) (22.1) (22.6) (16.3)
32.031.9 32.1
<15.6) <16.9} (16.1) <16.2} (18.3) <13.8)
51.4 50.6 32.6 34.3 50.8 43.3
(18.4) (8.7) (32.7) (23.9) (17.8) (9.2)
44.4 60.1 46.6 47.3
(25.8) (10.7) (19.3) (19.0)
52.0 71.5 36.9 33.3
(27.0) (20.9) (19.5) (13.4)
44.5 39.1 39.2 32.5
(23.7) (17.8) (23.6) (14.4)
50.4 56.9 43.7 37.7
(20.6) (13.2) (16.7) (14.3)
56.1
(15.5)
44.6
(24.4)
44.0
(18.8)
48.2
(18.7)
(19.2)
(16.4)
31.4
(16.9)
'40.8
<16.2)
25.9
(6.5)
15.6
(6.5)
39.0 46.5 40.4 35.5 44.2 41.5
(9.1> (8.5) (14.8) (11.0) (13.1> (12.7>
PD= Panic disorders
GAD= Generalized anxiety disorders
OB-CO= Obsessive-compulsive disorders
- ~:04-
51.9 60.0 31.0 45.7 43.2 53.4
(1~2.1) (8.3) (15.0) ('.:t. 3) (23.4) <13.8)
52.4 61.3 42.7 42.8 47.6 56.7
(19.8) (20.8) (20.5) (6.5)
TABLE- 31 Means and standard deviations of each sub-category of
anNiety patients assessed by the F~ur Svstems Anxiety Questionnaire
(FSAQ), Three Systems AnNiety Questionnaire (TSAQ), Cognitive-Somatic
Anxiety Questionnaire (CSAO) and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI).
19.2 24.8
(6.6) (4.9)
17.4 21.7
(7.4) (5.8)
15.3 23.7
(9.4) (6.8)
19.8 20.5
(7.9) (7.4)
t£y TO J6§ls
AG-P= Agoraphobia
SO-P= Social phobia
SM-P= Simple phobia
21.7
(7.6)
18.6
(7.7)
(11.7> (6.4)
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FIGURE-B Anxiety profiles of each sub-category of DSM-II
anxiety disorders assessed by FSAQ.
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FIGURE-9 Anxiety profiles of each sub-category of DSM-III
anxiety disorders assessed by TSAO.
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~6B!'6~bs§ ~Q!jE:68~Q QE t!s6~ §QV68s F I6!'b=E:BQ~!-
FSAD
GROUPS 5 3842.96 3.68 0.006 **ERROR 48 1044.54
FC 'T 2565.82 19.30 0.000 tU'-'FC X GROUPS 15 738.59 5.56 0.000 u*
ERROR 144 132.94
TSAQ
GROUPS 5 1307.34 1.45 0.222
ERROR 48 899.53
TC ..., 2458.77 16.20 0.000 **t....
TC X GRUOPS 10 694.36 4.57 0.000 u*
ERROR 96 151.77
CSAD
GROUPS 5 84.34 1.21 0.318
ERROR 48 69.59
CS 1 210.07 6.91 0.011 *CS X GROUPS 5 83.66 2.75 0.029 *ERROR 48 30.41
STAI- STATE
GROUPS 5 937.40 4.27 0.003 **ERROR 48 219.49
STAI-TRAIT
GROUPS 5 506.62 2.12 0.078
ERROR 48 238.76
*U p<O.OOl
** p<0.01* p<0.05
TABLE- 32 Analysis of variance comparison of six sub-categories
of anxiety disorder in each anxiety questionnaire.
~~s!:IQ I6~bs
GROUPS= Six sub-categories of DSM-IJI anxiety disorders
FC= Four components nf FSAQ
Te= Three components of TSAD
CS= Cognitiive and somatic components of eSAO
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anxiety, significant differences amonQ the six anxiety categories on
FSAQ and State form of STAI existed. In terms of the interaction
between components of anxiety and different categories of anxiety
disorders, FSAQ, TSAQ and eSAQ showed significant differences. The
results indicate that comparison of sub-categories of anxiety disorder
in terms of components of anxiety reveals the differences more clearly.
The nature of anxiety in DSM-III anxiety disorder sub-categories was
investigated further. The manifestation of anxiety, first, in each
sub-category, second, across different sub-categories have been
examined.
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF ANXIETY IN
EACH ANXIETY DISORDER SUB-CATEGORY
The anxiety profiles 6f each sub-group of anxiety disorders are
obtained by the scores on FSAQ and TSAQ (Figures- 8 and 9). The figures
also indicated that profiles of the same groups of patients obtained by
two different qUEstionnaires (FSAQ and TSAQ) were similar. One-way
analysis of variance was applied to each sub-category of anxiety
disorders scores on FSAQ and TSAO (Table-33). The results showed that
differences between various components of anxiety of social phobic, GAD
and obsessive-compulsive patients were significant on both
questionnaires. The results of panic disorder patients were significant
only on TSAQ but not on FSAO. Analysis of variance results of
agoraphobics and simple phobics were not significant on either of the
scales. The results can be summarized as follows:
Agoraphobia: No significant differences among the components of
anxiety were observ~d in either of the scales. The behavioral component
appeared to be the most salient component of this anxiet~dlsorder-in
both scales (FSAQ AND TSAQ).
- ~n: -
~B!316r:c!:s~ ~Qt!E:B!3s.Q RE t!s6t:! SQUARE F IBI!:=E:!3Qfl!.------
AGORAPHOBIA
FSAQ 3 81.':t4 0.75 0.533
ERROR 27 109.76
TSAQ 2 186.95 0.61 ().552
ERROR 18 305.01
SOCIAL PHOBIA
FSAGl 3 1684.12 9.98 0.000 *U
ERROR 27 168.76
TSAQ 2 2715.16 15.85 0.000 ***ERROR 18 171.45
SIMPLE PHOBIA
FSAQ '7 106.03 0.65 0.588~,
ERROR 27 162.01
TSAQ " 229.47 1.26 0.309...
ERROR 18 181.42
PANIC DISORDER
FSAQ .,. 214.16 1.49 0.25-'ERROR 27 143.68
TSAQ 2 481. 93 7.04 0.001 **ERROR 18 68.49
GENEF:ALIZED ANX. DIS.
FSAQ .~ 10:36.30 10.33 0.000 ***~)ERROR 27 100.29
TSAQ 2 461.90 6.25 0.025 *ERF:OR 18 73.86
OBSESSIVE- COt1P. DIS.
FSAQ 3 2987.85 25.70 0.000 ***ERROR 27 116.24
TSAQ ') 1761. 00 26.23 0.000 ***s:ERROR 18
u* p<O.OOl
** p<O;Ol* p<0.05
TABLE- 7"" Analysis of var-iance comp ar ing components of an>:iety.,_\._\
on the 5cor-es of FSAQ and TSAQ in each an>:iety sub-categories.
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Social Phobia: In both scales (FSAQ and TSAQ) significant
differences among the components were found. In FSAQ the feeling and
cognitive compponents were the highest. In the TSAQ~ however~ the
behavioral component was the highest.
Simple Phobia: Results of analysis of variance on FSAQ and TSAQ
showed no significant difference between the components of anxiety. The
cognitive comp onent was found to be the most salient component of
anxiety. Their scores on the behavior component were comparatively low.
Panic Disorder: Only analysis of variance results of rSAQ
indicated a significant difference. Their highest score was on the
cognitive component.
Generalized Anxiety Disorders: Analysis of variances in both
scales (FSAD and rSAD) indicated significant difference among
components of anxiety. This group of patients' highest anxiety score
was on the cognitive component of anxiety in both ~cales (FSAQ and
rSAQ) •
Obsessive-Compulsives: The results of analysis of variance on both
scales were s iqn i Fi cant , ,This group of patients revealed ttH? most
erratic anxiety scores across different components of anxiety in both
scales. Thev scored very h ich on the coqni.tive compone·nt and verv 10"1
on the others on FSAQ and TSAQ.
13.3 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF ANXIETY
BETWEEN SUB-CATEGORIES OF ANXIETY DISORDER
To €'>:i:ill1in(~J the diffel'-E'nces between the si>: anx iet.v sub'-cateqol""ie~;
in terms of components of anxiety, one-way of analysis of variance
between the si>: cst eqor i es on each component of anxiety scales I.'ICiS
applied. rh, results (Table- 34) indicated that all components of FSAO,
and behavior component of n;?'1(.J- and <;;tah:? form of Sl'AI "Ie,"'e
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~£!Bl£!§!:§;§ ~Qt:1E:£!BfQ DF t:1§;~~SQUARE F I~l!:=E:BQ§.!.------
FSAQ
FEELING 5 7075.04 3.83 0.005 U
ERROR c"'") 469.78.JL.
COGNITIVE 5 1678.00 3.74 0.006 **ERROR 52 566.65
BEHAVIOR 5 1779.68 5.02 0.001 **ERROR 52 491.31
SOMATIC 5 907.31 3.33 0.012 **ERROR 52 333.93
TOTAL SCORE 5 936.51 3.57 0.008 **ERROR c"'") 262.09.JL.
TSAQ
COGNITIVE 5 237.80 0.76 0.581
ERROR 50 304.07
BEHAVIOR 5 1926.39 4.34 0.003 U
ERROR 50 591.51
SOMATIC 5 319.31 1.01 0.419
ERROR 50 314.15
TOTAL SCOF:E 5 416.89 1.47 0.217
EF:ROR 50 296.16
CSAQ
COGNITIVE 5 73.19 1.64 0.167
ERROR 51 47.31
SOMATIC 5 39.65 0.94 0.459
ERROR 51 41.60
TOTAL SCORE 5 120.72 0.90 0.48
ERROR 51 132.57
STAI
STATE C" 605.01 3.77 0.006 **.JERROR 50 204.92
TRAIT C" 200.43 1.90 0.113.J
ERROR 50 114.87
tU p(O.001** p<O.01
t p<O.05
TABLE- 34 Analysis of variance comparison of six sub-categories
of anxiety disorder patients on each component of anxiety
questionnaires.
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significantly different across six anxiety categories. The results have
shown significant differences across sub-categories of anxiety disorder
on the different components of anxiety scales. Nevertheless, the
behavior component of anxiety differentiated sub categories of anxiety
most significantly and consistently (on FSAQ and TSAQ).
Social phobics, apart from the somatic component, scored highest
among all anxiety disorders (Figures 8 and 9). This was mainly due to
the nature of items included in the questionnaire (specifically in FSAQ
and TSAQ). Behavior and cognitive components of TSAQ and the cognitive
component of FSAQ were related to anxiety in social situations. On the
somatic component, agoraphobics scored highest and they were followed
by GAD patients.
In the comparison of anxiety sub-categories, one important point
is the difference between agoraphobia and generalized anxiety disorder
patients. Although their total anxiety scores were very close to each
other, agoraphobics scored higher on the behavior component but Iowan
the cognitive component. C~ the other hand, the pattern was just the
opposite for GAD patients, i.e. the cognitive scores were higher than
the behavior scores. This situation indicates the usefulness of
comparing different anxiety disorders in terms of components of anxiety
rath~r than their overall anxiety scores.
Followinq DSM-III classificaton, the six sub-categories of anxiety
disorder were re-categorised into two main groups of phobic anxiety
disorders and non-phobic anxiety disorders (anxiety states). Means and
standard deviations of each of the two groups on all anxiety scales
were calculated (Table-35) and anxiety profiles were presented
(Figures-IO and 11). T-tests between these two main groups on the
components of anxiety (Table-351 were carried out. The results of
t-tests (two-tail) indicated that these two major qr~JPs (phobic
- 212 -
E:!:!Q§]_~
I~NXIETY QI§QBQsB§ e~gsIY §IeIs§ I=~e,=!::!s§----~---
t!ge~ §!.Qg~!. MEAN §!.Qg~!.
FSAQ
FEELING 51.3 22.3 45.2 21.4 1.03
COGNITIVE 51.2 23.0 57.1 24.2 0.91
BEHAVIORAL 47.7 21.9 31.5 19.9 2.88 **SOMATIC 41.8 17.9 40.3 18.7 0.31
TOTAL SCOF:E 48.0 17.7 43.7 18.6 0.85
TSAQ
COGNITIVE 52.3 18.1 54.2 17.6 0.39
BEHAVIOR 54.1 26.2 37.8 19.5 2.54 *SOMATIC 44.0 18.6 36.7 17.4 1.45
TOTAL SCORE 50.8 17.1 42.9 16.7 1.67
eSAQ
COGNITIVE 21.9 6.6 22.9 7.7 0.54
SOMATIC 19.9 6.1 18.7 7.5 0.65
TOTAL SCORE 42.1 10.9 41.1 12.4 0.31
STAI- STATE 49.9 14.1 49.1 14.7 0.20
STAI-TF:AIT 54.4 11.4 53.7 10.0 0.29
** p<O.Ol* p<0.05
TABLE-35 Con~arison (t-test) of the two main groups of anxiety
disorders by all anxiety scales included in the study.
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FIGURE-IO Anxiety profiles of phobic disorders and anxiety
states patients aSSESSEd by FSAQ.
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FIGURE-II Anxiety profiles of phobic disorders and anxiety
states patients assessed by TSAQ.
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anxiety di~orders and anxiety states) were significantly different on
the behavior component of the scales (FSAQ and TSAQ) alone.
Very high behavioral avoidance scores (as measured by FSAD and
TSAD) of agoraphobics and social phobics in comparison to the rest of
anxiety disorders were obvious (Figures-8 and 9). Low scores of simple
phobic patients on the behavior components of these anxiety scales were
caused by the structure of items in FSAD and TSAQ and the discrete
nature of simple phobias. The results obtained up this point indicated
that though variation among anxiety sub-categories in the manifestation
of anxiety exists it is most significant on the behavioral component of
anxiety. On this component, as assesed by FSAQ and TSAQ, phobic
disorder patients scored significantly higher than the anxiety states,
eventhough simple phobics tended to score low.
14. Summary
A- There were no differences among sub-categories of anxiety
disorder in terms of age, length of therapy or severity of problem.
B- Patients' self~diagn05es <primary) were moderately correlated
with the clinicians' diagnoses.
c- Reliability and validitv levels of the anxiety questionnaire
(FSAQ) developed in this study were satisfactory.
D- Feeling and Cognition
a- Overall sex differences were found to influence the
interaction between feelinq and cognitive components of anxiety
assessed bv FSAQ. Such differences were siqnificant in the group of
university students but not in the anxiety patients. The absolute
difference between males and females on the feelinQ and the cognitive
components wa~ higher in the anxiety patients than that in the
university students. This differ~nce did not reach the level of
PAGE
NUMBERS
CUTOFF
IN THE
ORIGINAL·
significance in the anxiety patients, probably owing to the low number
of subjects in this group.
b- The interaction between the feeling and the cognitive
components of anxiety was significant across two groups of anxiety
disorders (i-obsessive-compulsives, 2-Rest of anxiety patients).
E- Each anxiety disorder's manifestation of anxiety across
various components was different in a way reflecting the clinical
understanding of each anxiety disorder. For example, agoraphobics
showed more evenly distributed profiles indicating high levels of
anxiety on each component but a specifically high level of anxiety on
the behavioral and somatic components in comparison with other anxiety
sub-categories. Obsessive-compulsive patients, on the other hand,
revealed very high levels of anxiety on the cognitive component only
and showed law levels of anxiety on the other components. An unexpected
finding was low scores of PO patients, specifically on the somatic
components of the scales.
F- When anxiety disorders were compared among themselves in terms
of the manifestation pf anxiety, social phobics showed the higest level
of anxiety on every component except the somatic. On the somatic
component agoraphobics together with GAD patients revealed the hiohest
anxiety. ObseSSive-compulsive patients showed very high on the
cognitive component and considerably low on the remaining components of
anxiety. Simple phobics. as expected~ and panic disorders patients~
5uprfsinqly. were the categories with the least levels of anXiety.
G- The behavior component appeare~ to be the component of anxietv
which most clearly differentiated phobic disorders from anxiety states.
In a way this result supported the classification of anxiety disorders
into two major categories, in terms of presence or absence of avoidance
behavior. as Indicated bv DSM-I1I.
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DIS C U S SID N
In this section the order of the discussion will follow that of
results presented in the previous chapter.
15. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
An important point was the severity level of different anxiety
disorder patients as assessed by the clinicians. The results indicated
that all six anxiety disorder groups had similar severity ratings. If
the severity ratings of the anxiety disorders had been different, it
would have been difficult to interpret the observed differences between
the anxiety disorders, because of the confounding effect of anxiety
severity across the various sub-groups. Having found no significant
difference amongst the six anxiety disorders on the severity level, we
can be more confident that the observed differences are due to the
nature of anxiety in each anxiety disorder.
16. COI'1PARISON OF PATIENTS' SELF-DIAGNOSIS WITH CLINICIANS'
DIAGNOSES
In this research a self-diagnostic method and the clinicians'
diagnoses were compared. In the self-diagnostic form six brief
statements describing each of the DSM-III anxiety disorder
sub-categories were presented. The clients were required to tick two
items that best represented their problem. In the present study the aim
of applying the self-diagnostic form was to obtain some idea of the
patients' conception of their problem, and how closely it was related
to the clinicians' view.
The results showed that when anxiety patients are given the
opportunity to select the diagnoses best suited to their problems,
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their choices are similar to the clinicians' diagnoses. In the present
study correlations (kappa) between anxiety patients' primary
self-diagnosis and the clinicians' primary diagnoses ranged from 0.38
(for GAD) to 0.92 (for obsessive-compulsives) for different categories
of anxiety disorders (Table-9). These figures indicate that patients'
self diagnoses were moderately related to clinicians' diagnosis.
17. PSYCHOMETRIC EVALUATION OF FSAQ
17.1. RELIABILITY
First of all, the FSAQ which was developed in this study has been
, proved to be psychometrically satisfactory. Studies on the
internal-consistency (split-half reliability) indicate that each of the
four parts of the questionnaire and the scale as a whole is reliable.
In this study the split-half reliability of the questionnaire has been
calculated. The reasons underlying the selection of this type of
reliability were related to the easy application and widespread
acceptance of this type of r:liability (Black and Champion, 1976). As
presented in the results section. the fiqures that were obtained. -
indicated that the FSAQ has a satisfactory level of reliability.
17.2 VALIDITY
FSAQ also proved to have satisfactory validity. The validity of
th~ questionnaire was evaluated using two different approaches,
concurrent and criterion related validity:'
17.2.1. Concurrent Validity
To assess~the level of concurrent validity of the FSAQ the
correlations between this anxiety scale and the TSAQ, CSAQ and STAI
were calculated (Tables-16 and 17). Total anxiety levels as measured by
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the FSAQ and TSAQ were found to be highly correlated (1"'=.85).
Furthermore~ the corresponding components of anxiety between the two
questionnaires had higher correlations with each other than the
correlations between non-corresponding components (see Table-16). The
finding of high correlations between the same components of anxiety in
two different types of anxiety questionnaires indicate that different
components of anxiety (as supposedly measured by the FSAQ) have
satisfactory levels of validity. It is important to bear in mind that
the two anxiety questionnaires (FSAQ and TSAQ) were developed through
different techniques. The TSAQ is a Likert-type scale and the three
components of anxiety that it claims to measure have been developed
through a factor-analytical study. The FSAQ, on the other hand~ is a
Thurstone-type scale and the verification of the four components was
obtained through a sorting techique. Obtaining high correlations
between the two an>:iety scales on the same an>:iety components may
indicate the actual validity of dividing anxiety into at least three
relatively independent components.
Correlations betweeR the FSAQ and CSAQ indicate a moderately
strong relationship between the two scales. The highest correlation,
however, was obtained between the cognitive component of both scales
(1"'=.75).
The cOf-relation resul ts between the FSAQ and both forms of STAI
suggests that the type of anxiety assessed by the FSAQ was an anxiety
trait type as opposed to an anxiety state. This conclusion holds true
not only for the level of anxiety assessed'by each of the four
component-s but also the total score of the FSAQ (Table-17). vJhenthe
high correlation between FSAQ and TSAQ is taken into consideration, the
-strong relations,hip between the trait form of STAI and FSAQ becomes
more meaningful. Mackay and Liddel" (1986) reported that anxiety
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assessed by TSAQ was highly related to the trait-type measured by STAI.
Overall, examination of the concurrent validity of the FSAQ
indicates that the questionnaire has a satisfactory level of validity,
and that the FSAQ assessment of an>:iety is similar to the trait anxiety
measured by STAI.
17.2.2. Criterion Validity
The other type of validity, criterion related, also indicates that
the FSAQ is capable of differentiating an anxious population from a
non-anxious population. Anova results indicate that the differences
between anxious subjects (anxiety patients) and non-anxious subjects
(university students) on total anxiety scores of FSAQ and on each of
the four components of the FSAQ were significant.
17.3. ASSESSMENT OF PF:E-POST TREATMENT ANX IETY LEVELS OF
AGORAPHOBIC PATIENTS BY FSAQ
FSAQ was applied to-agoraphobic patients in another study, to
examine whether it was able to assess the differences in the anxiety
levels of patients before and after behavioral treatment. The results
showed that patients' scores after the treatment were significantly
lower than before the treatment. The only exception to this was the
score on the cognitive component of FSAQ. Although after treament
scores of the patients on this component were clearly lower than their
scores before the treatment (X=35.2 before'and X=24.3 after) the
difference did not reach the level of significance. One possible reason
for obtaining a non-.ignificant result on this component was the
inclusion of ~ low number of SUbjects.
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17.4. CONCLUSION
The reliability and validity evaluations indicate that the scale
is psychometrically sound. One reservation can be made regarding the
lack of items with very high scale values (weight). Items that Occupied
the higher end of the scale values had weights around 8.5. The scale
included no item having a scale value of more than 9. This lack of
items with very high scales values (10 or 11) can be thought to reduce
the variance in subjects' scores. However, evaluation of FSAQ indicated
that the scale was well able to discriminate an anxious subject group
from a non-anxious subject group. Therefore, this shortcoming is
considered to have no important effect in the assessment of subjects by
FSAQ.
In the light of the present findings, it can confidently be stated
that the FSAQ appears quite satisfactory in terms of validity and
reliability levels. Furthermore, FSAQ was observed to be sensitive to
the changes in the anxiety levels of agoraphobic patients before and
after treatment, though the number of patients was low. The scale,
therefore, can be consid~red ·as a useful instrument in the assessment
of anxiety.
18. FEELING (AFFECT> AND COGNITION
As noted by the present author and by others (Zajonc, 1980, 1984;
Lewis, 1983) the relationship between cognitions and feelings is one of
the unresolved issues in psychology, specifically in clinical
psychology. One viewpoint (Zajonc, 1984) that has recently gained
increased acceptance, indicates that the interaction between feeling
and cognition is not as one directional and simple as cognitive
therapists adv6cate. Cognitive therapists have claimed that affective
responses (feelings) are directly determined by cognitions, thus,
affect is regarded as an epiphenomenon i.e., affect develops only after
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cognitive processes have operated. As such~ affect is regarded as of
secondary importance and a causal role is attributed to cognitions.
Therapists who adhere to the cognitive camp claim that the way in which
a person thinks about a given event determines his/her feelings related
to that event (Beck, 1976). Cognitive therapists think of the
relationship between feelings and cognitions as unidimensional. They
think that increases in negative ideation will directly lead to
increased levels of feeling in general. Although such a claim has a
substantive validity (Beck and Emery~ 1979)~ it may be an
over-simplification of the cognition-affect interaction. As presented
in the introduction chapter, other psychologists (Zajonc, 1984;
Plutchik~ 1980) have indicated that feeling can influence cognitions.
Some psychologists suggest that the interaction is not as one sided as
cognitive therapists believe (Rachman, 1981), while others claim that
perhaps dt is affect which distorts cognitions rather than vice versa
as suggested by cognitive psychologists (Lewis, 1983).
The purpose of this research was to investigate whether, or not
affect and cognition operate relatively independently of ~ach other.
The author of this study concurs with those psychologists who
oppose the rather one sided conceptualization of cognitive therapists~
that changes in cognitions are not necessarily and immediately followed
by changes in feelings. Some other elements, such as personality
traits, gender, defense mechanisms employed or hemispheric dominance
may playa part in this process. If the assumption of cognitive
therapists is correct i. e. if feelings are directly influenced by
cognitions, then high scores on the cognitive component of anxi~ty
should be +nllowed by high scor-eson the feeling component of anx iatv,
Conversely, law scores on the cognitive component of anxiety should be
followed by low scores on the feeling component. These factors will
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operate regardless of ~ny intervening variables, such as, the influence
of sex differences on personality structure.
In this study male students scored higher on the cognitive
component while females scored higher on the feeling component.
Furthermore, the difference between the cognitive and the feeling
components of anxiety of male subjects was higher than that of female
subjects. The findings indicate that males cognitively experience
anxiety in terms of negative expectations and ideations, and report
much less anxiety in the feeling domain. Females, on the other hand,
cognitively experience anxiety at a lower level than males, and by
comparison with male subjects score higher in the feeling component of
anxiety. Similar findings were obtained in the comparison of
obsessive-compulsive patients with the rest of the anxiety disorder
patients. The difference between the cognitive and feeling components
of anxiety was higher in the obsessive-compulsive patients than in the
remainder of the anxiety patients. Comparison of the manifestation of
anxiety in obsessive-compulsive patients and the rest of anxiety
disorder patients on the fe~ling and cognitive components of FSAQ
produced similar results to the comparison of female and male scores on
these components. Obsessive patients scored very high on the cognitive
component of FSAQ, in fact, their mean score on the cognitive component
was the highest of all the anxiety sub-categories. However, they scored
much lower on the feeling component, thus exhibiting a significant
difference between the scores on these two components of anxiety. By
contrast, the anxiety scores, as measured by FSAQ, of the remainder of
anxiety disorder patients on the feeling and cognitive components were
not significantly different. These findings suggest that it is not
"quite appropriate to postulate a simple and straightforward
relationship between affect (feeling) and cognitions in general, and
affective and cognitive components of anxiety in particular. These
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results also provide s~pport for the conceptualization of affective and
cognitive processes as interacting but relatively independent.
If the claims of cognitive therapists are valid, male subjects
and obsessive-compulsives who scored high on the cognitive component of
anxiety should also have scored high on the feeling component assuming
,
that people's feelings are determined directly by their thoughts and
assumptions. The reverse could be e>:pected for females and remaining
anxiety patients, since thei~ overall score in the cognitive component
is lower than the males' and obsessive-compulsives' scores, and they
should therefore score lower in the feeling component of anxiety.
However, as noted above, the results of this study indicate that the
relationship between cognition and feeling was not so straightforward.
Thus, the overall findings of this research have provided credence to
the conceptualization of affect and cognition in terms of two
interacting systems, as originally put forward by Zajonc (1980).
The findings of the present study related to the interaction of
affect and cognition in obsessive-compulsive patients have supported
"the claims of Freud. The results indicate that obsessive-compulsives
can be distinguished from other anxiety disorders in terms of excessive
use of the isolation defense mechanism. The dominance of the isolation
defense mechanism manifests itself in a great difference between the
cognitive and feeling components of FSAQ in these patients.
A short review of the literature indicates that from an
evolutionary point of view, affects can be considered as taking
precedence ~ver cognitions (Plutchik, 1980). Such a view assumes that
in a new born baby no a priori cognitive structures exist apart from
the inborn structures which receive and process incoming stimuli. The
cognitive structures, such as thinking, judging etc. develop later
through the interaction between the infant and the external
environment. The main ingredients of this interaction are the sensation
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of pleasure and unpleasure (Fenichel, 1945; Sutherland, 1963). A baby
does not initially know that his/her mother is good. This idea develops
in his/her mind because the presence of his/her mother brings pleasure
by satisfying the needs of the baby. Humans do not stagnate in this
phase of development where feelings of pleasure and unpleasure play the
determining role in all of their mental processes. Later, with the
development of intellectual structures (especially of thought) the
relationship between cognitions and feelings becomes more complicated.
Cognitions begin to exert an influence over feelings (affect) acting
as an inhibitory agent. To what extent cognitions exert an influnce
over affective states is difficult to determine. All that can be stated
is that such relationships are difficult to conceptualize as one sided
and simple, because their very nature is largely based on each
individual's personality structure which are determined by the unique
way of gratification of his/her instinctual needs via interaction with
his/her environment.
The relationship between affect and cognition can be investigated
from a neuropsychological point as well. Lateralization studies already
offer some explanation. Buffery and Gray (1972) have claimed that
females show reduced cerebral lateralization of function in comparison
with males; that means, the left hemisphere which organizes mainly
cognitive processess, is less dominant in females. This point maybe
Iconsidered as another explanation of males showing higher discrepancy
between feeling and cognitive components of FSAQ than females. However,
the data supporting such a claim are equivocal and the issue is
accepted as inconclusive at present (Beaton, 1985).
In this research the application of FSAQ to male and female
students and patients has found, contrary to the cognitive therapists'
assumptions, that the high levels of anxiety expressed in the cognitive
compone~t are not directly followed by high levels of anxiety expressed
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on the feeling component. Therefore, some intervening variables between
the feeling and cognitive components could be considered to be playing
an important role. In the present study sex-differences (because of
their implications for different types of personality structures in
psychoanal ytic theory) have been employed as a factor influendng the
relationship between cognitions and feelings. The results indicate that
although the overall anxiety levels of males and females were almost
identical, females scored higher on the feeling component of anxiety
while male scores were higher on the cognitive component of anxiety.
Furthermore, the difference between the cognitive and feeling
components of anxiety of male subjects was found to be significantly
greater than that of female subjects, indicating that the relationship
between the feeling and cognitive components has been influenced by
gender differences. The finding of significant differences between male
and female subjects (university students and patients) and between
obsessive-compulsives and the rest of DSM-III anxiety disorder
patients, not on the over-all anxiety scores but on the feeling and
cognitive components, indicates the significance of assessing the
feeling and cognitive components of anxiety separately.
18.1. EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETltJEEN FEELING AND
COGNITION
The difference between scores on the feeling and cognitive
components of anxiety of males and females may be related to
personality structure. Males are thought to be similar to
obsessive-compulsive types who are characterised by an over emphasis of
cognitive (i~tellectual) processes and suppression of affect due to
the utilization of the isolation defense mechanism. Therefore, males
are expected to exhibit a greater difference between the cognitive and
affective components of am:iety. On the other hand, the female
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personality structure is conceptualized as being similar to that of
hysterics, being characterised by an over emphasis of affect.
Consequently, females in comparison to males, are expected to indicate
less difference between cognitive and affective components of anxiety.
The finding of a significant difference between male and female
scores on the difference between cognitive and affective components in
the expected direction provides more support for the affiliation of
male personality with obsessive-compulsive and female with hysterical
as originally put forward by Freud (1926). The comparison of the
manifestation of anxiety in obsessive-compulsive patients and the other
anxiety disorder patients on the feeling and cognitive components of
,FSAQ produced similar results to the comparison of male and female
scores on these components. Obsessive patients scored very high on the
cognitive component of FSAQ, in fact, their mean score on the cognitive
component was the highest of all the anxiety sub-categories. However,
their scores were quite low in the feeling component, thus exhibiting a
significant difference between the scores on these two components of
anxiety. By contrast, anxiety scores, as measured by FSAQ, of the
remainder of anxiety disorder patients on the feeling and cognitive
components were not significantly different.
It is difficult to explain these results solely in terms of the
socialization process, since the male-female ratio was similar for both
diagnostic groups (2 males and 6 females in obsessive-compulsives and
16 males and 30 females in remainder of anxiety patients). As noted
previously Gur and Gur (1975) indicated that obsessive-compulsive
people usually have left brain dominance, as opposed to people with
hysterical t~ends who indicate a right brain dominance. In the light of
this finding, it may be suggeste~ that obsessive-compulsive patients
who have left brain dominance, express their anxiety more in the
cognitive domain. Counteracting this assumption, lateralization
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findings (Hayenga and Hoyenga~ 1979) related to sex-differences
indicate that males are mare lateralized than females. So~ it follows
that females are likely to show little discrepancy between cognitive
and feeling components. ~Ialeson the other hand~ being more
lateralized~ will tend to exhibit a larger difference between the
cognitive and feeling components. Because the majority of patients in
the obsessive-compulsive category were female (6 out of 8) the
difference between the cognitive and feeling components of anxiety
would have been expected to be minimal in the patients of this
category. However, the present results indicated that the·difference
between the feeling and cognitive components of the FSAQ of tibsessive
patients was significantly larger than the difference between the same
components of the FSAQ in the rest of anxiety disorders patients. This
finding indicates that sex differences alone may not account for the
differences between cognitive and feeling components of FSAQ.
Otherwise, a predominantly female obsessive-compulsive group would not
exhibit such a large di5crepancy between the feeling and cognitive
components of FSAQ.
In the light of the information presented above, the explanation
of the difference between the cognitive and feeling components of the
FSAQ for both subjects groups (males-females, obsessive-compulsive and
rest of anxiety patients) in terms of personality structures and
variations in the socialization process seems more plausible.
18.2. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY
A- Sex differences on the feeling and cognitive components of FSAQ
were compared in two different subject groups, university students and
anxiety patients. Neither of these groups is necessarily
representative of the normal male and female population, but rather
skewed in nature. Therefore results obtained may not be a proper
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reflection of male and female differences an the feeling and cognitive
components of FSAQ. The reason far selection of university students and
anxiety patients was related to easy access to these groups, and also
it was assumed that types of the subject groups would nat influence
male female differences an the feeling and cognitive components of
FSAQ. However, application of FSAQ to subjects who better reflect
"normal" population is necessary far the verification of the results
obtained in the present study.
B- The application of a questionnaire to measure the different
response channels (affective and cognitive) can be criticized an the
grounds that the questionnaire itself operates an a single r~sponse
channel e.i. verbal-cognitive. The use of a questionnaire can be seen
as obtaining information about cognitive and affective processes
through a verbal-cognitive filter. ~everthless, such an argument need
nat necessarily weaken the basis of this research, it may, in fact,
increase the validity of the present findings. If the affective and
cognitive systems are found to be relatively independent under
circumstances where both affective and cognitive information passes
through a verbal-cognitive filter, then the independence of the two
systems may be even more obvious than the findings of this research
indicate.
C- Another problem in the present study relates to the possible
limitations of information obtained by questionnaire. Questionnaires
are a subjective method of measuring psychological constructs, relying
solely on the self-reports of SUbjects. Therefore, the level of
accuracy of the information provided can easily be manipulated by the
subjects thems~lves. This implies that the lower scores of male
subjects in the emotionality component may be due to their active
avoidance of the items measuring levels of feeling in the experience of
anx iatv,: This may be because emotionality is often regarded as
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incompatible with accepted masculinity. Low scores in the affective
component of the anxiety questionnaire may thus not reflect the true
personality structure of males but, instead, may indicate that male
subjects are reluctant to reveal their emotionality. This is a drawback
related to self-report information gathering techniques. To ensure that
the sex differences found in this study are the true reflections of the
differences between males and females, less obvious ways of measuring
the same concepts could be employed, such as the use of projective~
techniques. These techniques leave little room for the subject to
distort the information about himself. Fortunately, the application of
projective techniques and dream analysis has also indicated that the
female personality structure, in comparison to the male, is more
emotionally dominated (Lewis, 1981).
In short, in spite of some shorthcomings of the study, the results
indicate that some grounds can be found to suggest feeling and
cognition as interacting but relatively independent systems. The
findings also suggest that ~ome variables can influence the
relationship between affect and cognition. In the present research
(male vs female and obsessive-compulsives vs remaining anxiety
disorders) personality factors have been found to have an important
effect on this relationship. However, their influence can be explained
by various perspectives e.g. defense mechanisms, socalization,
literalization.
18.3. CONCLUSION
First of all, it should be noted that the view adopted by the
present author. does not aim to degrade the importa~ce of cognitions at
the expense of emphasizing affect~ Nor is the aim to suggest that
feeling and cognition are two totally independent systems. As can
clearly "be seen in Table - 13 the correlation between the feeling and
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cognitive components of the FSAQ is highest in comparison to the
correlation between the other components of the same questionnaire. In
the present study it has been argued that feeling (affect) is not an
epiphenomenon. Contrary to the cognitive therapists' claim which places
feeling under the control of cognitions, the author suggests that
feeling and cognition should be conceptualized as partially interacting
but partially independent systems. Furthermore, the relationship
between feeling and cognition is thought to be influenced by various
intervening variables. In this study, individual personality traits and
the type of defense mechanisms employed have been considered to be
important variables influencing the relationship between cognition and
affect. After the conceptualization of feeling and cognition as two
relatively independent systems, it is possible to suggest that certain
individuals may be more affectively oriented whereas others may be
cognitively oriented.
The investigation of the relationship between the affective and
cognitive components of anxiety has some implications for the treatment
methods used to alleviate anxiety problems. If the cognitive
therapists' claim that the feelings of people are directly and always
influenced by their cognitive structures needs to be reconsidered and
the role of intervening variables needs to be recognized, then it would
be better not to apply routine cognitive therapy techniques to every
case. Rather, it may prove to be more effective to adopt an eclectic
and flexible approach, to take the peculiar relationship between the
affect and cognition of each individual into account and thus to design
an intervention strategy accordingly. As noted previously, some people
are more affectively oriented, others more cognitively. For those
people whose experiences are dominated by their affective system, more
direct ways of dealing with the problematic affect may be the choice of
treatment. In psychoanalytical therapy, affect is given the determining
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role in the manifestation of anxiety problems as in any psychological
problem. Re-experiencing the original problem in the therapy has been
conceptualized as an important therapeutic step (Alexander, 1963).
Thus, depending upon each individual's personality makeup, the
therapist may plan his/her intervention strategy, whether cognitive
structures would be the main treatment targets or whether the case
requires a mixture of analytical-cognitive intervention strategies. In
this way feeling (affect) can be incorporated into the Three Systems
approach as a fourth component.
The results of this study support the idea of conceptualizing
feeling as a relatively independent system. It follows that the therapy
method suitable to patients who manifest their anxiety more evenly on
both of the components may be different from those applied to patients
who experience their anxiety mainly on the cognitive or feeling
component. Thus, the assessment of affective and cognitive experiences
of anxiety can be useful for the selection of effective treatment
techniques for different individuals.
19. EVALUATION OF DSM-III ANXIETY DISORDEF:S WITHIN THE
FF:AMEWOF:KOF THF<EE SYSTEMS THEORY
The other aim of this study was to investigate the manifestation
of anxiety from the Three Systems Theory point of view, both within
each anxiety disorder and across the different anxiety disorder
sub-categories as delineated by DSM-III.
19.1. COt1PARISON OF THE COMPONENTS OF ANXIETY WITHIN EACH
ANXIETY DISORDER SUB-CATEGORIES
Research on the Three Systems Theory started in 1974 and
intensified during the early 1980. The main interest lay both in the
individual response patterns and their effect on the outcomes of
...,..,.7
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different psychotherapy methods, and in the importance of synchrony and
desynchrony for treatment outcome. No research to date has investigated
anxiety response profiles. Referring to the lack of investigation in
this area, Michelson (1984) stated that "examination of individual
differences, response profiles and treatment consonance may decrease
heretofore unexplained treatment outcome variance in comparative
m!~~lff![!l~!l~"(p. 358). Thus, an aim of this research has been to
fill this gap in the anxiety research.
-The results showed that apart from agoraphobia and simple phobia,
differences between the different components of anxiety in each of the
six sub-qr-oups of arndety disorder were significant. The
nonsignificant differences across components of anxiety in agoraphobics
were expected since agoraphobics were thought to score high on each
anxiety component (Barlow, 1985).
Patients diagnose~ as social phobics scored very high on the
feeling and cognitive components of FSAQ. In the TSAQ, however, the
behavioral component was the highest. The reason for having highest
anxiety scores on the cognitive and feeling components of FSAQ but on
the behavior component of rSAQ was probably related to the nature of
items in the scales (FSAQ and TSAQ). The behavior component of TSAQ was
reported to assess avoidance in specifically social situations, while
the behavioral component of FSAQ measure~ gemeral avoidance in everyday
1ife.
Simple phobics scored the lowest anxiety scores among all six
sub-categori~s of anxiety disorders, especially on FSAQ. As expected,
their scores on the behavior component were considerably Iowan both
scales (FSAQ and rSAQ), because both of the anxiety scales measure
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behavioral avoidance in general or in social situations. Simple
phobics, having a circumscribed avoidance behavior which is object or
situation specific, were bound to score Iowan the behavior component
of both scales.
Panic disorder patients together with simple phobics exhibited the
lowest levels of anxiety on both scales (FSAQ and TSAQ). Their low
scores specifically on the somatic components of FSAQ and TSAQ were
unexpected. The anxiety profile of panic disorder patients reflected
ambiguity regarding the nature of this anxiety disorder in the
literature (Turner, Williams, Beidel and Mezzich, 198b). This issue
will be elaborated in the following pages.
Generalized anxiety disorder patients scored high on all
components apart from the behavioral. Their low scores on the behavior
component was apparent especially on FSAQ.
Obsessive-compulsive patients showed the most drastic changes
across components of anxiety, scoring very high on the cognitive
component and Iowan the remaining ones. The most interesting finding
related to the manifest~tion of anxiety of this category of patients
was the relationship between their cognitive and feeling scores. As
noted elsewhere in the thesis they exhibit a very high discrepancy
between these two components of anxiety.
The overall findings indicated that each anxiety disorder, as
defined by DSM-III, had a different anxiety profile peculiar to the
nature'of the disorder.
The obtained anxiety profiles for each disorder give an idea of
the type of anxiety treatment best suited for that anxiety disorder. On
the basis of these findings it can be claimed that for agoraphobics who
score relatively high on each component of anxiety a more comprehensive
treatment package which includes behavioral, cognitive, analytical and
pharmacological approaches may be more appropriate, whereas for
- 235 -
obsessive-compulsive patients who manifest their anxiety mainly on the
cognitive component a mainly cognitive approach may be more effective.
For social phobics, cognitive behavior modification may be the best
suited treatment since their anxiety reaches its peak on the cognitive
and behavior components. For GAD patients, who score high on the
cognitive and somatic components, cognitive therapy supplemented with
relaxation training and pharmacological treatment may be more suitable.
However, in order to sUbstantiate the finding of different anxiety
profiles for different anxiety disorders obtained in the present
research, further studies with more subjects are needed. Moreover,
comparative studies investigating the effect of different therapeutic
approaches on different anxiety disorders are also necessary. In this
way, the effect of different therapy methods on alleviating the
different components of anxiety can easily be observed.
19.2. COMPARISON OF THE COMPONENTS OF ANXIETY BETWEEN
ANXIETY DISORDER SUB-CATEGORIES
One of the main innovations introduced by DSM-III is firstly, the
separation of anxiety disorders into the two main categories of phobic
anxiety disorders and non-phobic anxiety disorders (anxiety states),
and secondly, a further breakdown of each of the two main categories
into three sub-categories. The logic behind the division of anxiety
disorders into two main categories came from the fact that certain
sub-categories of anxiety disorders showed clear avoidance behavior,
lflhereasin the other sub-categori es there was no cl ear avoidance
behavior but either episodic or chronic anxiety states.
The results of the present research support the idea of dividing
the anxiety di~orders into two main categories. Behavioral avoidance
was found to be the only discriminating factor amon~the six anxiety
disorders. Agoraphobia and social phobia patients scored very high on
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the behavioral compone~ts of the both scales (FSAQ and TSAQ). GAD,
panic disorder and obsessive-compulsive patients, on the other hand,
scored considerably low on this component of anxiety. Furthermore the
behavioral scores appeared to be the only significant difference
between phobic anxiety disorders and anxiety states. Simple phobics, as
indicated before, ~jerealso found to have low scores on this component.
But these low scores ~jere in fact e>:pected, given the very
circumscribed nature of the phobic avoidance and the nature of
behavioral anxiety (general avoidance in everday situation) assessed by
the questionnaire.
In the present research social phobic patients exhibited the
highest level of anxiety among all the six disorders on overall anxiety
and on the cognitive and behavioral components of anxiety on both of
the scales (FSAQ and TSAQ). Agoraphobic patients showed the highest
level of anxiety on the somatic component, and they were followed by
GAD patients. Obsessive-compulsive patients, as expected, showed very
high levels of anxiety on the cognitive component but less on the other
components. Profiles of-simple phobics and panic disorders were similar
to each other. Both groups had the lowest scores of the six anxiety
disorders. Simple phobics scored slightly lower than the panic disorder
patients. The low scores of simple phobics were consistent with the
results of other studies reported in the literature (Marks, 1970). On
the other hand, the low scores of panic disorder patients contradicts
th~ findings of other research (Cameron, Tyer, Nesse and Curtis, 1986;
Barlow, Blanchard, James, Vermilya, Vermilya and DiNardo, 1986). These
investigators found anxiety levels of panic disorders rather hiQh in
comparison with other sub-groups of anxiety disorders. Thev also found
that the somat~c component of anxiety in panic disorder was one of the
highest in all the anxiety disorders.
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Contrary to the findings of the studies cited above~ in the
present research panic disorder patients were found to exhibit very low
levels of anxiety on every component~ having the second lowest level of
anxiety after simple phobics. One obvious reason for this finding may
be the limited number of patients. However, the number of patients in
all six sub-groups of anxiety disorders were approximately the same~
and the anxiety profiles of other anxiety sub-categories were similar
to the results of the studies reported in the literature on the related
issues.
Another possible reason for having different results on the panic
disorders in comparison with the studies in the literature may be
related to the diagnostic criteria for this disorder in DSM-III.
Problems concerning the definition of panic and the diagnosis of panic
disorder have been pointed to by several investigators (Cerny, Himadi
et al., 1984). The same difficulty was mentioned in relation to the
diagnosis of agoraphobia with or without panic attacks. Without
defining exactly what "panic attack" means, the type of anxiety
patients included in this sub-category may vary from study to study.
No clear agreement regarding the level of anxiety exhibited by
panic disorder patients exists in the literature at the present.
Turner, McCann, Beidel and Mezzich (1986) applying STAI found that
panic disorders had the lowest level of anxiety among the anxiety
states categories. On the other hand, Cameron, Thyer et al. (1986)
-reported panic disorder patients together with agoraphobia as having
the highest symptom severity.
It seems that the level of anxiety in panic disorders may vary in
different studies because of the different assessment instruments used,
and a rather loose definition of panic attacks. On the symptom severity
rating (Cameron, Thyer et al.~ 1986) panic disorders had the highest
rating~ therefore it can be suggested that they should have scored high
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on the somatic component of anxiety. However, their scores on the
somatic component of anxiety were very low in both of the
questionnaires (FSAQ and TSAQ).
Findings of low anxiety scores for panic disorders may be related
to the discrete nature of the problem. Both panic disorders and simple
phobias have one similar feature, namely the discrete nature of the
anxiety. Regardless of how severe the anxiety may be at a specific
point in time, it is not continuous, that is, the problem does not
cover all the daily activities of the afflicted person. Such patients
are usually incapacitated during the panic attack, but function
moderately well at other times. If they have constant worries placing
them under GAD, or if they exhibit avoidance of certain objects or
situations due to their panic attacks, then placing them under an
appropriate phobic condition would be a more accurate diagnosis. Since
these patients are diagnosed as suffering from panic disorder they
should not show any particular behavioral avoidance nor they should
have a general apprehensiveness. If general apprehensiveness is
accepted as a part of p~nic·disorder, it would be almost impossible to
discriminate panic disorder from GAD, as half of the GAD patients are
reported to exhibit uncued panic attacks (Cerny, Himadi et al., 1984).
The only discriminating factor between panic disorder and GAD would
then be the frequency of the panic attacks. This situation would render
the difference between the two disorders meaningless. Therefore, the
inclusion of general apprehensivess into panic disorder category seems
quite problematic. Thus, if we accept panic disorders as having a
discontinuous nature, it would not be suprising to see them exhibiting
low anxiety scores on questionnaires (FSAQ and TSAQ) measuring trait
aspects of arixiety. All these contradictory findings about the level of
anxiety and confusion about the d~finition of the term 'panic' itself
indicate that this anxiety disorder is not well defined in DSM~III.
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Turner, Williams, Beidel and Mezzich, (1986) suggested that rather than
having a separate classification for panic disorders it could be merged
with the category of agoraphobia with panic attacks. They claimed that
panic disorder could be viewed as a pre-agoraphobic stage.
19.3 PLACE OF AGORAPHOBIA A~10NG THE TlIJOIvtAIN CATEGORIES
OF ANXIETY DISORDERS
The other area of interest in the present study was the
investigation of the relationship between agoraphobia vis a vis phobic
and anxiety states. The idea that agoraphobia is more similar to anxiet
states than to phobic anxiety disorders was introduced by Hallam
(1978), and suppor~ed by the results of Turner, McCann et al. (1986).
In this recent study by Turner, McCann et al. (1986) a variety of
questionnaires (e.g. STAI, Beck Depression Inventory) were administered
to different sub-categories of anxiety patients. The scores of
agoraphobic patients on these scales were more similar to the scores of
anxiety states patients than to phobic disorder patients (this category
included social phobiciand simple phobics). On the basis of this
finding Turner, McCann et.al. suggested that the placement of
agoraphobia in the anxiety states category would more accurately
reflect the true nature of the disorder.
However, the above study has important methodological and
clinical shortcomings. When Turner, McCann et al. (1986) combined
simple phobics and social phobics to make up a phobic category, they
did not take into account the varying numbers of patients in each
category. In their study 32 simple phobics and 12 social phobics were
included. The resulting phobic category predominantly reflected the
features of simple phobics. In effect they compared agoraphobics with a
phobic anxiety grouping which predominantly carried the features of
simple phobics.
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On the other hand~ several studies (Solyom, Ledwidge and Solyom,
1986; Amiens, Gelder and Show, 1983 and Cameron, Thyer, Nesse and
Curtis, 1986) have found that in terms of the level of anxiety assessed
by various questionnaires and symptom severity, social phobics are
quite similar to agoraphobics, and rather distinct from simple phobics.
Thus, to lump simple and social phobics into the same category where
simple phobics predominate distorts the relationship between social
phobics and agoraphobics. The above criticisms, one methodological
(predominance of simple phobics in the phobic category) and the other
clinical (assuming social phobics being similar to simple phobics),
clearly illustrate the shortcomings of Turner and McCann et aI's study
(1986).
The findings of the present study support the results of Cameron~
Thyer et al. (1986), Solyom~ Ledwidge et al. (1986). Social phobics
appear to be more similar to agoraphobics than to simple phobics in
terms of the anxiety profiles (Figures-8 and 9). The anxiety profiles
of simple phobics, as obtained by the FSAQ and TSAQ, are similar to the
.
profiles of anxiety states ~atients (du~ to low scores on the
behavioral component of anxiety). Agoraphobics together with social
phobics indicate very high levels of phobic avoidance. Furthermore, the
other agoraphobic group which was assessed before and after behavioral
intervention exhibited an anxiety profile very similar to that of first
agoraphobic group. Both agoraphobic groups obtained their highest
scores on the behavioral component of an>:iety and scored relatively
lower on the cognitive component. These findings suggest that placing
agoraphobia in the phobic rather than the anxiety states category is a
better reflection of the nature of the anxiety of agoraphobics. As
noted before, high behavioral avoidance was the only component that
separated social phobics and agoraphobics from an>:iety states. The
reason for the low scores of simple phobics on the behavioral component
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was the specific natur. of their avoidance behavior and the assessment
of general avoidance by the questionnaires (FSAQ and TSAQ). It can be
concluded that the separation of anxiety disorders in DSM-III, in terms
of the presence or absence of avoidance behavior is supported by the
findings of this research.
One final note relates to the advantages of applying anxiety
scales with different components in the comparison of anxiety
disorders. Classical anxiety scales usually give scores about the two
levels of anxiety (e.g. STAI measures state and trait aspects of
anxiety, the Hamilton Anxiety Scale assesses psychic and somatic
am:iety). Scales adopting the Thrae Systems view'-point measur,e anx iet.v
in terms of different components. In this way they reveal the nature of
anxiety in each category of anxiety disorders. Although the overall
level of anxiety can be similar among several disorders, the anxiety
profiles can be significantly different. For example, the overall
anxiety levels of GAD and agoraphobics as measured by the FSAQ and TSAQ
were almost identical. Perhaps this was the reason why certain
psychologists regard agoraphobics as similar to GAD (Hallam, 1978).
However, when the nature of anxiety in these anxiety disorders was
investigated from the perspective of Three Systems Theory, very clear
differences appeared. GAD patients obtained high scores on the
cognitive, and low scores on the behavior"al component of anx ietv, The
opposi t,epattern was observed for aqoraphob ics who manifested their
anxiety mainly on the behavioral component. These results indicate the
appropriateness of placing agoraphobics into the phobic category and
also support the DSM-III division of anxiety disorders.
19.4. LIMITAtIONS OF THE STUDY
A- One of the important shortcomings of the study was having a low
number of patients in each category of anxiety disorders. The number of
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patients in the anxiefy categories varied between 7 and 10. This
situation obviously reduces the validity of the generalization that we
can make about the anxiety profiles of each anxiety sub-classification
that was obtained from the present study.
B- The other problem is related to patients' medication. Most of
the anxiety patients were on anti-anxiety drugs. The effect of
medication on the anxiety profiles of the patients was not controlled
in the study. The main reason for this problem was the tendency for BPs
to prescribe anxiolytics to patients prior to referral to clinical
psychology services where patients were recruited. The cessation of
medication for the patients was, therefore, totally outwith the present
author's responsibility and control. However, since the patients were
all referrals from GPs to clinical psychologists following non-response
to medication, it is assumed that the effect of medication on the
anxiety problems of the patients was minimal. Otherwise the patients
would not have been referred to clinical psychologists.
c- There was no control over selection of patients for this study
on two different levels:
1- GP referrals to clinical psychologists: Not all anxiety
patients that GPs see are referred to clinical psychology services.
Those patients whose anxiety problems are alleviated by anti-anxiety
drugs, or who are managed by their respective GPs without use of
medication, or whose GPs preferentially refer to psychiatric services,
are not reffered to clinical psychology services. Patients included in
the present study were those referred from BPs to clinical psychology
services, then selected by these psychologists according to DSM-III
anxiety disorders classification •
.,
Anxiety profiles of patients managed without referral to clinical
psychology services may be different than those anxiety patients who
are referred to clinical psychology services. Unfortunately, control of
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patients selection in lhis respect was out with the responsibility of
the present author.
11- Selection of patients by clinical psychologists was not
controlled. All clinicians participating in the study were issued
DSM-III anxiety disorders classification and they were requested to
follow DSM-III criteria for the selection of each patient. How well
each clinical psychologist complied with DSM-II1 classification was not
controlled. It was assumed that each clinician followed the given
instructions adequately.
D- Another criticism of the study can be the lack of inter-rater
reliability for severity of patients' anxiety problems. A very severe
case for one clinician may be regarded as moderately severe by another
clinician. Therefore~ when clinicians mark severity of their patients
problems they may have applied their own sub.jective definition of
severity~ which makes severity ratings of patients difficult to
compare.
All clinicians included in the study were assumed to have similar
..definitions of severity. Whether this was a justifyable assumption or
not can only be understood by asking certain number of clinicians to
rate same anxiety patients in terms of severity of the problem.
19.5 CONCLUSION
The results of this study have indicated that the assessment of
anxiety within the framework of the Three Systems Theory offers a
better understanding for the nature of anxiety. Various anxiety
sub-c ateqor ies were found to differ" in terms of the most salient
component of anxiety. Social phobics and agoraphobics scored very high
on the behavioral avoidance component. These two clinical groups also
differed between themselves. Agoraphobics indicated high levels of
anxiety on all components of anxiety; social phobics~ however~ scored
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very high on the cognitive and behavior components but low on the
somatic component. Anxiety states patients, on the other hand, showed
their anxiety mainly on the cognitive component but scored very low on
the behavioral component. Thus, the results of the present study showed
that the anx i etv profiles of each amdety sub-category differed.
Obtaining different anxiety profiles for different anxiety
patients suggest that the most effective treatment packages for
different anxiety disorders may vary. Matching the focus of the
intervention method with the most problematic component of anxiety in a
given anxiety disorder may increase treatment effectiveness.
The results also supported the validity of the DSM-III anxiety
disorders classification. The differences between the anxiety profiles
of different anxiety disorders were in accordance with DSM-III
classification. First, phobic anxiety disorders and anxiety states were
found to differ on the behavior component of anxiety. Furthermore, the
anxiety profiles of agoraphobics indicated that placing agoraphobia in
the phobic anxiety disorders category rather than anxiety states would
better reflect the nature of this anxiety disorder, as the most salient
component of anxiety in agoraphobics was on the behavioral component in
both scales (FSAQ and TSAQ).
20. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A~ In this research the relationship between affect and cognition
was found to be influenced by various factors (sex differences and
obsessive-compulsive personality structure). This finding implies in
the first place that affect and cognition can be conceptualized as
interacting but relatively independent systems. This conceptualization
of the interaction opens up canew area of investigation where variables
infJuencinq the affect-cognition relationship could be identified.
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These variables could be related to other' branches of psychology, ego
neuropsychology or information-processing.
If it can be found that affectively oriented individuals are more
attentive to different properties of stimuli, information or
interpersonal communication than cognitively oriented individuals,
treatment processes tailored according to the type of orientation of
individuals may be more effective in alleviating anxiety. For example,
it can be investigated whether affectively oriented individuals will
/
be more effected by non-verbal components of the treatment i.e.
gestures of the therapist, manner of therapist's talk, tone of voice,
the quality of rapport between themselves and the therapist. On the
other hand, cognitively'oriented individuals may be more sensitive to
the content and theoretical richness of the therapy. The identification
of such variables may facilitate the modification of affective and
cognitive components of anxiety.
B- The relationship between different components of anxiety and
different modes of measurement should be investigated. The question of
the correlation between, for example, the behavior score of a patient
on the FSAQ and on a behavioral avoidance test must be clarified. If a
strong relationship is established between the overt measurement of
behavioral and physiological components of anxiety and the scores on
the corresponding components of the FSAQ, the validity of the FSAQ will
be substantiated. Finding a high correlation would also mean that, due
to the simplicity and easy application, this questionnaire could be
preferred to the assessment of behavioral and physiological components
of anxiety by behavioral avoidance tests and physiological measurement.
As noted before, there is an other advantage of using questionnaires in
comparison with different methods for assessments of each response
channel. When applying questionnaires, one can at least be sure that
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the differences between various components of anxiety are not caused by
differences in the assessment techniques themselves.
C- Once the validity of the questionnaire has been sustained, the
next step would be to replicate the findings of different an>:iety
profiles of DSM-III anxiety disorders obtained in this research. This
is necessary because this study only attempts to delineate the anxiety
response profiles of an>:iety disorder patients. For the agoraphobic
group however, the anxiety profiles obtained in two different samples
of agoraphobic patients showed remarkable similarities. In both samples
of agoraphobics the highest anxiety score was on the behavioral
component, and the lowest was on the cognitive component. Replication
of the anxiety profiles of other sub-categories of anxiety disorders
will enhance the findings of the present research.
In a study investigating the anxiety profiles of different
sub-groups of anxiety disorder, control of the subjects in terms of
medication would clarify the points that the present study left
ambiguous. The comparis9n of anxiety patients as on versus off
medication within each sub-group of anxiety disorders could provide
more valid anxiety profiles.
D- The next step would be the application of different treatment
methods for each anxiety disorder to compare the effect of these
treatments on different components of anxiety. Different therapeutic
method~ ego cognitive, behavioral, Rsychoanalytic and pharmacological
approaches could be applied to four different groups of agoraphobics to
investigate the effect of different treatment packages on the different
components of am:iety. In this way we could observe which component of
anxiety is most affected by which treatment method. The results of
such studies may reveal some idea.sabout the relative efficacy of
different treatment approaches in alleviating different components of
anxiety~ For example, the results may indicate that certain approaches
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may drastically reduce one specific component of anxiety, without
effectively alleviating anxiety on the other components, while other
approaches may moderately reduce all components of anxiety.
-
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A P PEN D I X - I
CLINICIANS' ASSESSMENT SHEETS
CASE NO:
SHEET-i.
PAT IENT" sAGE SEX
Length of Time on All Psychotherapy and medication
Please note your own clinical assessment of each patient in
terms of primary and secondary diagnosis.
Primary Diagnosis:
Secondary Diagnosis:
SHEET-2
Please Check ( X ) one.
SEVERITY of PROBLEM:
Considering your
particular population,
total clinical experience with this
how disturbed is the patient at this time?
1- Normal +no t; at all disturbed ,absence of symptoms.
2-
3- Mild symptoms definately present, but no significant
impairment of function.
4-
5- Moderate- a definite degree of impairment.
6- (
7- Severe- or incapacitating condition.
Thank you for help.
A P PEN D I X - II
SELF DIAGNOSTIC FORM
Please chose two of the statements below as indicators of your
problem. Specify your order of choice by putting 1 beside the statment
that best describes your problem and by putting 2 beside the statement that
second best describes your problem.
A - The occurance of my anxiety is related to leaving
and being alone in crowded public places.
B- My anxiety is related to being in social situations
C - My anxiety is related to certain objects or heights or closed
places.
o - I have recurring panic attacks not related to any specific
situation or object.
E - I have recurring disturbing thoughts and compulsive repetitive
behaviours.
F - My anxiety is very general not related to certain objects or
situations, showing itself in terms of general apprehensiveness
and uneasiness.
A P PEN D I X - III
FOUR SYSTEMS ANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE
A~:
SEX:
This questionnaire contains sixty (60) items concerning difficulties
that most people experience from time to time. Read each item carefully,
IF YOU HAVE experienced any of the thoughts, feelings, physical symptoms
or behaviours in the manner indicated by any of the items, then put an
X into the bracket under the column headed YES. IF YOU HAVE NOT put an
X in the bracket under the column headed NO. Please make sure that
none of the items are omitted.
There are no right or wrong answers, this is not a measure of
intelligence or ability. Do not spend too much time over any question
we are interested in your first reaction, not a deeply considered
response.
Thank you for participa~ion.
YES NO
--------
1 - I blush easily
2 - I often feel so helpless, and desperate that life
becomes a source of suffering for me.
3 - Poor sleep is one of my biggest problems.
4 - I often avoid talking to people in a train or a bus.
5 - I tend to avoid going out
6 - I often have a headache
7 - I often experience the feeling of embarrasment
_( 8 - A jittery feeling has become part of my life
9 - I often have dizzy attacks
10- I sometimes cannot think of anything except for my worries
11- I seldom experience chest pains
12- I seldom feel on edge
13- I cannot concentrate on a task because of disruption by
uncontrolled thoughts.
14- I rarely feel joyful.
15- I have persistent disturbing thoughts
16- I definitely avoid going to any kind of place again, where
I previously had a difficult time (for example, a social
gathering or a street etc).
17- I som~times think of myself as an inefficient person
18- My feelings dominate my personality sc.much that I have no
control over them
19- I worry a lot when I think of possible disapproval of me
from others
20- I often experience the feeling of excitement
21- I rarely try to steer clear of challenging jobs
).. 22- I rarely have disturbed sleep
23- I sometimes feel upset ,
24- My muscles are quite tense throughout the day
25- When at home I usually try not to stay alone at night.
-26- I sometimes get easily tired even when not working hard
YES NO
27- I rarely worry about unim~ortant events.
28- I seldom laugh freely
29- I usually worry that I will not be able to cope with
difficulties in my life
30- I tend to avoid talking to someone who is above me such
as my boss
31- I rarely find myself lost in worrying
32- Wherever 1 go, or whatever 1 do, 1 always have a
feeling of discomfort
33-1 sometimes avoid participating in discussions even though
1 know the topic well
34- My hands rarely shake
35- 1 sometimes feel extremely self-conscious
36- I am worried that others may misunderstand me
37- I occasionally experience a tingling sensation around my
body
38- 1 rarely try to keep away from social gatherings
39- I sometimes feel happy but it easily fades away
40- Even if everything is going well, my mind is occupied
by imaginery upsetting ideas
41- 1 seldom have palpitations
42- Icannot think clearly about anything because disrupting
thoughts keep occurring in my mind~
-,43- There seems to be a lump in my throat much of the time
44- I cannot feel relaxed, even though I am not in a hurry
45- 1 seldom avoid speaking at social occasions
46- Even if it is necessary, I sometimes avoid asking other
people questions
47- 1 very rarely imagine myself being unpopular with my
friends
48- I have diarrhoea once a month or more
.
49- I often find myself thinking about possible embarrassing
situations
50- I usually feel quite insecure in my life
) _ 51- I have a tight sensation at my neck
YES NO
52- I usually avoid getting involved in social acitivity
53- My uneasy feelings flare-up at any moment
54- I usually try to avoid walking in crowded streets
55- I always feel irritable
56- I hardly ever tell jokes
57- I am concerned about how others view me
58- I sometimes have stomach problems
59- Half of my thoughts are related to some kinds of
worries
60- I try to avoid standing up to other people even if
they have taken advantage of me.
A P PEN D I X - IV
THREE SYSTEMS ANXIETY QUESTIONNIRE
Some statements that indicate certain problems related to thoughts,
behaviours, physiological symptoms and experienced by most of people
presented below. Read each statement then circle the appropriate
number under each statement to indicate your response.
Before beginning to give your response to the items, please read
the two examples below that show how to respond to this questionnaire.
EXAMPLE 1
I avoid going to the cinema
never almost always
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
This answer indicates that the respondent strongly avoids going to the
cinema.
EXAMPLE 2
My liver disturbs
never almost always
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
This answer shows that the respondent does not have such problems.
Thank you for your assistance.
1never
1
My stomach hurts
2 3 4 5
almost always
8 96 7
2 I pass by school friends, or people I know but have not seen for
a long time unless they speak to.me first
never
1
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 9
3
never
1
7 8
I think about possible misfortunes to my loved ones
almost never
2 3 5 6 97 84
4
never
1
My muscles twitch or jump
almost always
2 4 5 6 97 83
5
never
1
I cannot get some thoughts out of my mind
almost always
2 4 5 6 97 83
6 -
never
1
My neck feels tight
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 97 8
7 My limbs tremble
never
1
almost always
8 92 3 4 5 6 7
8
never
1
My arms or legs feels tight
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 7 98
9
never
1
My heart poundn :
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 97 8
10
never
1
I am concerned that others might not think well of me
almost always
2 3 4 6 97 8
11
never
1
I have difficulty in swallowing
almost always
2 7 9
12
never
1
I cannot get some pictures of images out of my mind
almost always
2 3 954 6 7 8
13
never
1
I experience chest pains
almost always
2 3 95 64 7 8
14
never
1
I have an uneasy feeling
almost always
2 5 6 973 4 8
15
never
1
I breath rapidly
almost always
2 6 953 74 8
16 -
never
1
I experience tingling sensation somewhere in my body
almost always
2 3 5 6 974 8
17
never
1
My arms and legs feel weak
almost always
2 3 4 5 6· 9
18
never
1
7 8
I have to be careful not to let my real feelings show
almost always
2 4 5 96 7 83
19
never
1
I picture some future misfortunes
almost always
2 4 5 96 7 83
20
-never
1
I cannot concentrate at a task or job without irrelevant thoughts
intruding
almost always
2 3 5 96 74 8
21
never
1
I avoid talking to people in authority (my boss, policeman)
almost always
2 3 5 9
22
never
1
6 7 84
I avoid going into a room by myself where people are already
gathered and talking
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 9
23
never
1
7 8
I experience muscular aches and pains
almost always
2 3 5 6 97 84
24
never
1
I prefer to aviod making specific plans for self improvement
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 9
25
never
1
7 8
I try to avoid social gatherings
almost always
2 4 5 6 97 83
26
never
1
I feel dizzy
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 8 9
27
never
1
7
I try to avoid challenging jobs
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 7 9
28
never
1
8
I avoid new or unfamiliar situations
almost always
2 4 5 6 7 983
29
never
1
I feel numbness in my face, limbs or tongue
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 7 9
30
never
I
8
I dwell on mistakes that I have made
almost always
2 3 4 5 976 8
31
never
1
32
never
1
My throat gets dry
almost always
2 3 ·4 5 6 7 8 9
I try to avoid starting conversations
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
33
never
1
34
never
35
never
1 2 3 5 6 97 84
36
never
1
I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts
almost always
2 3 4 5 6 97 8
A P PEN D I X - V
COGNITIVE SOMATIC ANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE
Please rate the degree to which you generally or typically experience
this symptom when you are feeling anxious by circling a number from 1
through 5 with 1 representing "not at all" and 5 representing "very much so".
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 -
11
12
13 _.
14 -
I cannot keep anxiety provoking thoughts out of my mind
not at all
1 2 3
very much so
54
I become immobilized
not at all very much so
1 3 542
I imagine terrifying scenes
not at all
1 2 4 very much s053
My heart beats faster
not at all
1 2 4 very much so 53
I worry too much over something that doesn't really matter
not at all very much so1 2 345
I feel jittery in my body
not at all
1 4
very much so 5
2 3
Some unimportant thoughts run through my mind and bothers me
not at all
1 2
very much so 5
3 4
I nervously pace
not at all
1 2 4 very much so 53
I find it difficult to concentrate because of unconctrolled thoughts
not at all
1 4
very much so
52 3
I feel like I am'los~ng out on things because I cannot make up my
mind.
not at all
1 2
very much so
53 4
I perspire
not at all
1 2 4
very much so
53
I get diarrhoea
not at all
1 2 4
very much so
53
I cannot keep anxiety provoking pictures out of my mind
not at all
1 2 3
very much so
54
I feel tense in my stomach
not at all
1 2 4
very much so
53
A P PEN D I X - VI
STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
Developed by C. D. Spielberger, H. L. Gorsuch and R. Lushene
STAt FORM X-'
~E _ .... _.:._._..... lJATE _
tECTIONS: A number of statements which people have
I to describe themselves arc given below. Read each state-
t and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the ri~ht of
stntr-nu-nt to indicate how you /(,(.[ right now. that is, at
moment, There an' no right or wrong answers. Do not
Id tilO much time on any nru- stalt'nU'll1 hilt give tiw answer
'h :-t'I'II)-, to clt·sniht· your pn'~I'llt (t·t·lings IIt'st.
[ (eel calm .
[ feel secure . ..
[ am tense ; ..
Iam regretful .
I feel at ease .
I ('el upset .
I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes ..
[ (c('l rested '" .
I (c(·1 anxious .
[ feel comfortable .
[ feel self-confident ..
[ feel nervous ..
[ am jittery .
[ feel "high strung" ..
[ am relaxed ..
[ feel content .
[ am worried .
[ feel over-excited and "rattled" .
r (eel joyful .
[ feel pleasant . ..
20
:c a0:c ~ e -c0... l' ... l'• 1'1 I:l ,.... ~ --i
• - -: -~ • ~ s...
e (j) CD <9
CD (i) CD <9
CD <D CD <9
CD (!) (!) <9
(j) (!) Q) <9
CD CD (}) <9
CD (i) Cl> <9
CD (J) (J) <9
CD Cl) (}) 0
o e CD <9
CD (!) CD <9
CD <D Q) <9
CD (!) Q) <9
CD (!) Q) <9
CD cv Q) <9
CD (!) Q) <9
<D (!) <V <9
CD <D Q) <9
CD CD Q) <9
CD CD Q) <9
BEST COpy
AVAILABLE
TEXT IN ORIGINAL
IS CLOSE TO THE
EDGE OF THE
PAGE
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
STAI FORM X-2
NAME ._ _. . DATE _
DIHE('TIO:-';S: A number o( Nlall'rllI'llls whkh 1)('0)111, have
lIM'1! ltl d.·serilll' t lu-msr-lvr-s a rr- givI'1l IlI'low. H";ICI (,;t('h st n te-
rnc-nt and Own blnckr-n in the appropriate circle to the right of
tho st ntr-nu-nt to indicate how you /:('II('rally feel. There arc no
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any
one statement hut give the answer which seems to describe
how you g('nNally feel.
21. I feel pleasant CD
22. I tire quickly . (i)
23. I f~d like crying ..
24. I wish I could he as happy as others seem to he CD
25. I am losing out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough .... CD
26. I feel rested CD
27. I am "calm, coo], and collected" .
28. I Iocl that difficulties are piling up HO that I cannot overcome them CD
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn't matter CD
30. I am happy :......................................................... CD
31. r am inclined to take thinga hard CD
32. I lack self-confidence :: :............................................................... CD
......
~C
<3 ~
0
Vl
~ .'" -i
~
...
~ 0 l'"
a ;( ~ ;lA ~:t. ell
CV 0)
(!') ())
cv (J>
cv cv
Q) cv
Q) Q)
Q) Q)
Q) ())
<D CD
Q) Q)
<D (1_)
CV' (1_)
33. I (cc] secure CD CV CV @
34. I try to avoid facing a criHiAor difficulty ..
35. I Ieel blue ..
36. I am content .
(i)
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers rnr- (I) CV (j) r.)
38. I take disappointments 110 keenly that Ican't put them out of my mind (j) CV Q) (4)
39. I am a steady person :.... CD CV Q) @
40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think bve» my recent concerns and
interests
21
